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A baby is born twice. Its biological birth occurs approximately nine months after concep-
tion; its moral birth however, quite some time before. Moral birth denotes the moment 
the needs of the child-to-be enter the world. The most elementary of these needs and 
corresponding responsibilities pertain to the survival and health of the newborn. For 
its health and therefore its wellbeing, a newborn needs healthy nourishment and 
adequate care. We primarily look to the parents to respond to these ‘health needs’ as 
they are expected to protect, maintain and promote the health and wellbeing of their 
children. Parents however, are not the only ones who carry responsibility for the health 
needs of their children-to-be. In fact, a baby is never only born to a mother, a father 
or into a family; it is also born into a society. That society also carries responsibility 
for the child. For example, when society has the means to do so, it has the responsi-
bility to make decent and accessible pregnancy related care - such as preconception, 
prenatal and maternity care - available. If a mother-to-be carries the responsibility to 
invest in having a healthy pregnancy for the benefit of the health and wellbeing of her 
child-to-be, then surely society carries the responsibility to make the access to decent 
pregnancy related care readily available. 
This raises the question: when have parents and society responded adequately and sat-
isfactory to the health needs of children-to-be? The moral exploration of the parental 
and societal responsibility to satisfy the health needs of children-to-be is the central 
theme of this dissertation.
Ambitious as this exploration may at first glance seem, this wide scope is, as I will ar-
gue, in fact necessary. There is reason to be optimistic about the fulfillment of parental 
and societal responsibility for the health of children-to-be. The perinatal mortality in 
the Netherlands for example, has decreased substantially these last decades.(1) Insights 
into the harmful effects of smoking and drinking and advances in gynecological and 
obstetric care have reduced the number of adverse pregnancy outcomes significantly. 
Yet, when we consider the avoidability of poor pregnancy outcomes in the Netherlands 
on the one hand and the staggering inequalities in the chances of having healthy 
pregnancy outcomes between neighborhoods on the other(2, 3) it becomes clear that 
questions about the responsibility for the health of children-to-be are of paramount 
importance. As an example of these staggering inequalities, consider that “[In Rotter-
dam] [t]he neighborhood-specific perinatal mortality rates varied from 2 to 34 per 1000 
births, for congenital abnormalities from 10 to 91 per 1000 births, for IUGR [measure 
for poor fetal growth] from 38 to153 per 1000 births, for preterm birth from 34 to 
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157 per 1000 births and for low Apgar [measure for physical condition of a newborn 
immediately after birth] score from 4 to 37 per 1000 births. The highest mortality rates 
were observed in deprived neighborhoods.”
Needs
It is a good idea to begin at the beginning. So when do responsibilities for the health 
of the newborn, both from parents and society, ‘begin’? The period of time in which 
behavior, action and policy can have a significant impact on the health of newborns 
seems a reasonable starting point. This is not the moment of conception. An increasing 
amount of scientific evidence points towards the period before conception (4, 5)–the 
preconception period– as the appropriate window of opportunity to start considering 
the health of the newborn. Embryonic development is a key determinant for the health 
of a newborn.(6) Conventional antenatal care (which typically begins between the 8th 
and 12th week of pregnancy) is ill-equipped as it is delivered  too late to prevent a 
possible suboptimal embryonic development as many key events in the development 
of the embryo have already taken place when the mother has her first consultation.
(7) Preconception care however, care for couples who contemplate pregnancy, is aimed 
at preventing the suboptimal embryonic (and fetal) development by addressing the 
underlying risk factors before conception. Moreover, preconception care is also aimed 
at improving the health of the mother-to-be.(8) Interventions that aim to improve 
women’s intake of sufficient folic acid in the preconception period to decrease the 
risk for newborns to have a neural tube defect (9) belong to the best-known examples 
of preconception care. What is more, in addition to the direct benefits to the health of 
the newborn and the mother, preconception care can actually benefit the subsequent 
lifelong health of that newborn Studies building on the so called ‘Developmental Origins 
of Health and Disease’ paradigm show that one’s risk to develop chronic diseases such 
as cardiovascular disease and diabetes later in life is associated with one’s development 
in utero.(10, 11) Thus in sum, for its health and wellbeing a newborn needs its parents 
to prepare for pregnancy. 
Responsibilities
Having introduced (some of ) the basic health needs of children-to-be I turn now to the 
corresponding responsibilities. Avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes in general and 
perinatal health inequalities in particular are unnecessary and unfair to the extent that 
they, for one, require a response from parents, the mother in particular as her preg-
nancy preparation affects the health of the child-to-be the most. Changes in behavior 
before conception such as smoking and alcohol cessation, dietary improvements and 
the use of folic acid supplementation improve the chances of giving birth to healthier 
babies. These opportunities for improvement give rise to responsibilities. Although not 
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by any means or at any cost, mothers-to-be have, by virtue of these opportunities, a 
responsibility to prepare for pregnancy. This responsibility is felt strongly by mothers-
to-be themselves as they are typically interested in the opportunities to improve the 
health and wellbeing of their children-to-be.(12) Adequate pregnancy preparation can 
however, be quite demanding. For example, it may require mothers-to-be to make sub-
stantial lifestyle changes such as resisting an addiction such as smoking or postponing 
pregnancy, that is, resisting her strong desire to have a baby because, for example, of a 
complicated medical or obstetric history. 
Therefore, the ‘demandingness’ of maternal responsibility has to be established in 
order to develop, organize and deliver of pregnancy-related care in an ethically justi-
fied manner. Are, after ethical scrutiny, only those pregnancy-related interventions 
justified that inform, give advice to and encourage mothers(-to-be) to make choices that 
benefit the health of their children(-to-be)? Or are, with an appeal to the health of the 
newborn and the corresponding responsibility of the mother, interventions that rely 
on the steering of unreflective behavior (i.e. nudges), coercion or even force justified? 
In this dissertation I aim to answer these questions by considering the justifiability 
of two types of pregnancy-related interventions at the opposite of the ‘demanding-
ness spectrum’. On the one side there are the so called ‘nudges’ that aid mothers-to-be 
to prepare for pregnancy for example by making healthy choices such as visiting a 
preconception consultation the default. On the other side there is the use of force 
against mothers-to-be for the benefit of the health of the fetus. A classic case is that of 
the ‘forced cesarean’ where pregnant women are forced to submit to cesarean surgery 
to save the fetus in distress. The analysis of the justifiability of force in this classic case 
can serve as an ethical guideline for the use of force in other forms pregnancy-related 
care.
Considering the responsibilities of parents and mothers in particular is, as already 
stated, only part of the picture. The impact of the socioeconomic environment of the 
parents-to-be on the health of children-to-be, an impact which cannot be adequately 
captured by referring to parental responsibilities, is considerable. Most risk factors 
associated with poor pregnancy outcomes have significant socioeconomic components 
which are typically not or only to a limited extent a matter of parental choice. The high-
est risks of poor pregnancy outcomes are in fact recorded in deprived neighborhoods 
where parents-to-be struggle – even in a prosperous society like the Netherlands – with 
the burdens of poverty.(13) Poor housing, air and noise pollution, maternal stress and 
a suboptimal availability and access to pregnancy-related care are examples of risk fac-
tors that are associated with poor pregnancy outcomes over which mothers-to-be living 
in underprivileged neighborhoods have but limited control.(14-17) Addressing these 
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risk factors is a matter of public policy and governmental organization of (health) care. 
In other words, it is a matter of social responsibility to make resources for pregnancy-
related care (e.g. monetary investments in preconception care) available. However, 
society has to balance the claim on resources for the benefit of children-to-be with 
its (many) other societal responsibilities. It is simply unattainable and even ethically 
unjustifiable to direct all of society’s resources to combat poor pregnancy outcomes; 
some form of prioritization of scarce resources is necessary. So what can we reasonably 
ask from society when it comes to resource allocation aimed at benefiting the health of 
children-to-be? This is a question of distributive and social justice. In this dissertation I 
aim to address this question by considering what the demands of justice pertaining to 
the health and wellbeing of children-to-be do (and do not) entail.
Aims
The aims of this dissertation are:
·	 To identify and describe the views of parents and caregivers on the responsibilities 
for the health of children-to-be in general and the responsibility to prepare for 
pregnancy in particular.
·	 To provide an ethical analysis of the justifiability of unreflective behavioral inter-
ventions (nudges) aimed at benefiting the health of children-to-be.
·	 To provide an ethical analysis of the justifiability of the use of force in pregnancy 
related care by considering the case of the justifiability of forced cesareans. 
·	 To identify and present the demands of justice pertaining to the improvement and 
securing of the health of children-to-be.
Methods
Questions in bioethics and medical ethics are typically complex as they consist of ‘real-
world’ empirical elements as well as more abstract philosophical and normative ele-
ments. A ‘mixed method’ approach, in which literature research, qualitative interview 
studies and ethical analysis are combined is considered to be an appropriate method 
to tackle questions within these domains.(18) This will also be the method used in 
this dissertation. The views of the stakeholders, those being (vulnerable) mothers(-to-
be), caregivers and researchers, on the responsibility for the health and wellbeing of 
children-to-be are of key importance. These views will be identified through qualitative 
interview studies and an expert meeting. Central in these studies and meeting is the 
question of responsibility and the barriers and facilitators to fulfill this responsibility. 
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To answer the normative question on responsibility for the health of children-to-be 
there will be an emphasis on critical ethical analysis in this dissertation We use the 
(narrow) reflective equilibrium. (19) This is a method in which the principles one is 
committed to are tested for their coherence against one’s intuitions and considered 
judgments. We use this method explicitly to establish the responsibility of caregivers 
for the health of pregnant women and children-to-be. The analysis of the demands 
of justice pertaining to the health of children-to-be will be based on Rawls’s idea of 
justice as fairness(20) and Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach(21, 22). Both 
focus on the important distinction between interpersonal duties, in our case parental 
responsibilities towards their children(-to-be), and duties of justice, in our case societal 
responsibilities towards children(-to-be). 
outline
Part I ‘Maternal and Parental Responsibilities’ 
In Chapter 2 we report on the barriers and facilitators to adequate pregnancy prepara-
tion according to healthcare professionals. 
In Chapter 3 we report on the perceptions vulnerable mothers-to-be have on their re-
sponsibility to prepare for pregnancy.
In Chapter 4 we introduce the concept of other-regarding nudges; behavioral interven-
tions that are aimed at promoting the health and wellbeing of someone else than the 
person who is being targeted by the behavioral intervention. The conventional ethical 
justification for nudges i.e. Libertarian Paternalism is replaced by an ethical justifica-
tion which is suited for explaining why one person (e.g. a mother) can be justifiably 
targeted to be nudged for the benefit of another person (e.g. her child-to-be). 
In Chapter 5 we discuss the limits of maternal responsibility for the health of her child-
to-be by considering the justifiability of forcing pregnant women to submit to surgery 
when this would save the life of their child-to-be. We argue that although pregnant 
women have a serious and robust responsibility to promote the health and wellbeing 
of their children-to-be, they should not be forced to fulfill this responsibility.
Part II ‘Societal Responsibilities’
In Chapter 6 we report on the conclusions reached in a multidisciplinary expert meeting 
in which the definition and distribution of roles and responsibilities of caregivers and 
the organization of preconception care were discussed. 
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In Chapter 7 we provide an ethical analysis of the problem of inequalities in pregnancy 
outcomes in prosperous societies such as the Netherlands and it is proposed that jus-
tice demands the equalizing the ‘health agency’ of parents(-to-be) to a sufficient level.
In Chapter 8 we discuss the insights of the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease 
and epigenetics and how these insights should be used to establish the societal respon-
sibilities towards the health and wellbeing of children-to-be. 
In Chapter 9 I summarize and discusses the main findings of this dissertation.  
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Abstract
Objectives: To examine the health care professionals’ views on their role and responsi-
bilities in providing preconception care and identify barriers that affect the delivery 
and uptake of preconception care.
Methods: Twenty health care professionals who provide preconception care (PCC) on a 
regular basis were interviewed using semi-structured interviews. 
Results: We interviewed twelve community midwives, three General Practitioners, 
three obstetricians, one cardiologist specialized in congenital heart diseases and one 
gastroenterologist. We identified four barriers affecting the uptake and delivery of 
preconception care: 1) lack of a comprehensive preconception care program; 2) Most 
future parents are unaware of the benefits of PCC. GP’s are hesitant about the necessity 
and effectiveness of PCC; 3) poor coordination and organization of preconception care; 
4) conflicting views of health care professionals on pregnancy, reproductive autonomy 
of patients and professional responsibility.  
Conclusion: We have identified four types of barriers in the uptake and delivery of pre-
conception care. Our findings support the timely implementation of a comprehensive 
program of PCC (already advocated by the Health Council of the Netherlands) and 
increasing awareness and knowledge of PCC from care providers and future parents. 
We emphasize the need for further research on how organizational barriers lead to 
suboptimal PCC and how interdisciplinary collaboration and referral can lead to opti-
mally tailored intervention approaches.
Significance
What is already known about this subject? Despite persistent adverse pregnancy outcomes 
and even though the benefits of preconception care have been established, the uptake 
and delivery of preconception care remain low. Health care professionals play an im-
portant role in the uptake and delivery of preconception care.
What this study adds? This study identifies barriers perceived by health care profes-
sionals. These barriers need to be addressed to improve the uptake and delivery of 
preconception care.
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Introduction
An increasing amount of research links fetal development with perinatal morbidity 
and mortality as well as the development of chronic diseases in later life (1, 2). Many 
risk factors for perinatal mortality and morbidity and associated diseases in adulthood 
are already present during the periconception period – the period before and shortly 
after conception– (3). Targeting the periconceptional period opens opportunities to 
prevent later risks. Preconception care (PCC) – care and advice given before pregnancy 
– offers such an opportunity as it is offered before risk factors can exert negative effects 
on the developing fetus. A substantial body of evidence supports the benefits of PCC 
interventions on pregnancy outcomes (4-7) and influenced national and international 
recommendations and guidelines for the uptake and delivery of PCC (8-10) Most recom-
mendations endorse the use of a standardized risk assessment which includes both 
medical and non-medical risks. (11, 12) 
Despite persistent adverse pregnancy outcomes and although the benefits of PCC have 
been established, the delivery and uptake of PCC remain low. In 2007, in response to 
the relatively high perinatal mortality and morbidity rates in the Netherlands, the 
Dutch Health Council published an advisory report entitled ‘Preconception care: a good 
beginning.’ The report emphasizes the importance of introducing a PCC program that 
is initiated and coordinated by the government. (13)Guidelines for general practitioners 
and midwives (8) as well as risk assessment instruments have been developed (14), and 
the Dutch government recognized the importance of introducing PCC as a standard 
component of perinatal care (15). Despite these recommendations, no comprehensive 
PCC program has been introduced and only few healthcare professionals are currently 
delivering PCC.(16).
Healthcare professionals who deliver PPC (e.g., community midwives, general practitio-
ners (GPs), obstetricians and other medical specialists) have the potential to significantly 
influence the uptake of PCC (17, 18). But even though primary care setting, hospital set-
ting, community outreach programs and youth health centers all offer opportunities to 
address and offer PCC (19), healthcare professionals do not systematically discuss the 
availability and benefits of PCC in such settings (16, 20). 
The views held by those who provide PCC in different clinical settings influence the 
way in which they engage in PCC activities, discuss PCC with, and deliver PCC to future 
parents. A better understanding of the views of PCC providers regarding their role and 
responsibility towards PCC may help explain why the uptake is low. 
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The aim of this study is to explore the views, identify the barriers and provide recom-
mendations to optimize the uptake and delivery of PCC. 
Methods
We conducted qualitative interviews with healthcare professionals who provide PCC in 
the Netherlands. As PCC is implemented on a small scale and there is no overview of 
where it is delivered, a convenience sample was selected for this interview study. The 
convenience sample consisted of GPs, midwives, and specialists who deliver PCC on a 
regular basis (for our purposes defined as having delivered PCC at least 5 times in the 
previous year). We included specialists who deliver specialist PCC in order to compare 
whether their views differ from those of GPs and midwives who deliver regular PCC.
The selected midwives delivered PCC on a weekly basis in midwifery practices. All 
selected GPs offered PCC in an opportunistic way. The familiarity with their patients 
offers them opportunities to discuss PCC at strategic moments, such as the removal of 
an IUD. 
Both GPs and midwives were selected from the list of participants of the ‘Healthy Preg-
nancy 4 All’ study (21); a study that evaluates the effectiveness of a preconception care 
program in urban and rural multi-ethnic communities from 14 municipalities in the 
Netherlands. In the ‘Healthy Pregnancy 4 All’ study, midwives and GPs were recruited 
to deliver PCC to requesting patients, thereby automatically making them eligible for 
our study by fulfilling the inclusion criterion of having delivered PCC at least 5 times 
within the previous year. 
Specialists affiliated to the same university hospital as the authoring team and known 
to deliver hospital based PCC were invited to participate. Included specialists com-
prised of gynecologists, gastrointestinal specialist and cardiologists, all working at 
the Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam, which delivers care to a multi-ethnic urban 
population. As university hospital employees, these specialists are involved in more 
complex PCC cases, sometimes after referral from GPs, midwives, or other specialists. 
Interviews were performed using a semi-structured questionnaire. In developing the 
questionnaire, we carefully attended to the form and content of the questions. The form 
of the questionnaire was based on of the Theoretical Domains Framework developed 
by Michie and colleagues (22). This framework has been developed to enhance under-
standing of behavior change processes amongst health care professionals, which is an 
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Table 1. Form: based on the theoretical domain framework developed by Michie et al.
Domain Questions
Knowledge ·	 Are you familiar with the Dutch preconception guidelines?
·	 What do you think about the current organization of PCC? Is it feasible for 
you to perform your task as a preconception caregiver? 
·	 How effective do you think PCC is? Do you think the goals of PCC are 
attainable?
Skills ·	 How and with what aim do you ask the future parents about their medical 
and obstetric history? Other domains as well (Informative, directive 
(paternalistic), deliberative, shared decision making(23)) 
·	 What problems have you encountered when asking about the medical and 
obstetric history and how did you try to solve them? Can you give an example 
of such a problem? (And how were you able to solve the problem)
Social/professional 
role and identity 
·	 Do you encounter situations in which you think pregnancy should be 
postponed or discouraged because of the social economic conditions? Can 
this lead to a tension between your personal convictions and professional 
responsibility? (E.g. Personally I would advise against it however as a 
professional I feel obliged to advise and counsel)  
Beliefs about 
capabilities
·	 What problems have you encountered when delivering PCC in general?
·	 What problems have you encountered when asking about the medical and 
obstetric history and how did you try to solve them?
·	 How do you deal with the fact that working conditions can be hard to change, 
even if it is better for the health of the future parents and child?
Beliefs about 
consequences
·	 Are you optimistic about the likelihood of tobacco, alcohol and drugs 
cessation? 
·	 Do you think the current organization of PCC is adequate to help you solve 
the problems you encounter? 
·	 How does the fact that these conditions (working conditions/ social economic 
position) are hard to modify influence your delivery of PCC? 
Motivation and 
goals 
·	 How valuable is PCC? Do you subscribe the goals of PCC and do they motivate 
you to do your job as a preconception caregiver?





·	 How much preparation do you need to deliver a preconception consultation 
and is it in balance with the perceived reward? (Reward can be a good 




·	 What do you think about the current organization of PCC? Is it adequate 
for you to perform your task as a preconception caregiver? (Is there 
sufficient time and are there sufficient resources to perform your tasks as a 
preconception caregiver?)
Social influences ·	 Do you feel sufficiently recognized valued in your work as a preconception 
caregiver by your patients and your peers?
Emotion 
regulation
·	 Do you encounter situations in which you think pregnancy should be 
postponed or discouraged because of the medical or obstetric history? Can 
this lead to a tension between your personal convictions and professional 
responsibility? (E.g. Personally I would advise against it however as a 
professional I feel obliged to advise and counsel)  
Behavioral 
regulation
·	 What do you think about the current organization of PCC? Is it adequate for 
you to perform your task as a preconception caregiver
Nature of the 
behavior
·	 Do you encounter any problems and what would help to overcome these 
problems?
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important determinant for the success of the clinical implementation of evidence-based 
practice such as PCC in the healthcare domain. It consists of a list of consensus-based 
theoretical domains (e.g., caregivers’ knowledge, skills, motivation and goals), which 
are essential for achieving a successful evidence-based implementation. Structuring 
our questions according to these domains enabled us to systematically identify the 
limiting factors for the delivery and uptake of PCC. That is, this framework offered the 
opportunity to link PCC barriers perceived by participants to a specific domain known 
to affect the uptake and delivery of healthcare. For each domain, sample questions 
were provided to evaluate implementation (table 1).
The content of the questions was based on the Dutch guideline for GPs. (8). This is a 
broad guideline for general comprehensive PCC that describes several risk domains 
that should be covered during preconception consultations for couples from the gen-
eral public. This guideline includes the assessment of medical and obstetrical history, 
genetic risks, life style risks (including tobacco, alcohol and drug use, and risk exposure 
at work), genetic disorders, and socioeconomic factors (see Online Resource 1). We 
incorporated all these risk domains in our questionnaire.
To ensure consistency, only one interviewer (HI) conducted the interviews. Interviews 
had a duration of approximately 45 minutes. The semi structured interview format 
ensured that the preselected items were discussed but allowed to deviate from the 
interview format to explore new themes that were considered to be relevant by partici-
pants. The interviews were audiotaped and transcribed ad verbatim. All participants’ 
details were removed and the transcripts were de-identified to protect confidentiality. 
Three authors (HI, WP, and MH) read the transcriptions independently from each other, 
and subsequently discussed content to identify and compare the key barriers to PCC. 
The participants’ responses were classified using a deductive thematic method of analy-
sis, in which the framework provided domains to organize the barriers mentioned by 
participants. Microsoft Excel software was used to organize these barriers. 
results
Twelve community midwives, three general practitioners, three obstetricians, one car-
diologist specialized in congenital heart diseases and one gastroenterologist were inter-
viewed. The community midwives and GPs interviewed deliver general preconception 
consultation services, which cover the risk domains mentioned in the Dutch guideline 
for PCC. All the interviewed midwives and GPs indicated that they use Zwangerwijzer, 
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a validated PCC questionnaire. The online version of Zwangerwijzer allows to generate 
an overview of the respondents’ risk profile. The interviewed midwives and GPs use 
this risk profile to deliver PCC as effectively and efficiently as possible. Only the GPs 
offered PCC opportunistically (i.e. when women request removal of an intrauterine 
device). Midwives indicated that the midwifery setting does not often allow to offer 
PCC opportunistically because parents-to-be typically rarely visit a midwifery before 
conception. The interviewed specialists deliver specialist preconception consultation 
services. These consultations typically aim to address complex medical issues that 
expose the patient and her future child to substantial health risks. All interviewed 
participants were aware of the Dutch guideline of PCC and shared the view that the de-
livery of PCC is of upmost importance when preparing for pregnancy. They also shared 
the view that despite this importance, the uptake of PCC remains disappointingly low.
The participant’s answers in combination with the domains from Michie’s framework 
provided the identification of four barriers that affect the uptake and delivery of pre-
conception care. 1) Lack of a comprehensive PCC program; 2) Most future parents are 
unaware of the benefits of PCC. GP’s are hesitant about the necessity and effectiveness 
of PCC; 3) Poor organization and coordination of PCC; 4) Health care professionals’ 
conflicting views on pregnancy, reproductive autonomy of patients and professional 
responsibility.  
1. Lack of a comprehensive PCC program
The lack of a centrally coordinated and comprehensive offer of PCC (that is the lack of 
a PCC program in which contents of PCC is standardized) was raised as an important 
cause of the unfamiliarity with, and low knowledge of PCC amongst future parents. 
This unfamiliarity amongst future parents was thought to be the main reason for the 
low uptake of PCC. In addition, the low uptake of PCC also makes it difficult for health-
care professionals to develop a routine and build experience in the delivery of PCC. 
(Knowledge, belief about capabilities) “Due to the low uptake, the frequency with 
which we do preconception consultations is low. Therefore we lack the opportunity 
to develop experience and routine in delivering PCC.” (Midwife) 
All participants expressed the concern that future parents who would benefit the most 
from PCC are the ones who are the hardest to reach. Participants specifically identified 
future parents with low socioeconomic status, people living in poverty or deprived 
neighborhoods and non-western immigrants as hard to reach groups. 
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(Beliefs about capabilities) “PCC is simply unknown to a lot of people, espe-
cially to those who would benefit the most…I think that the people who would 
benefit the most are those who smoke, drink and are obese and live in deprived 
neighborhoods.”(Obstetrician) 
(Beliefs about capabilities) “Especially people with a low SES perceive that they 
should only start seeking care once they are pregnant. The fact that they can opti-
mize their health before pregnancy is unknown to them.”(Obstetrician) 
Midwives perceived the current lack of a fee (no financial compensation) in combina-
tion with the labor-intensiveness as a barrier to deliver PCC.
-(Environmental context and resources, motivation and goals) “The preconception 
consultation is very time consuming and we do not get paid for it.”(Midwife)
Delivery of PCC is perceived to be time consuming because it is a new form of care and 
because of the substantial amount of risk factors that should be addressed during a 
consultation. Interviewed GPs and medical specialists indicated that they have insuffi-
cient time to deliver PCC. This lack of time was partly due to the fact that consultations 
are time consuming and partly because of competing preventive care which also needs 
to be delivered. Participants also indicated that future parents were not always willing 
to invest the required time and effort to adequately prepare for pregnancy.
(Environmental context and resources) “I often have to use all the time available to 
address the patient’s medical questions, so the time to ask about the desire to have 
children or to discuss PCC is lacking… Because of time and resource constraints, 
PCC has to compete with other preventive care. That may also be a barrier.” (GP)
-(Beliefs about capabilities, beliefs about consequences) “I would like to see my 
patients invest more time in following my advice. It takes time to follow the advice 
I give them, like changing their medication or visiting another medical special-
ist for a checkup. When I ask them to come see me again in three months they 
sometimes are reluctant to do so because they want to get pregnant as quickly as 
possible.”(Obstetrician)
2. Care providers’ and future parents’ lack of knowledge of preconception care. 
Participants indicated that the future parents’ as well as healthcare professionals’ 
perceptions about PCC are important determinants for the uptake and delivery of PCC. 
The lack of familiarity with and knowledge of PCC of future parents and caregivers 
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were perceived as barriers. GP’s in particular were somewhat hesitant to deliver PCC 
because, according to them, it is a time consuming form of care that still has to prove 
to be effective. 
- (Knowledge) “My patients’ knowledge about their health and about pregnancy 
is generally limited. They do not experience the need for PCC. This is a barrier for 
them to seek PCC.” (GP)
-(Knowledge)“There is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding PCC. I am in favor of 
preventive healthcare interventions however I don’t know how evidence based some 
PCC interventions are…. excluding folic acid supplementation, tobacco and alcohol 
cessation and a good diet” (GP)
(Knowledge, Social/professional role and identity, memory attention and decision 
processes) “PCC is a relatively new form of care and, I think, not well known to 
many caregivers. And this unfamiliarity of caregivers with PCC is reflected in the 
amount of future parents seeking PCC.” (Midwife)
3. Poor organization and coordination of preconception care 
The proper delivery of PCC can be challenging because perinatal risk factors are 
multifactorial. Risk assessment and the subsequent timely referral to the appropriate 
caregiver are paramount. GPs and specialists indicated that in general, the healthcare 
professionals’ ability to timely identify all the different healthcare needs of future 
parents needs improvement. Women who have a substantial risk to experience compli-
cations during pregnancy, are too often not referred to the appropriate specialist. The 
inability of non-specialists to identify patients who need tailored PCC was perceived as 
a barrier. In addition, the poor or even lack of communication between the different 
healthcare disciplines that offer PCC was also identified as a cause for insufficient refer-
ral of patients to the appropriate caregiver and perceived as a barrier.
(Social influences, beliefs about capabilities)“ It is really important that patients 
are referred in time to the right caregivers which unfortunately doesn’t always 
happen… the communication between the different disciplines of PCC seems to be 
fragmented which makes the provided care suboptimal and less efficient.”(GP) 
-(Social influences, beliefs about capabilities)“In this hospital we have cardiologists 
who are specialized in managing congenital heart defects in young people, also 
during pregnancy. This includes delivering tailor-made PCC. A general cardiologist 
has less experience and expertise to provide this specific care. Although we encour-
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age the referral of these patients to a hospital that can provide the required care, 
this unfortunately doesn’t happen enough.” (Cardiologist specialized in congenital 
heart diseases)  
-(Social influences, beliefs about capabilities) “Midwives, GP’s and obstetricians 
have insufficient expertise about inflammatory bowel disease to provide adequate 
care for patients who have a desire to become pregnant. However, these patients 
who should be seen by me or one of my colleagues are too often not referred to us.” 
(Gastroenterologist)
4. Ethical barriers
The future parents’ medical history or non-medical risks can lead to situations where 
healthcare professionals would advise to postpone pregnancy or even advise against 
it. However, healthcare professionals also want to respect the clients’ and patients’ 
right to autonomously choose when to become pregnant. An ethical dilemma can arise 
when a patient persists in her wish to conceive against the advice of the healthcare 
professional and in spite of medical grounds to postpone or stall pregnancy. The ten-
sion between personal beliefs about pregnancy and the wellbeing of the future child 
on the one hand and the professional responsibility to provide the best care possible 
for patients while respecting the reproductive autonomy of the future parents on 
the other hand, was perceived as a barrier. However, all participants stated that they 
would, under no circumstance, forfeit their professional responsibility to provide care 
for their patients once they are pregnant.  
-(Social/professional role and identity, emotion regulation, motivation and goals) “A 
barrier is that sometimes you personally think that, considering the patient’s medi-
cal history, it might be better for her not to get pregnant. However as a caregiver my 
task is to advise and guide her regardless of my personal view.” (GP)
-(Social/professional role and identity, emotion regulation, motivation and 
goals)“Sometimes you see cases where for example the patient lives in squalid condi-
tions, has financial debts or is bedridden. These are difficult situations. I would ask 
my patient how she would take care of her child once it is born. The hope is that 
through discussion you can give an honest view of how difficult it would be for her 
to raise a child in her situation and perhaps persuade her to postpone or give up 
her desire to have a child. However, if she decides to become pregnant I will advise 
and guide her as good as possible.”(Obstetrician) 
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Discussion
The results of our study suggest that there are four types of barriers to the uptake and 
delivery of PCC. 1) Due to a lack of a comprehensive PCC program, the future parents’ 
and caregivers’ limited familiarity with and knowledge of PCC is perpetuated. This 
barrier is particularly worrisome because the groups who would benefit the most from 
PCC such as future parents with a lower SES and non-western future parents, are the 
ones who are the hardest to reach with PCC. 2) Most future parents are unaware of the 
benefits of PCC. GP’s are hesitant about the necessity and effectiveness of PCC. 3) Peri-
natal risk factors are multifaceted. It is important that future parents receive care from 
the proper caregiver. GPs and medical specialists expressed the concern that too often 
patients who need specialized care are not referred or are referred too late to them. 
4) There are situation where women trying to conceive are well advised to postpone 
pregnancy, but may choose to become pregnant regardless. Even when participants 
thought that choosing to become pregnant for a patient was the wrong choice, all 
participants clearly expressed that they would favor their professional responsibility 
and the patients’ reproductive autonomy over their own personal views. 
This study shows that there is an unfamiliarity with and lack of knowledge about PCC. 
The participants of this study indicate that both the unfamiliarity and lack of knowl-
edge towards PCC are reasons why the uptake towards such care remains low. The low 
uptake due to lack of knowledge about PCC was also observed by Hosli and colleagues 
(24) and van der Zee and colleagues (25). The GPs indicate that time and resource con-
straints as well as competing preventive care were barriers to deliver PCC. This was 
also observed by Mazza and colleagues (26). Our study draws attention to the barriers 
that result from the lack of a comprehensive PCC program. This barrier was anticipated 
by the Dutch Health Council that advised to set up a governmentally initiated and 
coordinated program of PCC, sustaining that this approach will reach the greatest 
number of future parents and create the most favorable conditions for monitoring the 
effectiveness, efficiency and social consequences of PCC (13). Unfortunately, the advice 
to set up a PCC program has not yet lead to the implementation of a comprehensive 
and coordinated PCC program in the Netherlands. 
Participants, especially the GPs and specialists, pointed out that even though timely 
referral of patients with complex medical and obstetric history to adequate caregivers 
is paramount, such patients are too often not referred or are referred too late. 
We do stress the need for further studies to look into the ways in which these or-
ganizational barriers lead to suboptimal PCC delivery and into how interdisciplinary 
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collaboration can result in optimally tailored PCC. However, because the inadequate 
referral of patients is an urgent matter we recommend the implementation of a PCC 
program as was suggested by the Dutch Health Council. We also support the inclusion 
of PCC in the academic curriculum of future healthcare professionals. We suggest that 
the implementation of a PCC program and the inclusion of PCC in the curriculum 
of future caregivers will increase overall knowledge about, and awareness of, PCC in 
general, and will promote adequate referral of future parents with a complex medical 
history. Education about PCC should include evidence-based findings of research on 
PCC. This is of particular importance because, as our study shows, GP’s remain hesitant 
about the effectiveness and efficiency of PCC. This hesitation is a barrier for the (op-
portunistic) offering of PCC in healthcare settings. 
Furthermore, efforts to train and educate caregivers should not end at graduation, es-
pecially in the case of PCC. The participating midwives pointed out that the low uptake 
of PCC reduces opportunities to gain the necessary experience in delivering PCC. This 
barrier was also identified by (27). In their study, they describe that barriers to provide 
PCC include a lack of contact with women planning to conceive. In addition, Van 
Heesch and colleagues (28) also reported that few midwives had received any training 
on PCC after qualifying in their discipline. In their study they show that midwives seem 
willing to play an active role in the provision of preconception care in the future, but 
that ‘there is a great need for continued training with practicing healthcare providers’
In some cases, patients with complex medical conditions or with difficult financial 
and social problems do wish to become pregnant, even against the caregiver advices to 
postpone pregnancy. Caregivers can personally feel that these patients are making an 
incorrect decision when they insist on pregnancy. However, our results do not indicate 
that the caregivers’ personal considerations lead to a suboptimal uptake or delivery 
of PCC. Nevertheless, we recommend that the curriculum of PCC caregivers should 
include ethical education and guidance so that in practice caregivers will be more 
competent in dealing with these dilemmas.  
Strengths
Incorporating risk domains mentioned in the Dutch guideline preconception care and 
composing the questionnaire for this study according to the framework Michie and 
colleagues ensured quality and relevance of the questionnaire. Furthermore, given the 
fact that the participants in our study were all experienced in the delivery of PCC 
according to the Dutch guideline, they were ideally positioned to report on barriers 
on the uptake and delivery of PCC. Finally, the variety of disciplines in which the 
participants included in our study practiced allowed to identify barriers experienced 
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in PCC as a whole. Ultimately, in accordance to the views of participants, PCC requires 
a multidisciplinary approach. This requires knowledge about barriers perceived by the 
whole ambit of healthcare professionals who deliver PCC. 
Limitations
The small number of participants, which is common in qualitative studies, limits the 
generalizability of our findings. However, interviews were conducted until saturation 
of responses was achieved. We do recommend the confirmation of our results by other 
studies. 
Conclusion
Our study has identified four barriers for the optimal uptake and delivery of precon-
ception care. Given the explorative nature of our study, we recommend that further 
research is done to gain a better understanding of these barriers and to determine 
which barriers should be prioritized for intervention. In addition, we highlight the 
need for further research into ways in which organizational barriers lead to suboptimal 
PCC delivery and how interdisciplinary collaboration can result in optimally tailored 
intervention approaches.
However, the recommendation for further research should not hinder the introduction 
and integration of PCC as a government coordinated program since the benefits of PCC 
interventions such as folic acid supplementation, alcohol and tobacco cessation and 
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online resource 1. Content: based on the Dutch guideline of general practitioners on preconception care
Domain Questions
Preconception care in 
general
·	 What do you think about the current organization of PCC? Is it 
adequate for you to perform your task as a preconception caregiver? Do 
you encounter any problems and what would help to overcome these 
problems? 
·	 How valuable is PCC? Do you subscribe the goals of PCC and do they 
motivate you to do your job as a preconception caregiver?
·	 How effective do you think PCC is? Do you think the goals of PCC are 
attainable?
·	 Do you feel sufficiently recognized and valued in your work as a 
preconception caregiver both by your patients and your peers?
Medical and obstetric 
history
·	 In what way and with what aim do you ask the future parents 
about their medical and obstetric history? (Informative, directive 
(paternalistic), deliberative, shared decision making(23))
·	 What problems have you encountered when asking about the medical 
and obstetric history and how did you try to solve them?
·	 Can you give an example of such a problem? (And how were you able to 
solve the problem)
·	 Do you encounter situations in which you think pregnancy should be 
postponed or discouraged because of the medical or obstetric history? 
Can this lead to a tension between your personal convictions and 
professional responsibility? (E.g. Personally I would advice against it 
however as a professional I feel obliged to advise and counsel)  
·	 Do you think the current organization of PCC is adequate to help 
you solve these problems? What kind of adjustments to PCC would 
ameliorate your capability to deal with these problems? 
Genetic disorders ·	 How and with what aim do you ask the future parents about genetic 
disorders?
·	 Does the difficulty of the subject matter change your role as a 
caregiver? (E.g. from informative to directive?)
Exposures at work ·	 How and with what aim do you ask the future parents about their 
working conditions?
·	 How do you deal with the fact that working conditions can be hard 
to change, even if it is better for the health of the future parents and 
child?
Socioeconomic factors ·	 How and with what aim do you ask the future parents about their 
social economic positions? 
·	 How does the fact that these conditions are hard to modify influence 
your delivery of PCC? 
·	 Do you encounter situations in which you think pregnancy should be 
postponed or discouraged because of the social economic conditions? 
Can this lead to a tension between your personal convictions and 
professional responsibility? (E.g. Personally I would advise against it 
however as a professional I feel obliged to advise and counsel)  
·	 Does the social economic situation alter your motivation or goals when 
delivering PCC? 
Tobacco, alcohol and 
drugs 
·	 How and with what aim do you ask about tobacco, alcohol and drugs 
use?
·	 Are you optimistic about the likelihood of tobacco, alcohol and drugs 
cessation? 
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In the promotion of periconceptional health, appropriate attention has to be given to 
the perceptions of those who are most vulnerable, such as women with a relatively 
low socioeconomic status based on their educational attainment. The aim of this study 
was to explore these women’s perceptions of pregnancy preparation and the role they 
attribute to healthcare professionals.
Design 
We conducted semi-structured interviews with women with a low to intermediate 
educational attainment and with a desire to conceive, of which a subgroup had experi-
ence with preconception care. Thematic content analysis was applied on the interview 
transcripts.
Findings 
The final sample consisted of 28 women. We identified four themes of pregnancy 
preparation perceptions: (i) ”How to prepare for pregnancy?”, which included health 
promotion and seeking healthcare; (ii) “Why prepare for pregnancy?”, which mostly 
related to fertility and health concerns; (iii) “Barriers and facilitators regarding preg-
nancy preparation”, such as having limited control over becoming pregnant as well 
as the health of the unborn; (iv) “The added value of preconception care”, reported 
by women who had visited a consultation, which consisted mainly of reassurance and 
receiving information. 
Key conclusions and Implications for practice 
The attained insights into the perceptions of women with a low to intermediate educa-
tion are valuable for adapting the provision of preconception care to their views. We 
recommend the proactive offering of preconception care, including information on 
fertility, to stimulate adequate preparation for pregnancy and contribute to improving 
perinatal health among women who are socioeconomically more vulnerable. 
Keywords
Preconception care, educational attainment, qualitative research, pregnancy outcomes, 
fertility, health behaviour
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Introduction
Optimizing preconception health does not only reduce the risk of poor pregnancy 
outcomes but also the risk of developing non-communicable diseases later in life (1-
3). This reduction of risk is paramount as many poor pregnancy outcomes as well as 
non-communicable diseases are to a great extent preventable. Despite high quality 
perinatal care in the Netherlands for example, perinatal mortality remains high com-
pared to other European countries (4-6). Moreover, similar to other health outcomes 
there is a social gradient observable in pregnancy outcomes (7-9). People in the lowest 
part of the social gradient, typically people who live in a deprived neighbourhood, face 
substantially higher risks to have poor pregnancy outcomes (10-12). Furthermore, the 
uptake of obstetric care has been shown to be lower among women who are socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged (13). Therefore, attention has to be given to women who are 
socioeconomically vulnerable when promoting health at the start of pregnancy. A cru-
cial period for health promotion is the periconception period, defined as the fourteen 
weeks before and ten weeks after conception, due to the processes of gametogenesis, 
organogenesis and placental development (14).
An increasing body of evidence suggests that preconception care (PCC) interventions 
can contribute to better pregnancy outcomes by identifying biomedical, behavioural 
and psychosocial risk factors prior to conception (15, 16). However, delivery and uptake 
of preconception care is still low (17, 18). The improvement of the uptake of PCC and 
of perinatal health outcomes relies partly on the extent to which women prepare for 
pregnancy. Actively preparing for pregnancy is associated with positively changing 
lifestyle behaviours (19). The extent to which women prepare for pregnancy is related 
to their perceptions about pregnancy preparation. As behavioural research indicates, 
perceptions underpin behaviour to a certain extent, for example pregnancy related 
behaviour (20, 21). As such, perceptions may influence whether women would prepare 
for pregnancy and make use of PCC. Based on previous research, we assume that a lack-
ing or an inadequate perception of the need of pregnancy preparation most probably 
leads to no, or inadequate, pregnancy preparation (22, 23). Women’s lack of awareness 
and their perception of absence of risks have been frequently identified as barriers for 
PCC use (23). Little is known about the perceptions and motivations of women who 
have used PCC (24). Besides, most of the studies have focussed on attitudes towards 
PCC and on subgroups of women with a medical risk (e.g. diabetes), but less on women 
with a desire to conceive and their general notion of preparing for pregnancy (23, 24).
To study perceptions of pregnancy preparation, we focussed on women with desire to 
conceive who are socioeconomically more vulnerable for adverse pregnancy outcomes. 
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We used low to intermediate educational attainment as a proxy measure for low to 
intermediate socioeconomic status (SES). Educational inequalities, as an indicator of so-
cioeconomic inequalities, have been demonstrated in various pregnancy outcomes, for 
instance birthweight (25, 26). Assessing the perceptions of women with a relatively low 
educational background, with and without PCC experience, will provide insights into 
why and how these women prepare for pregnancy and whether this includes consult-
ing a healthcare professional for PCC. These insights are valuable for the improvement 
of periconception health, in part via the improvement of the uptake and delivery of 
PCC. Therefore, the aim of this study was to explore perceptions of pregnancy prepara-
tion of women with a relatively low educational attainment and the role they attribute 
to healthcare professionals. We aimed at achieving this by interviewing women with a 
desire to conceive, of which a subgroup had received PCC.
Methods
Study population
This study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of the Erasmus MC. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants. The study population consisted 
of two subgroups. One subgroup, the PCC-group, was recruited from the Healthy Preg-
nancy for All (HP4All) Preconception Care study (27). This study, conducted in 14 Dutch 
municipalities, aims to assess the effectiveness of a recruitment strategy for PCC and 
the effectiveness of individual PCC consultations. The recruitment strategy included an 
invitational letter for PCC from a general practitioner (GP) and/or from the municipal-
ity. Women aged 18 to 41 years who applied for a PCC consultation with their GP 
or midwife were asked to participate in a cohort study. For our study, a selection of 
eligible participants was made based on the following criteria: consent to be contacted 
for an additional study, having received a PCC consultation in 2014, and an indication 
for having a low to middle SES based on a low or intermediate educational attainment 
(International Standard Classification of Education up to and including level 4). The 
selection resulted in a sample of 36 participants eligible for an interview. The other 
subgroup, the non-PCC-group, was recruited using a professional recruitment service 
specialized in finding suitable participants for scientific research. This service has a 
database of people willing to participate in scientific research. From this database, 
participants were identified based on whether they had a low to middle SES, a low to 
intermediate education attainment (as explained for the PCC-group above) and a desire 
to conceive in the nearby future. This resulted in a sample of 18 eligible participants.
We aimed at interviewing fifteen participants (thirty in sum) in both the PCC-group 
and the non-PCC-group, as we expected to reach saturation of responses at that num-
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ber. We were able to conduct 15 interviews in each group, but we had to exclude two 
participants from the PCC-group as they did not meet the inclusion criteria after all 
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figure 1: Enrolment of participants
As a result, we had a fi nal sample of 28 participants. Our aim was to have a sample with 
a variation in participant’s characteristics such as age, ethnic background and prior 
experiences with pregnancy. 
Data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the spring of 2015 by four researchers in 
close collaboration. The interviews were carried out at the Erasmus MC, at participant’s 
homes, or by telephone if preferred. The semi-structured interviews were conducted 
using a two-part topic list. The fi rst part focused on perceptions and behaviour with 
regard to pregnancy preparation. The second part listed questions on perceptions 
concerning healthcare needs prior to pregnancy. For the PCC-group, this second part 
included questions about their experience with PCC. The interviews were audio re-
corded and transcribed verbatim for analysis. 
Data analysis
We used an inductive process of thematic analysis as described by Braun and Clarke 
to identify the key themes of perceptions in the transcriptions (28). Firstly, we famil-
iarised ourselves with the data and generated an initial coding scheme. Together, 
two researchers with experience in qualitative research adjusted the coding scheme 
through an iterative process of analysing the transcripts. We used NVivo10 software 
(QSR International, 2012) for the analysis. Subsequently, based on our coded fragments, 
themes and sub-themes were mapped in Excel. The two researchers performed this 
step together to discuss and refi ne the themes during the process. Representative cita-
tions were selected and translated to English. 
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results
Study participants’ characteristics 
With respect to our inclusion criteria of low to intermediate education attainment, 
our final sample of 28 participants consisted mainly of women who had attained or 
were currently attaining an intermediate education (n=24). Thirteen women did not 
have a paying job; three of them because they had not finished their education yet. 
We achieved variation of other socio-demographic characteristics in our sample, with 
in both subgroups a similar composition: the women’s age ranged from 24 to 41 years 
in the PCC-group (median 32) and 21 to 38 years (median 29) in the non-PCC-group; 
four women did not have a Dutch background in the PCC-group and five in the non-
PCC-group; six women were mothers at the time of the interview in the PCC-group 
and eight in the non-PCC-group. The group of non-responders (referred to in figure 1) 
seemed to have similar background characteristics as the group of participants.
The perceptions
We identified three themes of pregnancy preparation perceptions in both groups 
which are perceptions about: (1) how to prepare for pregnancy? (2) why prepare for 
pregnancy? (3) barriers and facilitators regarding pregnancy preparation. We described 
one more perception theme in the PCC-group: (4) the added value of PCC.
(1) How to prepare for pregnancy?
1.1 Health related preparations
Participants from both groups mentioned similar ways to prepare for pregnancy such 
as; quitting smoking, moderating or abstaining from alcohol, reducing stress, the 
timely use of folic acid supplementation, losing weight and having a healthy diet. “The 
moment I would like to become pregnant, I wouldn’t go ‘all out’ at a party. I would abstain from 
drinking alcohol.” (Interview 7 non-PCC-group) “First of all I would quit smoking, …. , furthermore 
I would eat healthy, so that the baby receives good nutrition which the baby needs.” (Interview 13 
PCC-group)
1.2 Healthcare related preparations (non PCC-group)
We asked the participants of the non PCC-group about what they perceived to be the 
role of caregivers, especially the GP, in the period they are trying to conceive. Most 
participants mentioned that first and foremost it is in fact one’s own responsibility to 
adequately prepare for pregnancy. “First of all it depends on yourself, whether you go to the 
GP or midwife for information, because they won’t just come to you…. but actually I don’t think I 
would go, because I always think positive, no one thinks that their pregnancy would not go well.” 
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(Interview 7 non-PCC-group) These participants consider that the future mother should 
seek care herself when she considers this to be necessary. “I would contact my GP because 
I have used contraceptives for years, so I would like to know what the procedure is [emphasis 
added] ….” (Interview 11 non-PCC-group)
The participants were nevertheless positive about the suggestion of a GP who proac-
tively asks them about their desire to become pregnant, provided that these questions 
are asked when reproductive issues, such as contraception or teratogenic medications, 
are being discussed. “As he [the GP] prescribes medication, he should tell you to be careful with 
this medication in case you want to become pregnant.” (Interview 4 non-PCC-group) “I actually 
think that a GP, Midwife, and gynaecologist could tell you [about pregnancy preparation], be-
cause many women do not know, or are ashamed to ask.” (Interview 7 non-PCC-group) Some 
participants referred to the mother-to-be and the healthcare professional as having a 
shared responsibility for the adequate preparation of pregnancy. These participants 
did however also emphasize that it is the mother-to-be who eventually has to follow 
the advice of the healthcare professional and therefore the ultimate responsibility falls 
on her. “A healthcare professional gives advice, but you have to follow that advice.” (Interview 8 
non-PCC-group) 
1.3 Healthcare related motivations and expectations (PCC-group)
We asked the PCC-group what their motivations and expectations were when they 
decided to visit a healthcare provider before pregnancy. For most participants, the PCC 
invitational letter, which they had received from their GP or municipality, was the 
trigger to make an appointment. “We had received a letter… and then I thought let’s start with 
this PCC consultation, and all the information that we can get is welcome.” (Interview 6 PCC-group) 
However, some participants already had plans to visit their GP because of pregnancy 
related questions. “… I had been thinking, should I go to my GP or not, and that same week, 
a total coincidence, I received a letter about the start of consultations for women with a desire 
to become pregnant.”(Interview 11 PCC-group) Most women went without specific expecta-
tions to their PCC appointment, as they were not familiar with PCC, but they perceived 
it as a possibility worth exploring. “I didn’t know what it entailed, so I thought there is no 
harm in trying.” (Interview 14 PCC-group) Some women expected to receive information, an 
examination, or a general check-up.
(2) Why prepare for pregnancy?
2.1 Questions about conception and fertility 
For most participants questions about conception and fertility were the major reason 
to consider preparing for pregnancy. For both groups, the participants’ willingness to 
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seek pregnancy related care such as consultation from a doctor seemed to increase in 
case they would experience problems with becoming pregnant. “Yes, I might go [to the 
GP]….. for example, if I would face difficulties getting pregnant.” (Interview 3 non-PCC-group) 
“We already had a desire to have child for some time but still had not succeeded. Therefore, we 
wanted an appointment with the GP…” (Interview 13 PCC-group) In the PCC-group, questions 
about fertility and fertility problems were for about half the group the main reason to 
actually visit the healthcare professional for a PCC consultation. 
2.2 Assuring health of the mother and child
In both groups, some participants mentioned that they would consider pregnancy 
preparation as it may benefit their own health and the health of their future children. 
In response to their miscarriage for example, two participants mentioned that they 
would explore ways to adequately prepare for pregnancy in light of possible future 
pregnancies. “Well yes [visiting a doctor] because of my miscarriage, see what is there, blood 
tests or something, check whether my belly is healthy, I assume it is, but you never know.” [When 
would you do that?] “Well, anyway before you are pregnant… I think maybe a month ahead, 
but yeah, you cannot really determine that.” (Interview 12 non-PCC-group) The participants’ 
perceptions of adequate preparation consisted of checking their vitamin status, as well 
as making sure components of oral contraceptives and tobacco smoke were, as they 
phrased it, “cleared out of the body.” Working with potential harmful substances was 
also mentioned by a veterinary assistant as a reason to inform her employer about her 
desire to conceive and as a reason to have visited a PCC consultation. ”Because of my 
work [as a veterinary assistant] I wasn’t sure about what I could and could not do…. anaesthesia, 
x-rays….sedation using gas, is that dangerous? these kind of questions..”(Interview 12 PCC-group)
(3) Barriers and facilitators regarding pregnancy preparation
3.1 Facilitator
Most participants from both groups mentioned that they felt adequately prepared for 
pregnancy. They mentioned that ample information about pregnancy preparation is 
available, especially on the Internet, which enables them to adequately prepare for 
pregnancy. “Yes [having sufficient possibilities to prepare for pregnancy], nowadays you can find 
everything on websites, health websites, Google, everywhere really.” (Interview 1 non-PCC-group)
3.2 Barriers
Despite the fact that most participants felt adequately prepared for pregnancy, many 
also perceived barriers in terms of having limited control over their chances to conceive 
and the course of their pregnancy. “You just hope, you cannot say ‘I want’, but you actually 
hope that God lets you become pregnant”. (Interview 2 non-PCC-group) They also mentioned 
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that they had limited control over their ability to ensure good health for their future 
children during pregnancy. Well as far as I know you cannot do anything about it [actual 
pregnancy going well], but you can help it a bit.” (Interview 1 non-PCC-group) The latter percep-
tion was more pronounced in the non-PCC-group than in the PCC-group. 
Some participants, mainly of the non-PCC-group, mentioned that they experienced 
preparing for pregnancy and accessing pregnancy-related information as stressful and 
burdensome. “I do not go looking for answers on the internet, because then I go crazy. (Interview 
14 non-PCC-group) This was also mentioned as a reason not to explore or to “give up” 
on ways to prepare for pregnancy, such as giving up folic acid supplementation when 
it takes too long to become pregnant, finding it difficult to commit to healthy food 
not knowing how long it takes to become pregnant, and not succeeding in quitting 
smoking before and during pregnancy. “I tried taking folic acid for a period, but you know, the 
longer it took [getting pregnant] the more I forgot taking it. Thus, yeah at a certain time you just 
stop taking it. (Interview 14 non-PCC-group)” “Yeah I tried quitting smoking but it took so long, so 
.. yeah… Well my mother also smoked during her pregnancy and here I am, so yeah…” (Interview 
10 non-PCC-group) In the PCC-group, a few participants also referred to the difficulty 
of committing to for instance a healthy lifestyle, since it may take a while to become 
pregnant.
Some participants from the non-PCC-group reported that pregnancy was a “natural” 
event that does not require any special preparation or planning if one is not ill. “No, 
no [not going to a doctor before pregnancy unless there is a problem with becoming pregnant], it 
is different when I would be pregnant, then I would ask right away what I could do.” (Interview 3 
non-PCC-group) “Otherwise you are just planning all the time, I am against that, you should not 
plan something like this [pregnancy], if I prepare by for example eating healthy, then I am already 
planning a bit.” (interview 3 non-PCC-group)
Participants reported to perceive more urgency to be healthy and visit a healthcare pro-
vider once they would know they were actually pregnant rather than when they were 
preparing for pregnancy. “…when you know you are pregnant, then you can begin, because then 
you know and then you have to do it [live healthy].” (Interview 12 non-PCC-group) Furthermore, 
some women were sceptical about the effects of unhealthy behaviour, such as smoking 
and drinking alcohol, on pregnancy and the health of the unborn. “But I did stop drink-
ing alcohol. Regarding smoking, yes I’ll consider that when I really am pregnant….I have started 
to smoke a bit less.” (Interview 6 non-PCC-group) Accordingly, there was a wide range in 
perceptions with regard to what pregnancy preparation would actually entail ranging 
from quitting smoking prior to pregnancy to lowering the number of cigarettes during 
48 Chapter 3
pregnancy, and ranging from trying to have a healthy weight before pregnancy to not 
paying attention to weight at all because “you get fat anyway during pregnancy”. 
(4) Added value of PCC
The perceived added value of PCC was only assessed in the group that received a PCC 
consultation. We asked whether the participants felt that PCC had influenced their 
pregnancy preparation. Most participants reported that they were already familiar 
with the information and advice that was provided during the consultation. “No, it did 
not really [change anything], but it was actually just a confirmation that the things I did and read 
were right.” (Interview 7 PCC-group) 
However, a few participants mentioned that it changed their perceptions of pregnancy 
preparation, for example by learning about the importance of folic acid supplementa-
tion and quitting smoking. In addition, some participants reported that it influenced 
their behaviour, e.g. drinking less alcohol and having a healthier diet. “Yes, I don’t drink 
[alcohol] so much anymore at parties, less alcohol let’s put it that way. Not that I drink so much but 
now I will drink with moderation” (Interview 11 PCC-group)
When we asked how they valued the PCC consultation, almost all participants were 
positive about their experience with PCC. They explained the value of PCC in terms 
of reassurance and confirmation, or receiving information and answers to questions. 
Knowing now what the consultation entailed, most participants reported that in hind-
sight they would have visited a PCC consultation again. “Yes, reassurance, I could ask more 
questions, I received a lot of information, heard how it all goes, so yes that was nice.” (Interview 9 
PCC-group)
Discussion
This study provides new insights into the perceptions on pregnancy preparation of 
women with a low to intermediate educational attainment. We found that the par-
ticipants predominantly associate pregnancy preparation with fertility and concep-
tion. Many participants perceived limited control over the chance of conception and 
reported to be motivated to seek care in case of fertility concerns. This finding is in line 
with the findings of van der Zee, de Beaufort (21), Tuomainen, Cross-Bardell (29) and 
has been reported in the systematic review on PCC barriers and facilitators of Poels, 
Koster (23). Our study shows that women with a low to intermediate educational at-
tainment and a desire to become pregnant put an emphasis on fertility and conception 
during the period they are trying to conceive. As women are more likely to engage in 
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pregnancy preparation in case those issues that are relevant to them are addressed, we 
recommend making advice on fertility an important theme of PCC. Correspondingly, 
PCC could also be integrated in fertility care. 
Most participants mentioned relevant and important health related ways to prepare for 
pregnancy such as the importance of having a good lifestyle and smoking and alcohol 
cessation. Despite this awareness there were also preconception care related topics 
that we did not find in our data. These include topics such as over-the-counter drugs, 
immunizations, sexual risk behaviours, family history, chronic illness, and mental 
health which are typically included in PCC (16, 30). Frey and Files have also reported 
on this awareness of important pregnancy related issues on the one hand and what 
they call “knowledge gaps” on the other hand (31). 
Our results suggest that awareness and knowledge alone about adequate pregnancy 
preparation, e.g. smoking cessation, does not necessarily lead to actual pregnancy 
preparation, e.g. actual smoking cessation. For example, consider the following 
response “Yeah I tried quitting smoking [awareness] but it took so long, so .. yeah…”[actual 
behaviour] (Interview 10 non-PCC-group) and “I tried taking folic acid for a period [awareness], 
but you know, the longer it took [getting pregnant] the more I forgot taking it [actual behaviour] 
(Interview 14 non-PCC-group).” In other words, we suggest that poor pregnancy prepara-
tion is not only a matter of not knowing what to do, as participants typically displayed 
awareness of and knowledge about pregnancy preparation, but arguably also a matter 
of not experiencing the urgency to do what is known. Some women for example, were 
sceptical about the effects of unhealthy behaviour, such as smoking and drinking al-
cohol, on pregnancy and the health of the unborn and therefore did not stop smoking 
or drinking in the preconception period. However, the expressed scepticism could also 
be a form of self-justification. Further research should be done on this gap between 
knowledge about pregnancy preparation and actual pregnancy preparation in order to 
better understand, encourage and adequately help women with a desire to conceive to 
put in to practice the knowledge they have.
In addition, most participants felt sufficiently able to prepare for pregnancy because 
they could find information, especially on the internet, on pregnancy preparation, 
when deemed necessary. A conjecture, based on these outcomes, is that the educational 
background of our participants, and possibly a lower health literacy often associated 
with having this background, may lead to an underestimation of perinatal risks and an 
overestimation of abilities to reduce these risks. We based our assertion on responses 
such as “Well my mother also smoked during her pregnancy and here I am, so yeah…” (Interview 
10 non-PCC-group). In line with this conjecture, Lupattelli et al. found that low health-lit-
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eracy women were more inclined to underestimate the detrimental effects of smoking 
during pregnancy (32). Moreover, Endres, Sharp (33) have reported on an association 
between low health literacy in women with pregestational diabetes and a reduced 
likeliness to prepare for pregnancy, such as taking folic acid supplementation and seek-
ing medical advice before pregnancy. However, more research needs to be done about 
the relation between health-literacy and the estimation of pregnancy related risks to 
better understand whether and how health-literacy influences pregnancy preparation. 
In summary, taking up research on risk estimation is particularly important as women 
with lower education are more vulnerable to have adverse pregnancy outcomes (25, 
26). Furthermore, women living in socioeconomically deprived neighbourhoods have 
more preconceptional and perinatal risk factors for adverse pregnancy outcomes (34, 
35).
Our results show that the participants from the non-PCC-group were open to receiving 
information about pregnancy preparation from a healthcare professional provided 
that this information is presented in relevant situations, such as prescribing potential 
harmful medications. This is in line with the results of de Jong-Potjer et al. who found 
that women were interested in PCC-consultation of their GP should they decide to 
have children (36). We therefore recommend healthcare professionals to proactively 
integrate PCC in their consultations, in particular when pregnancy affecting issues 
are being discussed. This is warranted as most participants indicate they would not 
seek PCC without a, in their view, compelling reason to do so. This is in line with the 
current limited use of PCC and with the results of the PCC-group in which most women 
also had a compelling reason to seek PCC. However, prudence is required as some 
participants perceived planned pregnancy preparation as burdensome and stressful. 
Consideration has to be given to these feelings of burden and stress, as they can be-
come barriers to prepare for pregnancy and seek PCC. The ‘naturalness’ of pregnancy 
was also mentioned as a reason not to prepare for pregnancy. This concern regarding 
naturalness was also reported in the systematic review by Poels, Koster (23). Efforts 
need to be made to clarify that adequate pregnancy preparation is not at odds with the 
naturalness of pregnancy.
A remarkable result of our study was the PCC-group’s experience of modest but rel-
evant added value of having visited a PCC consultation. This experience may result 
from the fact that women who visited a PCC consultation may typically be women who 
were already motivated to prepare for pregnancy and therefore were relatively well-
informed. This assertion is supported by the study of Barrett, Shawe (22) who describe 
different groups of women with three different levels of investment in pre-pregnancy 
healthcare being the prepared group, the poor knowledge group and the absent pre-
pregnancy period group. To increase a sense of relevancy, they argue that individual 
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groups will likely need different PCC approaches. We also recommend a custom-made 
approach based on the perceptions, abilities and needs of women.
The fact that half of the participants did visit and the other half did not visit a PCC 
consultation offered a unique opportunity to explore pregnancy preparation percep-
tions in both groups. It is important however to emphasize the explorative nature of 
this research, which is not meant to draw conclusions from any comparison between 
the two groups. Neither did we intend to draw conclusions on differences related to the 
level of educational background. 
A limitation of our study is that our participants’ intention to get pregnant differed (i.e. 
actively trying to conceive, intention in the nearby future, or only an intention at the 
time of PCC), which could have influenced their current perceptions. In addition, par-
ticipants of the PCC-group were included in the broader HP4ALL-study. This may have 
increased the possibility of participants giving socially desirable answers. However, 
given that most participants felt unhindered to express only a modest but relevant 
added value of the PCC-consultation, we assume that participants felt free to give their 
own opinion during the interview. Participants could also have been influenced in their 
responses by the different interview settings (i.e. on site, at home, and via telephone), 
yet we have not been able to detect such differences. We included mainly women with 
intermediate educational attainment and only a few women with low educational at-
tainment, which may have affected our results. A final limitation is that our study was 
done in one country with a specific, mainly publicly financed, healthcare system that 
provides for primary care, which includes PCC. This may influence the perceptions 
people have about health in general and on pregnancy preparation in particular. That 
is, perceptions of pregnancy preparation may differ in situations where people have to 
carry the full financial burden of PCC from situations where this is not the case.
Conclusions
Our study provides insights into the perceptions about pregnancy preparation of 
women with a low to intermediate educational attainment. Understanding the percep-
tions of this group is of key importance as they have higher risk for adverse pregnancy 
outcomes. Based on our results, we recommend the proactive offering of custom-made 
PCC including information on fertility. Despite mentioning relevant ways to prepare 
for pregnancy, participants did not mention important topics such as over-the-counter 
drugs, immunizations, sexual risk behaviours, family history, chronic illness, and men-
tal health. More effort, e.g. in the form of information and education, is required to 
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bring these topics to the attention of women with a desire to become pregnant. In ad-
dition, more research needs to be done about how women can be motivated to prepare 
for pregnancy as knowledge about pregnancy preparation alone does not necessarily 
lead to actual pregnancy preparation. Special attention needs to be given to whether 
and if so, how low-health literacy influences pregnancy preparation. As participants 
were open to receiving information about pregnancy preparation provided that this 
information is presented in relevant situations, we also recommend that healthcare 
professionals proactively integrate PCC in their consultations, in particular when 
pregnancy affecting issues are being discussed.
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There is an increasing interest in the possibility of using nudges to promote people’s 
health. Following the advances in developmental biology and epigenetics, it is clear 
that one’s health is not always the result of one’s own choices. In the period surround-
ing pregnancy, maternal choice behaviour has a significant influence on perinatal 
morbidity and mortality as well as the development of chronic diseases later in life. 
One’s health is thus a matter of one’s own as well as one’s maternal choices. Therefore, 
self-regarding and other-regarding nudges should be considered as viable strategies to 
promote health. In this article, we introduce the concept of other-regarding nudges. We 
use the harm principle and the principle of beneficence to justify these other-regarding 
nudges. We conclude by stressing the importance of a fair assessment of expectations 
towards the nudgee, when determining whether a nudge is aimed at preventing harm 
or promoting a good.
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Introducing: other-regarding nudges
Fast and frugal rules of thumb or-heuristics as they are called-are cognitive processes 
that ignore part of the available information to make efficient decisions.(1) Heuristics 
are a powerful tool when it comes to making good inferences about the world under 
limited time and information. (2) Despite their usefulness however, decisions based 
on heuristics can arguably also be detrimental, for example, to one’s health. Choosing 
unhealthy food despite one’s intention to eat healthy and taking the elevator instead 
of the stairs to one’s sedentary office job are examples of this ‘surrender’ to heuristics. 
A well-known strategy that uses heuristics to the benefit of choice-makers is nudg-
ing. A nudge is defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives”(3)There is an increasing interest in the possibility of using 
nudges to encourage people to make healthier choices.(4) Poor health however, can’t 
always be traced back to one’s own choice-behavior. Perinatal morbidity (and mortality) 
and chronic diseases – two major challenges for healthcare and public health – are 
at least to a certain extent the result of other people’s choices, in the cas we discuss, 
parental choices.(5, 6) Although the origins of perinatal morbidity and chronic diseases 
are multifactorial with in part unclear causal chains, there is an increasing amount 
of evidence suggesting that the health of the mother during the period surrounding 
pregnancy influences the risk of developing these poor health outcomes.(7-9) Policy 
and interventions aimed at empowering mothers-to-be, have a great potential to pro-
mote healthy pregnancies and reduce the risk of developing chronic diseases.(10, 11) 
This opens up the possibility of introducing nudges that encourage parents, mothers 
in particular, to make choices that benefit the health of their future children. The aim 
of this paper is to explore the justification of nudges where the principal but not neces-
sarily sole beneficiary of the nudge is not the nudgee, in this case the mother, but her 
future children. We will call these nudges other-regarding nudges. We will use nudges 
aimed at promoting the health of the future child as a case study. Therefore the scope 
of this article will be limited to other-regarding nudges that are aimed at promoting 
the health of the future child by altering the choice-behavior of the mother. Like all 
nudges, these other-regarding nudges are not meant to replace but to complement 
policy, in this case to complement policy to improve maternal and fetal health. 
First we provide a short overview of the relation between the development of the 
unborn, perinatal morbidity and chronic diseases later in life. Subsequently the justi-
fication of nudges to improve the health of the future child will be discussed. Because 
Libertarian Paternalism, the traditional justificatory theory for nudging, only offers a 
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justification for nudges that benefit the nudgee, an alternative form of justification is 
required. As the securing of the future child’s health involves the prevention of harm, 
the Harm Principle will be put forward as a justification. Furthermore, not only should 
harm be prevented. The good, in this context the future child’s health, should also 
be promoted. This duty to promote the good is based on the principle of beneficence. 
Thaler and Sunstein, do mention ‘Libertarian Benevolence’ as a justification of other-
regarding nudges(12).1 We aim to present a fuller account of how beneficence justifies 
other-regarding nudges. 
The distinction between the duty to prevent harm resulting from act or omission and 
the duty to promote the good is notoriously hard to determine. It is important however, 
to seriously consider this distinction as the duty to prevent of harm is thought to offer 
necessary and sufficient justification to introduce preventive policy whereas the duty 
to promote the good does not. As this distinction of duties is based on what we can rea-
sonably expect from others, we conclude by discussing the importance of expectations 
when assessing whether an act counts as doing harm or failing to promote the good. 
from unborn to adult, the development of disease
Despite the fact that many risk factors for chronic diseases such as cardiovascular 
diseases, cancers, chronic respiratory diseases and diabetes, are to a great extent 
avoidable, the prevalence of chronic diseases has reached pandemic proportions.(13) 
Many public health interventions are traditionally introduced in the second half of life 
because it is assumed that during this period the risk of developing chronic diseases 
is greatest.(14) This approach however, has had limited success because it leaves the 
early origins of chronic diseases, unaddressed. Research shows that the development of 
the unborn is an important determinant for the risk to develop chronic diseases later 
in life. (15, 16) An impaired fetal development, which is for example associated with a 
mother’s poor diet, smoking, alcohol consumption or sedentary lifestyle in the period 
surrounding pregnancy, leaves biological traces on the newborn, putting him at higher 
risk to develop chronic diseases later in life.
The field of epigenetics elucidates the pathways through which social disadvantages 
become biologically impinged.(17) In tandem, these social and biological traces in-
crease the risk of chronic diseases later in life.(17) This is why the offering of adequate 
<?> The difference between benevolence and beneficence is irrelevant for our discussion so for the 
sake of clarity we will only use beneficence. 
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pregnancy-related care and the education and empowerment of mothers-to-be is impor-
tant. We argue in favor of a fair opportunity for mothers-to-be, to make choices which 
will benefit their own and their future child’s health. Because of their non-coercive 
character, nudges aimed at promoting healthy maternal choice behavior in the period 
surrounding pregnancy could be considered. In the next section we will examine the 
moral justification for using these other-regarding nudges.
Beneficence to promote the good, the Harm Principle to prevent harm
A nudge is an intervention that benefits from people’s propensity to favor heuristics 
over deliberation to steer them towards preset choices. For example, Thaler and Sun-
stein’s well-known cafeteria nudge relies on people’s tendency to choose food products 
that are conveniently in reach and thus easy to choose.(12) Libertarian Paternalism is 
put forward as a justification for nudging. In short, a Libertarian Paternalistic nudge 
encourages people to choose for their own good in their own eyes. The justification of 
nudges has been discussed extensively because of their alleged potential to manipu-
late, infantilize and nanny the targeted nudgees.(18, 19) These concerns also affect the 
justification of other-regarding nudges. A distinction should be made here between 
the aim of the nudge, for example helping individuals to eat healthy, and the nudging 
method which benefits from individual’s propensity to make heuristic decisions. We 
will put forward beneficence and the harm principle as ways to justify other-regarding 
nudges. The rest of the article will address whether these two principles adequately 
justify the aims of other-regarding nudges. As regards the method, the justifiability of 
relying on heuristics is a concern that is not limited to other-regarding nudges, but to 
nudges in general. If one finds the use of heuristics acceptable, provided that the aim 
of a nudge is justified, then the use of other-regarding nudges is equally acceptable 
and vice versa. This is however a matter we cannot settle here. Still, in our view, an 
assessment of the steering character of the other-regarding nudge (for example does 
resisting the preset choice involve strenuous effort or high costs) is a pragmatic way to 
determine the justifiability of the nudging-method. For the rest of this article we will 
assume that unless the assessment of an other-regarding nudge proves otherwise, the 
nudging-method is justified.     
Regarding other-regarding nudges, one example Thaler and Sunstein discuss is a nudge 
aimed at increasing the availability of organs.(20) This nudge does not benefit the do-
nors, but individuals who need the donor’s organs. In this case Libertarian Benevolence 
is put forward as justification. This shift from paternalism to beneficence represents 
the shift from self-regarding to other-regarding benefits. 
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Why then would it be justified to nudge someone for the benefit of another? In the 
case of organ donation, the fact that the availability of this valuable good fully depends 
on the willingness of others to donate, provides at least a strong reason to encour-
age people to become organ donors. Whether a nudge is appropriate to achieve this 
encouragement depends on the character of the nudge, for example, whether it suf-
ficiently respects the autonomy of the potential donors.
This dependency on others to promote a good also holds for the health of the future 
child. The securing and promotion of the health of the future child depends to a certain 
extent on the choice behavior of the mother. Notwithstanding the fact that maternal 
obligations are in no way comparable to the beneficent act of donating one’s organs, 
both cases demonstrate that the availability of certain valuable goods depends on the 
willingness of others to provide them. In these cases, an appeal to beneficence provides 
strong reasons to use other-regarding nudges that aim to promote the good (OG) In the 
section “beneficence as justification” we will argue that these strong reasons alone 
provide necessary but insufficient justification for OG.
There are arguably stronger reasons to prevent harm than to promote the good. There-
fore, the well-known Harm Principle can be used to justify other-regarding nudges that 
aim to prevent harm (OH). We will present the justification of OH based on the Harm 
Principle in the following section. 
The Harm Principle as justification
It is widely accepted that governments have the duty as well as the authority to protect 
and promote the population’s health.(21) The Harm Principle offers a justification for 
the authority to prevent harm to the population’s health. In On Liberty John Stuart Mill 
argues that ‘‘The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”(22) Joel Feinberg argues 
that liberty-limiting interventions aimed at preventing harm to others should be both 
effective and as less intrusive as possible.2(23) The ideas of Mill and Feinberg combined 
offer a basis for identifying the threshold for justified government interventions. In 
2 There are two ways an unborn can be harmed. A pregnant woman could do harm, for example 
by taking drugs when she is pregnant. She could also allow harm to happen, for example, in the 
case she is diabetic but doesn’t seek care to control her blood sugar. We will follow Feinberg 
in assuming that the Harm Principle applies to harms brought about both by act (harm done) 
and omission (failure to prevent harm). 
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our case, this entails that maternal decisions should be respected by the government 
except when a decision of a mother places the future child at substantial risk of serious 
harm. Only then, the most effective and least intrusive interventions are justified. 
Regarding OH, the justification based on the Harm Principle raises a serious concern. 
By definition nudges are not intended to be intrusive or to limit liberty. The Harm 
Principle justifies far more intrusive interventions than the mere steering character 
of a nudge. The concern about disproportional intrusiveness however is not a mat-
ter of justification, but one of adequacy. For example, if it is indisputably clear that 
maternal cocaine abuse during pregnancy harms the fetus, a hypothetical cocaine 
cessation-nudge, which does not block the use of cocaine, is not the adequate interven-
tion to prevent harm. If in this case the only guiding moral principle for introducing 
an intervention would be the Harm Principle, a far more intrusive intervention would 
not only be justified but also warranted. 
The softer side of harm
In many cases however, patterns of behavior rather than isolated choices cause disease. 
For example, women are well advised to abstain from drinking alcohol during preg-
nancy or when trying to conceive. However, it isn’t this one and only glass of wine but 
a pattern of drinking that leads to faltered fetal development. The difference between 
an isolated choice and a pattern of behavior is, from a moral point of view, important. 
The Harm Principle offers a prima facie justification to prohibit alcohol and enforce 
treatment in the cases of pregnant women with a severe alcohol addiction.(24) These 
interventions however, seem too extreme in the case of a pregnant woman who at 
times drinks a glass of alcohol. This is not new; it is a repetition of Feinberg’s articula-
tion of the Harm Principle. What is new though is that the concepts of proportionality 
and subsidiarity dovetail nicely with nonintrusive interventions that help the majority 
of mothers who live relatively healthy lives but who would profit from encourage-
ment to prevent harm to their future children. For example, a nudge that encourages 
the prevention of drinking an occasional glass of wine is far more appropriate than a 
legal prohibition of alcohol for women trying to conceive. A nudge that incentivizes 
smoking cessation in the period surrounding pregnancy rather than a blanket prohibi-
tion of smoking, isn’t intrusive and it has promising chances to work.(25) An E-health 
nudge that generates a personal risk profile can encourage and empower women to 
adequately prepare for pregnancy. (26) Therefore, in our view, OH are justified when 
the causes of harm viewed separately are morally wrong but not to the extent that they 
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justify and warrant coercive interventions. In these cases, the Harm Principle offers 
necessary and sufficient justification for OH.
Beneficence as justification
We have argued that the availability of certain valuable even life-saving goods, such as 
organs and a healthy prenatal environment for the fetus, depends on the willingness of 
others to provide them. This dependency on others to attain a valuable good provides 
strong reasons to encourage individuals to provide these goods by introducing OG. In 
addition, is some cases, like ours in which we aim to improve the health of the future 
child by altering the choice-behavior of the mother, it may be argued that the mother 
has an interest in benefiting her future child. That is, there are stronger reasons for 
introducing OG when the nudgee has an interest in benefiting the other even if she is 
not the primary beneficiary of the nudge. 
But does the fact that we are dealing with (i) valuable goods whose (ii) availability 
depends on the willingness of others to provide them and (iii) these others have an 
interest in providing these goods, provide necessary and sufficient justification for OG? 
The noncoercive character of the nudge meshes well with the imperfect (deontological) 
or moderate (consequentialist) duty to promote the good. The consequentialist and 
deontological approach to beneficence share the idea that beneficence, contrary to 
the Harm Principle, isn’t an overriding principle.(27-30) That is, there are (prima 
facie) never good reasons to harm someone whereas there can be good reasons not 
to promote someone else’s good. Therefore, beneficence alone offers a necessary but 
not sufficient justification for OG. Compelling reasons not to promote the good can 
trump reasons to promote the good. The best-known constraint on the demands of 
beneficence is overdemandingness. This refers to the unreasonable duty to “give till 
in hurts”. (29) Over-demandingness however does not disqualify beneficence as a jus-
tification because of the non-coercive nature of nudges; when being nudged, no one is 
required to give till it hurts. For example, an organ donation nudge does neither oblige 
nor pressure anyone to donate  his or her organs. However, there may be other reasons 
besides over-demandingness that trump the reasons to promote the good.
Take the following example: it is hard for women to combine a high-powered career 
and children. Suppose that a government introduces as a 2-year pilot an egg-freezing 
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nudge to stimulate this combination.3 The government offers companies a financial 
incentive to stimulate the offering of egg-freezing. This incentive is meant to cover 
part of the costs of egg freezing. For example, the government pays half and the em-
ployer and employee pay the other half. This makes it easier for companies to offer 
egg-freezing to their employees so that they can choose to become pregnant when 
they are ready for motherhood. Let’s also assume that the intention of the government 
is to promote the good. The nudge is really meant to offer women a better chance at 
having a career and children. After two years the number of women freezing their eggs 
has gone up but less women are working part-time and compared to two years ago, 
relatively more young women without children are hired than young women with 
children. In this case, the principle of beneficence offers a necessary but not a sufficient 
justification. The government nudges companies with (the governmental interpreta-
tion of ) the good of women in mind. This satisfies the criterion of necessity. However, 
the reproductive autonomy of the employees could be limited rather than promoted. 
As it is now, a woman’s egg freezing preferences (if she has any in the first place) are 
her own and she is required neither to choose nor to make her reasons for any decision 
explicit. With the introduction of this nudge the option of keeping her preferences to 
herself is lost. Even if she ignores the option, she still chooses not to freeze her eggs. 
In this case –not choosing–  is a meaningful option that deserves to be protected, first 
and for all by the government. In addition, and from a more practical point of view, 
the evaluation of this nudge reveals detrimental side effects which are: a pressure to 
postpone pregnancy, less flexible hours for young parents and less career opportunities 
for young mothers. These concerns show that beneficence is necessary but insufficient 
as a justification for this OG.  This is, of course a fictive example that is only meant to 
show that ample prudence is required when introducing OG.
The murky waters of preventing harm and promoting the good
We have argued that the Harm Principle offers necessary and sufficient justification for 
OH and that beneficence offers necessary but not sufficient justification for OG. Thus 
it is important to determine whether an other-regarding nudge is aimed at preventing 
harm or at promoting the good. 
In theory, a nudge that helps women trying to conceive to start the timely use of folic 
acid supplementation is easier to justify than a nudge to help women trying to conceive 
3 This example is inspired on the controversies surrounding Apple and Facebook’s recent offer-
ing of egg-freezing to their female employees
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to optimize their diet. The former nudge aims at preventing harm whereas the latter 
aims at optimizing a good. Unfortunately, the murky waters of everyday practice often 
resist this neat theoretical distinction. It is all but clear where prevention of harm ends 
and where the promotion of good begins.
Take folic acid supplementation again as an example. Let’s consider the case of Amy 
who is trying to conceive but doesn’t use supplementation because she is unaware of 
its effects on fetal development. A nudge may be introduced to help Amy to optimize 
her folic acid intake. For example, bread that is fortified with folic acid can be made 
easily available for her during the period she is advised to use supplementation. Reduc-
ing the chance of neural tube defects becomes as easy as eating a sandwich. Because the 
nudge is aimed at preventing harm the Harm Principle offers necessary and sufficient 
justification. 
Amy’s case however, may also be construed, as one of failing to promote a good. 
Amy isn’t putting her future newborn in a more harmful situation than the newborn 
would be in the first place, a necessary condition for an action (or omission) to count 
as harm. What she is ‘doing’ is failing to provide a good, the good being the benefits 
of supplementation. In this case the justification of the nudge would be based on the 
principle of beneficence. When considering the introduction of a nudge this difference, 
although small, does matter. The moral constraint of causing harm is stronger than 
the moral obligation to promote the good. There are stronger reasons to introduce a 
supplementation nudge to prevent harm (decrease the chance of neural tube defect) 
than to promote a good (increase the chance of no neural tube defect). One way to 
determine whether we are dealing with a situation of harm or a situation of benefit is 
by assessing what we may reasonably expect from Amy and why. 
It is reasonable to claim that women trying to conceive have some maternal obligations 
towards their future children. These obligations are very likely to inform us about 
what we may reasonably expect from Amy. Not fulfilling these obligations could be 
construed as harm. Binge drinking in the period she is trying to conceive for example, 
would count as harm. There is also a class of actions (or omissions) which are praise-
worthy but not obligatory; supererogatory actions. Not acting in a supererogatory way 
can be construed as failing to provide a good. Even though not visiting a preconception 
consultation does not does not count as harm, a visit would be recommendable and 
praiseworthy. In order to distinguish between situations of harm and benefit however, 
a full account of obligations of women trying to conceive is required. Although giving 
this full account is beyond the scope of this article, the most important requirement 
this account should satisfy is that the expected benefits for the future child should 
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justify the burdens put on women trying to conceive. In the case of the fortified bread 
nudge, the benefit of substantially reducing the risk of a neural tube defect justifies the 
“burden” of being encouraged to eat fortified bread instead of normal bread. Therefore, 
we argue that using folic acid supplementation is a moral obligation and we would 
classify that nudge as OH. Optimizing one’s diet when trying to conceive decreases the 
chances of disease development of one’s future child. The effect of diet optimization 
on the health of the future child however isn’t as clear as in the case of folic acid 
supplementation. In addition, optimizing one’s diet is significantly more burdensome 
than taking folic acid supplementation or eating a different type of bread. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to classify diet optimization as beneficence rather than preventing harm. 
A nudge that encourages women to optimize their diet, such as the earlier mentioned 
m-Health nudge, would therefore be an OG.  
A caveat is that there seem to be a lot of presumptions regarding the duties of mothers 
(-to-be). How easy and common it is to claim that women should do all they can do to 
prevent harm to their future children. And how easy and common it is to conflate pre-
venting harm with optimizing health. When the prevention of harm and promotion of 
good are conflated, everything a mother does that does not maximize her child’s health 
or well-being will count as harm. And harm offers necessary and sufficient justification 
for a whole ambit of interventions. To make sure that the adequate threshold for harm 
is safeguarded, a fair assessment of benefits and burdens is warranted
Conclusion
We have argued that OH and OG have a place in the array of interventions aimed at 
preventing harm to and promoting good health of the future child. The Harm Principle 
offers necessary and sufficient justification for OH. The principle of beneficence offers 
necessary but insufficient justification for OG. What is expected from nudgees, in this 
case women trying to conceive, determines whether they are expected to prevent harm 
or promote the good. Therefore, a fair assessment of these expectations is warranted. 
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Abstract
Is it morally justifiable to force non-consenting pregnant women to submit to cesarean 
surgery to save their fetus in distress? Even though proponents and opponents largely 
agree on the interests at stake, such as the health and life of the fetus and the respect 
for bodily integrity and autonomy of pregnant women, they disagree on which moral 
weight to attach to these interests. This is why disagreements about the justifiability of 
forced cesareans tend to be pervasive and intractable. To sidestep this deadlock, we will 
focus on conditions that give rise to the ‘cesarean dilemma’ in the first place, namely 
the conflict between inherent norms and values medical professionals are committed 
to by virtue of being a medical professional. Using the reflective equilibrium, we will 
we test the opponents’ and proponents’ considered judgments about forced cesareans 
against the norms and values they –as medical professionals– are committed to and 
determine whether they are coherent. Subsequently we will identify the proponents’ 
incoherencies between the considered judgments and norms and values they are 
committed to and conclude that as long as these incoherencies are in place, forced 
cesareans are morally impermissible.
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Introduction
A is brought into the delivery suites. She is 36 weeks pregnant and is diagnosed with an 
umbilical cord prolapse. Immediate cesarean section is indicated to save the fetus. Two 
years ago A was treated for an appendicitis. Her wound got infected and she developed 
a sepsis. This unfortunate ordeal left A terrified of surgery – especially abdominal sur-
gery. Scared but coherent, she refuses to consent to the cesarean section. After an hour 
of persistent but fruitless pleas of the doctors, the fetus dies. 
Should the doctor in the case of A have forced A to submit to cesarean surgery?4 Dis-
agreements about the justifiability of forced cesareans are pervasive and intractable. 
Although opponents and proponents of forced cesareans agree about the interests at 
stake, they disagree about the moral (and legal) ‘weight’ that should be given to these 
interests. Proponents typically acknowledge that women have a right to bodily integrity 
and autonomy. They claim however, that these rights aren’t absolute and the life and 
health of the fetus should, in dire circumstances, outweigh the right to refuse surgery.
(1, 2) Opponents on the other hand acknowledge that the fetus has interests. They 
claim however, that even though the rights to bodily integrity and autonomy (from 
here on right to autonomy) aren’t absolute, they do protect women against forced sur-
gery.(3) As medical ethics and law stand now, no one can be forced to submit to surgery 
to save someone else’s life. Forcing women to submit to surgery would therefore be an 
unjustified demand, irreconcilable with the moral and legal standards in the medical 
domain. Because of these different perspectives on the justification of forced cesareans 
proponents and opponents are unlikely to reach consensus on an issue that, because of 
the possible tragic consequences for mother and child, demands it. 
We will sidestep this deadlock by focusing on the conditions that give rise to the 
cesarean dilemma. The cesarean dilemma is precisely –a dilemma– because of the 
conflict of ethical principles professionals working in the medical domain are commit-
ted to. Without this commitment to principles such as ‘beneficence’ and ‘respect for 
autonomy’ the cesarean dilemma would in fact not arise. Therefore, we will test the 
coherence of the ethical principles medical professionals are committed to and the 
considered judgments they hold. This is the adage of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium 
(RE).(4) To present the ethical principles professionals are typically committed to in a 
systematic way, we will use the widely accepted principles of biomedical research of 
Beauchamp and Childress.(5) 
4 In the Netherlands for example, the Dutch group ‘Actio Caesarea’, consisting of doctors and 
(former) judges, argues for the possibility to force women, via a court order, to submit to 
cesarean surgery in cases of medically indicated fetal distress (1). 
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The use of the RE is appealing because the justifiability of the positions at stake is 
judged by referring to the principles and considered judgments the opponents and 
proponents themselves are committed to. The RE is thus an instrument that can be of 
help as it requires the arguments of proponents and opponents to be, at the very least, 
coherent. 
We will conclude that as long as a pregnant woman is competent to consent, propo-
nents face a serious challenge to argue in favor of forced cesareans while at the same 
time remaining faithful, as professionals, to their own body of considered judgments 
and ethical principles.
We will start by giving an overview of the arguments typically put forward by pro-
ponents and opponents of forced cesareans. Because seemingly the respect for the 
pregnant woman’s rights is seemingly in conflict with the duty to bring forth the best 
consequences for the fetus, we will, for the sake of clarity, present the arguments in terms 
of (i) deontological arguments in favor and against, and (ii) consequentialist arguments 
in favor and against forced cesareans. 
Opponents 
Based on most legal and moral literature on the topic, it is surprising that the justifi-
ability of forced cesareans is a matter of controversy. With few exceptions, the lit-
erature suggests that a pregnant woman’s right to autonomy trumps the doctor’s duty 
to promote the interests of the fetus and pregnant woman.(6-11) This defense of the 
pregnant woman’s right to refuse surgery typically takes two forms. 
first is what we call the deontological defense. This line of defense exhibits in a number 
of ways the importance of respecting a competent patient’s right to autonomy, that is, 
the right to have control over what happens to their body (e.g. in the medical setting) 
– whatever the consequences of this right may be5. One way this right is justified for 
instance, is by arguing that the right to autonomy is meant to protect the ‘intrinsic 
value’ or ‘human dignity’ of patients. This right to protection brings forth the claim to 
self-governance and privacy that patients have on medical professionals. This entails 
that in situations of medical decision-making, a (competent) patient cannot be forced 
to undergo treatment without her consent even if the consequences are detrimental 
to herself or a third party. Hence, a pregnant woman may not be ‘victimized’ through 
5 This is not to say that there exist no consequentialist or utilitarian defenses of the right to 
autonomy.
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surgery without consent for the sake of her own or someone else’s good. This right is 
enshrined in the doctor’s duty to obtain informed consent.(12) As it is now, the respect 
for the patient’s autonomy and the duty to obtain informed consent are of paramount 
importance in the medical domain. A legal example that demonstrates the importance 
of respect for autonomy is the ruling of the Court of Appeal in the UK in the case of S v 
St George’s NHS Trust. The court made it unequivocally clear that a pregnant woman is 
allowed to refuse medical treatment (cesarean surgery) even if this would likely harm 
her own health or the health of her unborn “unless she is clearly and properly not 
sound of mind”.(13) The ethical argument underpinning this court order thus is that 
a pregnant woman’s right to autonomy cannot be traded off in pursuance of the best 
possible consequences for the fetus.
The corollary of this deontological reasoning is a critique of the use of ‘greedy’ con-
sequentialist reasoning. For example, in her refutation of consequentialism Rhoden 
writes “If decisions are made for a woman in a way that suggests that it does not matter 
very much who she is, then she has, in a very real sense, been wronged. Of course, 
courts in these cases do not override women’s choices lightly. They are faced with 
extraordinarily hard decisions in which the threat to the infant must be neither denied 
nor minimized. But, if the way to avert this threat is to coerce the woman and violate 
her rights, then the court, in pursuing the best consequences, inevitably treats the woman 
merely as a means to the goal of preserving the infant’s health.”(10) 
Second is what we may call the consequentialist defense. This line of defense accepts the 
assertion that the interests of the mother and the fetus ought to be balanced against 
one another. When all possible consequences are taken into account however, the 
balance would arguably not tip in favor of the use of force. Here is a list of adverse 
consequences.
(i) If the option to force women to submit to surgery is accepted, it invites –in addition 
to the use of force– the use of coercion. Consider the case of Lisa Epsteen who received 
an email form the chairman of an obstetrics and gynecology department in the U.S. in 
which he stated: “I would hate to move to the most extreme option, which is having 
law enforcement pick you up at your home and bring you in, but you are leaving the 
providers [of the hospital] no choice.”(14) The chairman was deeply concerned that 
Epsteen’s refusal to come in for surgery would result in her fetus dying or incurring 
serious brain damage. His rationale for the email is understandable. However, even if 
forced cesareans are justified, the coercive offer to bring Epsteen in and potentially 
force her to undergo surgery requires additional justification.
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(ii) The actual enforcement of forced cesareans may lead to humiliating situations. For 
example, in Chicago a Nigerian woman was hospitalized for the final months of her 
pregnancy and was advised to have a cesarean section. When she did not agree she was 
placed by force in leather wrist and ankle cuffs. She reportedly screamed for help and 
bit through her intravenous tubing in an attempt to get free.(15, 16) 
(iii) With the possibility of forced cesareans looming, women, especially those with 
an obstetric history, may become less likely or even reluctant to seek needed obstetric 
care.(17)
(iv) The possibility of force is also detrimental to the patient-doctor relation in which it 
is of crucial importance that a patient feels safe. 
(iv) Concerns have also been expressed about the lack of due process for women who 
would be forced to undergo cesarean surgery. In these cases there is typically an ”ab-
sence of notice, an absence of adequate legal representation for the pregnant woman 
and no explicit standard of proof to judge the necessity of a cesarean.”(18) 
We haven’t presented an exhaustive list of adverse consequences of forced cesareans. 
But these examples should suffice to show that even if a consequentialist line of reason-
ing is accepted, it remains questionable whether the overall benefits of the use of force 
do outweigh the burdens for (pregnant) women. We will now present the arguments 
put forward by the proponents of forced cesareans. 
Proponents 
Compelling as they may be, the arguments put forward can be disconnected from the 
‘sense of urgency’ felt by doctors who face this dilemma. Research conducted by Samu-
els et al. found that 51% of the questioned 229 obstetricians and 126 health lawyers 
were highly likely to support the use of a court ordered cesarean section to protect and 
promote the health of the fetus.(19) These doctors and lawyers (seem to) hold the view 
that saving the fetus in distress is a good reason to bypass informed consent. When a 
child may suffer life-long misery or even die because a mother refuses surgery, feelings 
of helplessness and despair do arise. With these stakes it is no wonder that some doc-
tors will do all they can to save the fetus, if not by persuasion then by force. Again, we 
may divide the arguments into a deontological and a consequentialist defense. 
first, the consequentialist defense is straightforward. Severe harm or death may be pre-
vented at the cost of what is considered to be intrusive but relatively safe and routine 
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surgery. Therefore, in cases of a medically indicated cesarean, the use of force is justi-
fied. 
Second, is the deontological defense. Once a human life begins it matters how that life 
goes. This creates a conditional duty 6 to act in such a way that the interests of the (un)
born are promoted. Pregnant women have this duty towards their (un)born. This duty 
includes making some acceptable sacrifices, such as consenting to cesarean surgery, if 
that would save the life of her (un)born. Chervenak et al. present a similar argument. 
(1, 20). They argue that if (i) cesarean surgery is medically indicated and the indication 
is based on (ii) well-founded obstetrical judgment, which should be (iii) replicable by a 
well-informed competent clinician, a doctor should not be guided only by a mother’s 
refusal but also by his own duty of beneficence. Respecting the refusal of a mother to 
undergo a medically indicated surgery would be, according to Chervanak et al., “a form 
of indefensible imprudence.”(1) 
In short, the justification of forced cesarean sections builds on the beneficence based 
maternal and professional conditional duties that follow from maternal duty, prudence 
and well-founded medical judgment. In sum, both opponents and proponents of forced 
cesareans present reasonable arguments that support their position. The result is a 
moral deadlock. We will now introduce the RE and explain why and how this method 
can help to establish whether forced cesareans are justifiable.
The re
In short, the RE is a method that allows us to align, as well as possible, our most confi-
dent moral judgments or intuitions (considered judgments), with the ethical principles 
we are committed to.(21) This method does not treat considered judgments as unas-
sailable truths nor ethical principles as self-evident axioms. Rather it takes considered 
judgments as starting points. In order to affirm these considered judgments, they must 
be coherent with other considered judgments and ethical principles one is committed 
to. When coherence is achieved, the RE has been reached and there are good reasons 
to be confident about the soundness of the judgment at hand.
The RE works ‘up and down’. Ethical principles are specified in terms of considered 
judgments. For example, the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ is specified as the 
considered judgment that it is wrong to perform surgery on A against her will. Considered 
6 A duty resulting from certain relations we have with one another
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judgments on the other hand are subsumed under ethical principles. For example, the 
considered judgment that doctor should save the baby is subsumed under the principle 
of beneficence. The more one is successful to specify and subsume, the more reason 
one has to be confident about the judgment at hand.  
We emphasize the importance of taking the viewpoint of the professional as they are 
committed to professional norms and values. Surely a doctor strives to promote the 
health and well-being of his patients while treating them with due respect –and if he 
doesn’t, he should! We are therefore aiming to find a narrow reflective equilibrium in 
which we take the professional norms and values, which we base on the biomedical 
principles of Beauchamp and Childress, to be (at least for now) unproblematic. We do 
so because, the cesarean dilemma does, prima facie, not challenge the whole body of 
norms and values of the medical domain. Quite the contrary, the cesarean dilemma 
appears precisely as a dilemma because two cornerstone principles, which are -the 
duty of beneficence- and -the duty to respect autonomy-, are in conflict. If, say, the 
duty to respect autonomy wasn’t a cornerstone principle, the cesarean dilemma would 
arguably not arise. The benevolent paternalistic doctor would simply decide what is 
best for the mother and her fetus. We will now assess the coherence of the considered 
judgments and ethical principles pertaining to the cesarean dilemma.
The equilibrium at work: the case of A revisited
We begin by formulating a hypothetical equilibrium (HE) which after scrutiny will or 
will not pass the test of the reflective equilibrium. (HE) Doctors should have the possibility to 
force a competent pregnant woman to submit to surgery if according to the best of their professional 
judgment this would save the life or greatly benefit the health of the fetus without exposing the 
woman to disproportionate risks.
Textbox 1
A is brought into the delivery suites. She is 36 weeks pregnant and is diagnosed with an umbili-
cal cord prolapse. Immediate cesarean section is indicated to save the fetus. Two years ago A 
was treated for an appendicitis. The wound resulting from the appendectomy got infected and 
she developed a sepsis. This unfortunate ordeal left A terrified of surgery –especially abdomi-
nal surgery. Scared but coherent, she refuses to consent to the indicated cesarean section. After 
an hour of persistent but fruitless pleas of the doctors, the fetus dies.
Let’s go back to the situation in which A (textbox 1) is brought into the delivery suites 
and she adamantly refuses the indicated cesarean.
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We start with considered judgment (CJ1) (table 1) the doctor should force A to submit to 
surgery. For (CJ1) to be accepted it should be in equilibrium with other considered judg-
ments as well as the medical ethical principles. 
We add (CJ2) Given that X is a doctor he should try to save the life of the fetus in distress. As a 
doctor it is reasonable to hold these two considered judgments because a doctor wants 
to do good; (P1) the principle of beneficence. In RE terms: (P1) is specified by (CJ1,2) and 
(CJ1,2) are subsumed under (P1). 
For a doctor who holds (CJ1,2) to act fair (P2) he should force all women in A-like cir-
cumstances to submit to surgery because the doctor should treat all equal medical 
cases equally. Whether that is the case depends of course on what qualifies as an A-like 
case. A-like cases can be thought to comprise all cases in which competent women 
refuse a medically indicated cesarean. 
Table 1
Hypothetical equilibrium
(HE) Doctors should have the possibility to force a competent pregnant woman to submit to surgery 
if according to the best of their professional judgment this would save the life or greatly benefit the 
health of the fetus without exposing the woman to disproportionate risk
Considered judgments
(CJ1) the doctor should force A to submit to surgery.
(CJ2) Given that X is a doctor he should try to save the life of the A’s fetus in distress
(CJ3)  forcing A to submit to surgery is justified because the benefit for the fetus outweighs the harm 
to A.
(CJ4) Forcing A to submit to surgery to benefit the fetus is justified if persuasion fails
(CJ5)  Because A’s refusal is based on fear, it isn’t a reflection of what she really wants; without fear 
she would consent
Principles based on the principles of biomedical research by Beauchamp and Childress
(P1) the principle of beneficence
(P2) the principle of fairness
(P3) the principle of proportionality
(P4) the principle of subsidiarity
(P5) the principle of respect for autonomy
A-like cases can however also be thought to comprise all cases in which one person has 
a conditional duty towards another person, like mother and fetus but also father and 
son, and the prior is in a unique position to save the latter by way of surgery. Consider 
for example the case in which a father could save his son by donating his kidney which 
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would come at a risk comparable to a mother having cesarean surgery to save the life of 
her fetus. If a mother is forced to save the life of her fetus but a father is not forced to 
save the life of his son, then equal cases are not treated equally.7 (CJ1,2) are not coherent 
with (P2). 
The scenario in which a father is in the unique position to save his son but chooses 
not do so has, as far as we know, not been recorded. The case that comes closest to this 
scenario is the case of McFall v Shimp.(22, 23) McFall was dying and Shimp, his cousin, 
was the only person known to have compatible bone marrow. Shimp refused to donate, 
so McFall attempted to force Shimp to comply on the grounds that his life depended 
upon the transplantation. The court decided that Shimp could not be compelled to 
donate. McFall died8. 
From a moral viewpoint, what matters is that moral fiduciaries can be in a unique 
position to save those under their moral protection. This can be a mother saving her 
fetus but also a father saving his son (and why stop there and not include McFall?). To 
single out women as the only targets of force is, from a moral viewpoint, arbitrary. 
Therefore, we argue that A-like cases should be expanded to all moral fiduciaries who 
are in the unique position to save those under their protection at a reasonable cost, 
such as submitting to relatively safe surgery. Consequently, we should either permit 
force in all or in no A-like cases. In RE terms: (CJ1,2) are not coherent with (P2) if we only 
use force against pregnant women.   
We will now scrutinize the principle of beneficence (P1). It is understandable that 
doctors want to use force to save the fetus (CJ1,2) as they have a duty of beneficence 
(P1). But what is understandable is not necessary justifiable. Especially in the medical 
domain, the demands of beneficence is not without limits. The case of Angela Carder is 
a clear example of the danger of the ‘overdemandingness’ of beneficence. 
Carder, who was pregnant, was a bone cancer patient. She became critically ill and the 
condition of the fetus seemed to deteriorate to such an extent that Angela’s family was 
asked for permission to perform a caesarean section.(24).Because the caesarean might 
further shorten Carder’s life and it would lead to more discomfort in her already pre-
carious situation the family, in accordance with Carder’s own desire, decided against 
7 In this paper we only discuss to the justifiability of forced cesareans. We are however, aware that there is 
a broad discussion about the justifiability of liberty-restricting measures in cases where maternal behavior 
may possibly harm children(-to-be).
8 It is worth noting that in common law there is a distinction between parents and all others in regard to a 
duty to rescue.
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surgery. The hospital attorney however felt that the interests of the fetus deserved 
more consideration. “Balancing Angela Carder’s life expectancy as a cancer-ridden 
patient against that of the fetus, the court ordered the cesarean.”(25) the surgery was 
performed, sadly followed in short order by the child’s death and that of its mother.(26) 
Three years later an appellate court overturned the lower court ruling in order to pre-
vent a precedent.(24) The ruling stated clearly that considerations such as a mother’s 
prognosis and likelihood of success should not make a difference when protecting a 
woman’s right to be the decision maker.
To prevent such dramatic situations, the demands of beneficence are regulated by (P3) 
proportionality and (P4) subsidiarity. The burdens of cesarean surgery have to be accept-
able relative to the benefits for the fetus (P3) and the benefits for the fetus must be 
achieved using the least intrusive methods (P4). (P3,4) are the ‘checks and balances’ 
for (P1). 
Going back to the case of A we can now add two more considered judgments: (CJ3) 
forcing A to submit to surgery is justified because the benefit for the fetus outweighs the harm to A. 
(CJ4) Forcing A to submit to surgery to benefit the fetus is justified if persuasion fails. We’d like to 
mention that to our mind persuasion as mentioned in (CJ4) is morally permissible and 
for the sake of the fetus it is even required. Let us now scrutinize (CJ3,4).
How coherent are (CJ3,4) with (P3,4)? Do the demands of proportionality and subsidiar-
ity allow for the use of force when the use of force brings about benefits for the fetus 
that outweigh the burdens for the mother? To be clear we are not aiming at finding the 
conditions in which the benefits for the fetus outweigh the burdens for the mother. 
Even if it is possible to identify such conditions, by themselves these conditions do not 
justify the use of force as such. For the sake of argument, we will assume that the 
exchange of benefits and burdens is reasonable and ask whether this is sufficient to 
justify force. 
The use of force in the medical domain is rare. Its use for the benefit of others even 
rarer. This is not because the options to help each other are limited. Individuals may 
undergo surgery, donate organs, donate blood or participate in medical research; all for 
the sake of others. The use of force is limited because it, prima facie, violates (P5) the 
principle of respect for a patient’s autonomy. Yet, one example of the justified use of force 
for the benefit of others is the use of force when quarantining contagious individuals 
to prevent serious communal harm.(27) In dire circumstances, quarantine can be the 
only available measures to stop an outbreak of diseases such as SARS and Ebola. The 
restriction of movement during the estimated period of communicability is therefore 
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thought to be a proportionate and subsidiary use of force (P3,4). Let us now compare 
the risks and burdens pertaining to quarantines and forced cesareans. To be sure we 
are aware that the (possible) voluntariness of pregnancy and involuntariness of having 
a contagious disease limit the comparison. However, we may still discuss, in a meaning-
ful way, the burdens and benefits of both interventions.
Without doing injustice to the considerable praiseworthiness of rescuing the potentially 
lost life of a viable fetus, the prevention of an epidemic (including the potential death 
of a great many viable fetuses) counts as a ‘greater’ benefit’. More lives can be saved. 
The burdens on the other hand are arguably bigger for those who are forced to submit 
to surgery than those whose movement is restricted by force. Consider that “in response to 
concerns about informed consent, HHS/CDC has added regulatory language requiring 
that the Director advise the individual that if a medical examination is required as 
part of a Federal order that the examination will be conducted by an authorized and 
licensed health worker with prior informed consent. [emphasis added]”(27) The HHS/CDC 
rightfully assumes that medical examination without informed consent is a greater 
intrusion on one’s rights than the restriction of movement. In sum, the benefits of 
quarantine are bigger and the burdens are smaller. Therefore, as we do not force medi-
cal examination to save many people from an epidemic, a fortiori we shouldn’t force 
surgery on a pregnant woman to save the life of a fetus. 
Whether (CJ4) is subsidiary (P4) is more open to debate. One may claim that profes-
sionals cannot rely on persuasion as the least intrusive option. A pregnant woman can 
still refuse. On the other hand, in the overwhelming majority of cases information and 
persuasion are sufficient to convince women to undergo cesarean surgery. We will now 
address (P5) respect for autonomy.
Is respect for autonomy (P5) reconcilable with the use force in the medical domain? 
Obviously not; except for two situations. First, when medical disaster can be prevented 
as we have described in the quarantine case. The use of force is, however, even in that 
extraordinary situation limited to the restriction of movement. Second, it is permitted 
when a patient (temporarily) lacks the capacity to make a medical decision. In such a 
case, medical treatment can be enforced for the good of that patient. A legal example 
that demonstrates the importance of the capacity to make a decision about cesarean 
surgery is the case of Ms. A. Pacchieri an Italian35 year old woman who traveled to 
the UK.(28) Pacchieri who suffered from bipolar disorder had a panic attack and was 
subsequently detained. At 39 weeks of gestation an application was made to the Court 
of Protection to perform a cesarean section as this was thought to be in the best inter-
est of Pacchieri. The judge made a declaration that Pacchieri lacked capacity in relation 
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to this decision and that it was in her best interests for her baby to be delivered by 
caesarean section, with the use of reasonable restraint in order to achieve that opera-
tion safely and successfully.(29)
Given the importance of capacity we add (CJ5) Because A’s refusal is based on fear, it isn’t 
a reflection of what she really wants; without fear she would consent. If (CJ5) is true, then (P5) 
offers insufficient reason to not force A to submit to surgery. A is scared and will regret 
het refusal and thus there is reason to force her to submit to surgery.
If (CJ5) is not true and A’s refusal is a reflection of what she really wants, then there is 
good reason to adhere to (P5) and not allow force. And herein lies the problem. In acute 
situations such as a cesarean dilemma, it is particularly hard to establish a pregnant 
woman’s  decision-making capacity.(30) Moreover, decision-making capacity comes in 
varying degrees. The additional normative question is; which level of decision-making 
capacity (scalar) is sufficient to establish competence (binary)? (31) 
A’s decision is obviously affected by her fear for abdominal surgery. Yet fear alone 
should, in our view, never be the threshold for incompetence. Emotions such as fear, 
anxiety, anger and despair are part and parcel of the medical domain. Such a threshold 
would render many patients who are capable of balancing emotion with reason, incom-
petent. However, it isn’t easy to imagine situations in which the refusal of a medically 
indicated cesarean surgery is based on understandable and appreciable reasons. And 
these reasons for refusal are important to deflect the sentiment that in the medical 
domain, we allow for actual life to capitulate to abstract principle. It is at this point, 
that the ‘art of establishing decision-making capacity’ plays a crucial role and that our 
case study of A reaches its limits. We can, of course, construct A’s case in such a way 
that she turns out to be competent –or not.  But that does not help to establish the 
justifiability of forced cesareans.
Conclusion
From here, we turn back to the RE and draw two conclusions. First, we have shown that 
coherence is lacking between considered judgments (CJ1-5) and principles (P1-5). This 
suggests that the HE does not pass the test of the RE and should therefore be rejected.
Second, although we reject the HE this is not based on a blind adherence to the prin-
ciple of respect of autonomy (P5). To understand the adherence to a patient’s wish 
when anxiety and fear may have marred her decision-making capacity as ‘respect’ 
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for autonomy is, in our view, questionable and such adherence can, especially in a 
litigious culture, be a ‘moral bailout’. The overwhelming majority of cases show that 
refusal is an atypical response when cesarean surgery is required to save the fetus. This 
understandably raises questions about the woman’s decision-making capacity. In this 
dilemma, nothing would be more regrettable than not changing the mind of a mind 
open to change. Still, the moral norms and standards of the medical domain, in which 
the use of force to benefit others is close to unthinkable, should also apply to pregnant 
women and their doctors. The fact that this is an extraordinary dilemma offers on its 
own no reason to judge it according to extraordinary moral standards. 
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Abstract
Background: Embryonic and fetal development are key determinants for pregnancy 
outcomes and life-long health. Preconception care aims to identify, manage and coun-
teract risk factors to prevent or limit the impediment of this development. Moreover, 
it provides an excellent opportunity to improve couples informed decision-making by 
providing information on reproductive choices. Unfortunately, in most countries the 
uptake of PCC remains low. Moreover, it is usually provided infrequently and on an 
opportunistic basis. 
Objective: In response to the high prevalence of adverse pregnancy outcomes, especially 
among vulnerable women, and the poor uptake of PCC, an international and interdisci-
plinary expert meeting was organized in October 2016. The objective was to (i) discuss 
the key barriers in the provision, uptake and implementation of preconception care, 
(ii) to explore the gaps in current research and (iii) to explore the potential of new 
scientific insights to further improve pregnancy outcomes. 
Results: This report presents the most important outcomes of this meeting. These in-
clude the provision of tailor-made care; the definition and distribution of roles and 
responsibilities of caregivers; the inclusion of fertility counseling in preconception 
care and the development of pathways that cut across the medical and non-medical 
domains.
Keywords: preconception care, ethics, expert meeting, responsibility, inequity, epi-
genetics, fertility counseling, nudging
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Introduction
Embryonic and fetal development are key determinants for pregnancy outcomes and 
life-long health.(1-3) Preconception care (PCC) aims to identify, manage and counteract 
risk factors to prevent the impediment of this development and it aims to improve 
couples informed decision-making by providing information on reproductive choices.
(4) Especially vulnerable women living in deprived circumstances face higher risks to 
have adverse pregnancy outcomes due to an accumulation of risk factors.(5) There is 
compelling evidence for the effectiveness of a list of PCC interventions such as folic 
acid supplementation, smoking cessation and dietary improvement.(6) Given that the 
risks of adverse pregnancy outcomes can be reduced, the empowerment of mothers-to-
be to adequately prepare for pregnancy by offering them PCC is a medical and a moral 
imperative. 
Unfortunately, in most countries the uptake of PCC remains low and it is usually pro-
vided infrequently and on an opportunistic basis.(7) In response to the unnecessary 
high prevalence of adverse pregnancy outcomes especially among vulnerable women, 
and the poor uptake of PCC, an international and interdisciplinary expert meeting was 
organized in October 2016. The aim was to (i) discuss the key barriers in the provision, 
uptake and implementation of PCC, (ii) to explore the gaps in current research and (iii) 
to explore the potential of new scientific insights to improve pregnancy outcomes. This 
report presents the most important outcomes of this meeting.
Method
The expert panel of 11 members consisted of clinicians, clinical researchers, medical 
ethicists, and a representative of a patient- federation (an alliance of 70 patient organi-
zations). The discussion was structured around the following topics: (1) ‘The concept of 
PCC and the role of caregivers’ (2) ‘reaching those who need care the most’ (3) ‘societal 
valorization of new knowledge’ and (4) ‘translating behavioral insights into PCC’. Each 
topic was introduced by a member of the expert panel. The subsequent discussions 
were guided by a list of questions and statements (Table 1). The results of this meeting 
are presented in the form of four recommendations. All panel members participated in 
reviewing and providing suggestions related to the content of the   manuscript. 
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recommendations
1. Reach consensus about the organization of PCC
a. Appoint a PCC-provider responsible for the uptake
Although there is consensus about the content of PCC (4, 8), a uniform strategy about 
the best ways to maximize the uptake of PCC is largely lacking.(7) This is mainly due 
to the poor organization of PCC, in which it is unclear who should  develop, offer, 
provide, and fund PCC interventions. According to the expert panel, the poor uptake 
of PCC can in part be improved by appointing an easily identifiable PCC-provider, who 
acts as a case manager, responsible for the first contact for entry into PCC. Preferably, 
this contact should be someone who is easily approachable for parents-to-be, which in 
many cases is the general practitioner or public health nurse.   
b. Provide tailor-made care
A major problem in improving the uptake in PCC, is that those who could benefit most 
from entering PCC are often unaware of PCC or do not consider themselves as the 
target public.(9, 10). Barrett et al. reported that different PCC approaches are needed 
for different groups of women with differing investments in pre-pregnancy health and 
care.(11) Building on these findings, clinical experts mentioned that it is necessary 
to consider that parents-to-be are mainly interested in their own personal risks and 
possible benefits rather than the entire package of PCC aims. For example, patients 
who were interested in identifying their personal genetic risk, were generally not inter-
ested in a general preconception consultation. The need for tailor-made care including 
personal risk identification and a clear presentation of possible health benefits is thus 
not only necessary for adequate PCC delivery but also for an improved uptake of PCC. 
Digital assessment tools such as ‘Gabby’ (12, 13), the mHealth coaching tool Smarter 
Pregnancy, (14) and the preconception risk assessment tool ‘Preparing for Pregnancy’ 
(15) may prove to benefit the uptake of PCC as they are easily accessible, generate 
personal risk assessments and provide tailor-made information and advice explaining 
why the identified risks are a potential problem and how the user can minimize these 
risks.
c. Define and distribute the roles and responsibilities of caregivers
In accordance with existing research, the panel was in agreement on the fact that PCC 
encompasses medical and non-medical domains such as gynecology and obstetrics, 
general medicine, reproductive health, pharmacy, public health, social services and 
personal lifestyle.(16) Whereas the preconception consultation and the delivery of 
health care clearly belong to the medical domain, the duty to provide preconception 
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information and the improvement the socioeconomic determinants of adverse preg-
nancy outcomes cuts across the medical and non-medical domains. In accordance with 
existing literature, a shared care model, an approach to care that includes the skills 
and knowledge of a range of professionals such as pregnancy related healthcare profes-
sionals, policy makers, social peer group networks and community social workers, has 
been proposed to secure the involvement of all relevant stakeholders and ameliorate 
the fair distribution of the responsibility to improve pregnancy outcomes.(17)
Members of the panel mentioned that the lack of a shared care model sometimes 
results in the untimely referral of patients to specialist care. For example and in line 
with existing research(10) they experience that some caregivers tend to treat patients 
too long and consequently misestimate the appropriate moment of referral. Members 
mentioned   that caregivers tend to only deliver the care relevant to their domain, 
thereby overlooking other possible risks to pregnancy. For example, not all oncologists 
mention the possibility of egg freezing to women who will likely lose their fertility 
after treatment. Likewise, teratogenic medication is too often prescribed to women 
who might become pregnant without informing them about the reproductive risks. 
These examples reinforce the need for a shared care model. 
2. Reach those who need care the most
a. Include fertility counseling in PCC
Most members mentioned that parents-to-be are highly motivated to explore issues 
related to fertility during the period before pregnancy. One clinical expert mentioned 
that discussing fertility as part of PCC, would offer an opportunity to engage men as 
well. Van der Zee et al. and Tuomainen et al. also report that fertility is an important 
subject for women with a desire to become pregnant.(18, 19) The gains of fertility 
care –achieving pregnancy or not– are moreover clear and visible, whereas the gains 
of PCC that deals with prevention are less clear to parents-to-be and perhaps also less 
clear to caregivers. Therefore, including fertility counseling in PCC may improve the 
uptake as couples are arguable most motivated to hear about PCC when fertility issues 
will also be discussed. 
b. Develop pathways that cut across the medical and non-medical domain to address health 
inequalities 
The observed inequalities in perinatal morbidity and mortality and the socioeconomic 
gradient which describes these inequalities raised questions of social justice and 
health equity.(20) One clinical expert mentioned that some women have such an ac-
cumulation of social and economic problems that they have lost self-governance and 
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autonomy which makes them powerless; unable to overcome their problems without 
help from social workers and caregivers. The member mentioned the ‘Mothers of Rot-
terdam initiative’ as an example of care that cuts across the medical and non-medical 
domain, not only guiding women towards the appropriate healthcare providers but 
also guiding women towards debt management plans, housing services, educational 
plans and employment agencies.(21) In short, tailor-made help is offered to vulnerable 
women with the aim of helping them to regain control over their lives. Although all 
members supported such initiatives, the question was raised about what the exact 
role of the health care professional should be. There was however consensus on the 
suggestion that PCC-providers should at least identify non-medical problems and refer 
women to the appropriate institutions. ‘Care pathways’ should be in place to facilitate 
these referrals to non-medical institutions. 
c. Emphasize the importance of PCC and care pathways as a medical imperative and as a 
demand of social justice
Members also mentioned that inequalities in perinatal health outcomes deserve special 
attention as these are often the result of existing injustices such as poverty, racism 
and lack of access to high quality care for a vulnerable group of parents-to-be.(22-25) 
Moreover, if these inequalities remain unaddressed they perpetuate and exacerbate 
poor pregnancy outcomes, possibly over generations, as one’s ability to escape depriva-
tion and poor health is curbed by the very inequality one is trying to escape. Inequality 
begets greater inequality if left unaddressed. This makes the provision of PCC not only 
a medical imperative but a demand of social justice, as although PCC cannot address 
inequalities directly, it can mitigate the detrimental effects on pregnancy.
3. Societal valorization of new knowledge
a. Use new scientific insights to promote PCC and public health policy in general
The panel agreed on the fact that PCC could gain from new scientific insights such 
as those from the field of epigenetics. One clinical expert mentioned that epigenetics 
offered an interesting and appealing ‘frame’ to raise awareness about the importance 
of the preconception period for adequate pregnancy preparation. In addition, the ef-
fects of adverse changes to the epigenome that may result from generations of social, 
economic and cultural insults can insufficiently be addressed through only the delivery 
of PCC as a clinical form of care and require a concerted effort from other domains 
such as public health, education and social welfare as well.(26, 27) Therefore, it is 
quite possible that “the future of PCC will require an innovative multigenerational 
approach to health promotion for women and men to achieve optimal reproductive 
health outcomes.” (28) 
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b. Include the discussion on epigenetics and social inequities in the overall strategy to 
counteract adverse pregnancy outcomes
Epigenetics is a new and burgeoning field that attracts a lot of attention. Careless 
and oversimplified interpretations of epigenetics however, suggesting that mothers 
are the sole responsible for the health of their children, are unwarranted. Moreover, 
epigenetics has the potential to open up the discussion on the social determinants of 
adverse pregnancy outcomes. Epigenetic insights suggest that social inequities can be-
come biologically impinged to the detriment of the health and wellbeing of newborns. 
Therefore, the improvement of maternal (and paternal) and child health involves not 
only the provision of adequate pregnancy related care. Discussing how social injustices 
affect maternal and child health should become part of a comprehensive strategy to 
counteract adverse pregnancy outcomes.
c. Valorize new insights in the form of pregnancy-related policy and interventions
The experts mentioned that scientific researchers have a duty to valorize new scientific 
insights which should lead to interventions that benefit parents- and children-to-be.
(29) Although caution is well advised regarding the translation of new scientific in-
sights into policy, passivity from policy makers based on incomplete evidence is not 
always warranted. The dire situation of vulnerable parents-to-be in combination with 
reasonable scientific predictions should temper the requirement of conclusive scien-
tific evidence before introducing pregnancy related policy. 
4. Translating behavioral insights into PCC interventions
a. Explore the potential of incentives and nudges such as E-health and m-Health tools to 
promote PCC
Members discussed the potential of behavioral insights to increase the uptake of PCC. 
In addition to information and education about the benefits of an adequate pregnancy 
preparation, parents-to-be could also be incentivized or ‘nudged’ to seek PCC.(30) 
Nudges use people’s propensity to apply heuristics and biases, which are ‘mental rules 
of thumb’, when making decisions, such as decisions about lifestyle or decisions about 
seeking care. Behavioral interventions such as an opt-out rather than an opt-in system 
for organ donation and financial rewards to quit smoking were mentioned as success-
ful interventions, in the sense that the aim of the intervention was achieved.(31, 32) 
Possibilities for PCC were discussed. For example, people tend to favor immediate 
small gains over future bigger gains (hyperbolic discounting). Therefore, a future gain, 
for example child benefits (in the Netherlands) could be paid in advance, for example 
when visiting a PCC consult, to increase the uptake of PCC. As people tend to make 
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decisions based on availability (availability bias) and people use the internet ‘en masse’, 
the possibility of incentivizing parents-to-be through E-Health and m-Health tools was 
also discussed. “Gabby”, “Preparing For Pregnancy” and “smarter pregnancy” which 
are digital E-health and m-Health tools, were mentioned as successful digital tools that 
provide tailor-made risk assessments, health advice and can incentivize parents-to-be 
to seek PCC on the basis of a personal risk assessment.(12, 14, 33) 
b. Ethical justification of these interventions is needed to avoid charges of paternalism, 
infantilization and reliance on incentives 
Behavioral insights which can be used to ‘nudge’ parents-to-be towards PCC need to be 
ethically justified to prevent charges of paternalism and infantilization.(30) In addition, 
the problem with relying on incentives is that when the incentive disappears the effect, 
in this case an expected increase of uptake, may also disappear as the use of incentives 
does not increase the intrinsic motivation to adequately prepare for pregnancy. 
Conclusion
The main recommendations of the expert panel are: the provision of tailor-made care; 
the definition and distribution of roles and responsibilities of caregivers; the inclu-
sion of fertility counseling in PCC, and the development of pathways that cut across 
the medical and non-medical domains. Moreover, the discussion on how to promote 
maternal and child health should include the detrimental effects of social inequities 
and the potential use of incentives such as E- and mHealth tools.
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Session 1 ‘The concept of PCC and the role of caregivers’
Introduction: Prof Eric Steegers and Prof Inez de Beaufort on the concept of precon-
ception care, is there consensus about what it entails and why it is an 
important form of care (10 min)
Perspective: The role of caregivers and their reported barriers : Hafez Ismaili 
M’hamdi (10 min)
Discussion: Chair Prof Inez de Beaufort, discussion on the basis of cases. Case 1. 
PCC, one concept, one form of care (Is there consensus about PCC and 
what are the barriers to achieve consensus? What are the barriers 
that result from a lack of consensus? Who is primarily responsible 
for reaching consensus? How does reaching consensus about PCC 
promote the goals of PCC?)
Case 2. The proactive role of the caregiver (How to promote proactivity of 
caregivers? what can we reasonably expect from caregivers? How to 
overcome the barriers they experience, perceived lack of evidence-
based interventions/ competition with other practices of preventive 
care? Which caregiver is the gatekeeper of PCC?) Case 3. Late referral 
to adequate caregiver (Why are parents-to-be who need specialist care 
referred (too) late to the specialist? Are there examples of well-orga-
nized referral to adequate caregiver in general and to the specialist 
in particular? What can be done to advance timely referral?) Case 4. 
What to do with non-medical risks? (Poor socio- economic circum-
stances are recognized as risk factors. Are caregivers sufficiently able 
to identify non-medical risks? What can/should a caregiver do when a 
non-medical risk factor is identified? Can, as it is now organized, PCC 
adequately address non-medical risks?) Case 5. No directivity, no care? 
(How to offer PCC to women/couples who would be well-advised to 
postpone their desire to become pregnant? How to offer PCC to high-
risk women/couples who do not perceive any urgency? How far can 
a caregiver go on behalf of the unborn/ future child? Is non-directive 
counseling/advising of couples effective/adequate/sufficient?)
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Session 2 ‘reaching those who need care the most’
Introduction: Meertien Sijpkens, presentation results qualitative research on per-
ceptions of vulnerable women with a desire to become pregnant (10 
min)
Perspective: Prof Eric Steegers, why are we, despite all efforts, not succeeding at 
increasing the uptake of PCC? (10 min)
Discussion: Chair Medard Hilhorst, discussion on the basis of questions. Question 
1 Should pregnancy and birth be perceived as medical events by future 
parents and what are the advantages and disadvantages of such a per-
ception?
Question 2  Which measures have already been taken to increase the uptake? 
Question 3 Which of these measures are successful or unsuccessful? 
Question 4 What is the adequate measure of PCC uptake, consulta-
tion visits/delivery of care/ maternal-parental-fetal-newborn health? 
Question 5 How to deal with the discrepancy between perceived 
subjective health of parents-to-be and their actual objective health 
with respect to adequate pregnancy preparation? how do we overcome 
this discrepancy in a responsible and ethically justified way? Ques-
tion 6 How should we counteract pregnancy outcome inequalities? Is 
it justified to target higher risk groups (especially when they do not 
perceive themselves as high risk groups) for extra care. Question 7 
The most vulnerable future parents tend to have an accumulation of 
non-medical/socio- economic risk factors. How well equipped is PCC/ 
are caregivers to counteract these risk factors? ““Why treat people and 
send them back to the conditions that made them sick?” (M. Marmot chair of 
WHO social determinants of health) 
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Session 3 ‘Societal valorization of new knowledge’
Introduction:  Prof Eric Steegers, presentation of new scientific knowledge (DOHaD 
and epigenetics) and the ways in which this can be translated into 
policy (10 min)
Perspective:  Hafez Ismaili M’hamdi, how does new scientific knowledge influence 
ethical and philosophical ideas about perinatal health inequalities, 
parental responsibility and social justice? (10 min)
Discussion: Chair Prof Wim Pinxten, discussion on the basis of statements. 
Statement 1  As long as knowledge is not translated in sound evidence based inter-
ventions, it has no use for PCC. Statement 2 Insights from DOHaD 
and epigenetics show that pregnancy outcome inequalities are the 
result of socio economic inequalities rather than a lack of individual 
responsibility of parents-to-be. Statement 3 There is a real danger that 
insights from DOHaD and epigenetics will be used to shift too much 
responsibility for a healthy pregnancy on to the mother. Statement 
4 The potential of PCC to play an important role in reducing chronic 
diseases which manifest in adult life is currently underused. 
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Session 4 ‘Translating behavioral insights into PCC’ 
Introduction: Hafez Ismaili M’hamdi, bounded rationality and other-regarding 
nudges (10 min)
Perspective: Professor Regine Steegers-Theunissen, presentation on the potential 
of E-health/m-Health (10 min)
Discussion: Chair Prof Inez de Beaufort, discussion on Issue 1 is there reason to be-
lieve that future parents make decisions based on bounded rationality 
to their and their future children’s detriment? Issue 2 What types of 
interventions are ethically justified to counteract bounded rationality? 
Nudges? Directive counseling? Paternalistic policy? Issue 3 How can 
e-Health/ m-Health tools promote healthy pregnancies? Issue 4 What 
are the pitfalls when poor pregnancy outcomes are framed as results 
of bounded rationality/ is it adequate to perceive the problem of poor 
pregnancy outcomes as one of poor choice behavior on the part of 
mothers-to-be? 
7
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Inequalities in child morbidity and mortality occur in poor societies but also in pros-
perous societies that have free and high quality care in place. Much needs to be done to 
ameliorate the conditions of parents-to-be who live in underprivileged neighborhoods 
within prosperous societies. The improvement of the material and social conditions of 
these parents-to-be however, is but part of the solution to perinatal health inequalities. 
We argue that the effects of life in underprivileged neighborhoods on the health agency 
of parents-to-be have to be considered as well in order to successfully counteract peri-
natal health inequalities. That is, parents-to-be who live in underprivileged neighbor-
hoods tend to adapt their preferences regarding their own and their offspring’s health 
so these match the unfortunate conditions in which they live. This adaptation curtails 
their ‘capacity’, ‘feeling of control’ and ‘experienced freedom’ to seek and make use 
of care available to them. We therefore propose a ‘bare-bones-perfectionism’ approach 
to counteract perinatal health inequalities which, as we will argue, follows from the 
demands of justice.
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Introduction: raising aspirations beyond adaptations
“[A]ll experience has shown, that mankind is more disposed to suffer, 
while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms 
to which they are accustomed. [emphasis added]” (The Declaration of 
Independence)
There is an important distinction between ‘injustice’ and the ‘experience of injustice’, 
between what one ‘aspires’ and what one ‘is made to aspire’. Especially in destitute 
societies in which the odds to have poor health are overwhelming, people tend to 
adapt their health-related preferences so to acquiesce in their unescapable deprived 
living conditions.(1-4) This phenomenon is known as ‘adaptive preferences’; describing 
the tendency to curtail one’s (health-related) aims and ambitions so they match one’s 
unfortunate conditions, which then cease to be a source of frustration. The more one 
accepts underprivileged conditions as part of one’s life the less likely one is to imagine 
a better life.   
Individuals living in prosperous societies are also not immune to adaptive preferences. 
We, for one, are troubled by the peculiarity that a prosperous country such as the Neth-
erlands, that has free9 and high-quality health care as well as a robust public health 
policy in place, has a persistent high number of poor pregnancy outcomes compared 
to many other European countries.(5-7) In addition to these poor baseline numbers, 
inequalities in pregnancy outcomes between neighborhoods –especially in the city 
of Rotterdam– are alarmingly high.(8, 9) Despite these poor pregnancy outcomes and 
perinatal health inequalities (PHI), research shows that parents(-to-be) who face higher 
risks to have a problematic pregnancy, bear an unhealthy baby or even to lose their 
baby(10), typically do not appraise themselves as being more exposed to these risks or 
they accept these increased risks as a given.(11-13)  
Asking a group of vulnerable mothers(-to-be) whether they felt well prepared for preg-
nancy, one of them gave a response that adequately captured the overall sentiment 
namely: “in the end, what can we do but pray for the best?”(11) Rather than praying for 
the best, we will consider the appropriate response to PHI in prosperous societies that 
is warranted by the demands of justice. 
9 Free as in Universal healthcare. The Netherlands has a mandatory private insurance scheme 
with Government subsidies for individuals with a low income
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This essay will continue as follow. First we present the case of PHI in prosperous societ-
ies. We take the situation in the Netherlands as the paradigmatic example of a prosper-
ous society in which a decent minimum of social and political arrangements such as 
free and high quality pregnancy-related care is available. Yet there exist substantial 
PHI, the most disquieting being those recorded in the city of Rotterdam. We will use 
the recent insights from epigenetics and the Developmental Origins of Health and 
Disease paradigm (DOHaD) to describe the way social and political misfortunes become 
biologically impinged and consequently lead to avoidable poor pregnancy outcomes. 
We then present two mutually reinforcing sources of PHI, which are (i) the ‘corrosive 
conditions(14)’ in which disadvantaged parents-to-be prepare for (if they do so) and 
fulfill their parenthood and (ii) the ‘adaptive preferences’ of parents-to-be with regard 
to the health of their children-to-be. We will argue that from a normative viewpoint 
the ‘corrosiveness’ of (i) and the ‘adaptive preferences’ of (ii) impair what we call the 
‘health agency’ of parents-to-be. That is, what makes corrosive environments in which 
parents(-to-be) live and the adaptive preferences parents(-to-be) have troubling from a 
normative viewpoint, is that they impair 1. the capacity to form health-goals one has 
reason to value, 2. the perceived control over achieving those health-goals and 3. the 
freedom(s) they have to achieve those health-goals, in sum, health agency. 
Given that our health agency concept is primarily concerned with the impaired 
freedoms parents(-to-be) (from here on parents) have to choose health goals for their 
offspring and the severe and lifelong debilitating consequences of avoidable poor preg-
nancy outcomes, we will base this concept on the capabilities approach. Capability 
scholars such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have been extensively concerned 
with the detrimental impact corrosive conditions and adaptive preferences have on 
individuals’ agency and capabilities that are necessary for human flourishing.(4, 15-18) 
Their research however, has mostly focused on countries that face desperate poverty 
and destitution. Still, to our mind, the capabilities approach also offers the appropriate 
tools to address the challenge of counteracting PHI in prosperous societies. 
We will argue that justice requires the promotion of the health agency of parents. This 
entails that ultimately, the measure of success with which parents are able to convert 
available (health) care into actual good pregnancy outcomes should be adopted as the 
appropriate ‘currency’ of justice regarding PHI. Notwithstanding human diversity, we 
defend the view that when it comes to the lifelong health of newborns, some basic 
preferences such as the preference to invest in the prevention of avoidable poor preg-
nancy outcomes are or should be held by parents, care professionals, policy makers and 
society as a whole. Adaptive preferences can curb these basic preferences. We will call 
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the approach that holds that adaptive preferences are inconsistent with basic human 
flourishing ‘bare-bones perfectionism’. We will show how this approach can improve 
health agency by counteracting underlying adaptive preferences and how it can be 
used as a model to develop policy aimed at improving pregnancy outcomes. This ap-
proach will help parents to raise their aspirations beyond their adaptations.
We will conclude by presenting two caveats regarding our perfectionist approach. First, 
is that our proposal to improve the level of health agency of parents to a level of suf-
ficiency is intentionally underspecified. What ultimately counts as sufficient should be 
determined through deliberation within the community that seeks to achieve this level 
of sufficient health agency for all parents.(19) Second, is that adaptive preferences never 
justify the condescending view that parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods 
are unable to formulate and pursue their own ends.(20) This entails that parents living 
in underprivileged neighborhoods should never be excluded from public deliberation 
on the suitability and content of agency-promoting interventions. 
Perinatal health inequalities in rotterdam 
It is unfair that by dint of the circumstances in which they enter the world children run 
the risk to be deprived of good health and the fruits of good health. Few would disagree. 
This unfairness is arguably more disquieting when it occurs in societies in which these 
circumstances are not shaped by unfortunate chance such as the destitute conditions 
in poor countries, but rather by amendable choice. The Netherlands for example, a 
prosperous  country in which free and high quality health care is readily available, has 
relatively high and persistent poor pregnancy outcome numbers compared to other 
European countries.(5-7) In addition to these poor baseline numbers, inequalities in 
pregnancy outcomes between neighborhoods –especially in the city of Rotterdam– are 
alarmingly high. Research done by Poeran et al. has found that: “[In Rotterdam] [t]he 
neighborhood-specific perinatal mortality rates varied from 2 to 34 per 1000 births, 
for congenital abnormalities from 10 to 91 per 1000 births, for IUGR [measure for poor 
fetal growth] from 38 to153 per 1000 births, for preterm birth from 34 to 157 per 1000 
births and for low Apgar [measure for physical condition of a newborn immediately af-
ter birth] score from 4 to 37 per 1000 births. The highest mortality rates were observed 
in deprived neighborhoods.”(21) This shows the disquieting impact of neighborhood 
inequalities on the lifelong health of newborns. Being born in an underprivileged 
neighborhood in Rotterdam is tantalizing as the prevention of avoidable diseases is in 
sight yet for too many newborns out of reach. 
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Much needs to be done to ameliorate the conditions of parents living in underprivileged 
neighborhoods. Research has identified a sum of ‘barriers’ to prepare for pregnancy as 
a source of PHI. Some of these barriers pertain to the corrosive conditions associated 
poverty.(13) These range from low income levels(22), poor housing(9) air and noise 
pollution(23) to maternal stress(24) and domestic violence(25). To improve pregnancy 
outcomes in underprivileged neighborhoods, policy that addresses these corrosive 
conditions is of paramount importance.(26)
Although the PHI in Rotterdam are caused by poverty, it is not comparable to the 
desperate poverty people living in developing countries face. Moreover, free and high-
quality pregnancy related care is available in Rotterdam; although in underprivileged 
neighborhoods the access to available care should still be improved. In this article 
however we want to focus on a special category of barriers. These are the barriers 
parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods unintentionally erect for themselves. 
That is, the adaptive preferences that arise in the corrosive conditions present in un-
derprivileged neighborhoods. 
Consider that PHI are also caused by an accumulation of poor health-related choices 
such as smoking, drinking, unhealthy nutrition and a lack of physical activity; choices 
that are associated with living in underprivileged neighborhoods.(27) These choices can 
be ill-informed, unreflective or even involuntary, especially when they are made in un-
derprivileged neighborhoods. But choices they remain. Consider also that no elaborate 
ethical analysis is needed to see that being born and living in a desperately poor society 
is unfair. The choice to prepare for a healthy pregnancy is simply unavailable to many 
people living in such a society. In prosperous societies like the Netherlands however, 
the choice to prepare for pregnancy is available, even to those living in underprivileged 
neighborhoods. It may be less readily available, may require a greater sacrifice in terms 
of resources and time from parents. It may require a greater awareness of the benefits 
of pregnancy preparation; but available it is. Moreover, initiatives aimed at increasing 
the awareness of pregnancy preparation and the availability of pregnancy related care10 
have been launched, unfortunately with limited success.(29, 30) Although parents liv-
ing in underprivileged neighborhoods appraise the goals of pregnancy related care, 
they typically do not identify themselves as the target audience that faces higher risks 
to have poor pregnancy outcomes.(13) This results in parents who could greatly profit 
10 Preconception care in particular. Preconception care is concerned with identifying biomedical, 
behavioral and psychosocial risk factors prior to conception to improve pregnancy outcomes. 
28. Atrash H, Jack BW, Johnson K. Preconception care: a 2008 update. Current Opinion in 
Obstetrics and Gynecology. 2008;20(6):581-9.
Pray for the best 109
from available care not seeking this care, to the disappointment of many well-willing 
caregivers (in Rotterdam).(13, 31) 
This is what makes addressing PHI in prosperous societies so challenging (and frus-
trating). On the one hand, the recorded PHI are disquieting and demand a response 
from parents, caregivers, policy makers and society as a whole. Avoidable PHI that 
are mediated by neighborhood inequalities are the epitome of injustice pertaining to 
health. No newborn deserves her poor health. On the other hand, care and help are 
available (although there still is much room for improvement!) for those who seek it. 
Unfortunately, few parents benefit from this availability. To formulate an appropriate 
response to PHI in prosperous societies it is, we will argue, of great importance to 
consider how the corrosive conditions in which parents live adapt the preferences they 
have regarding the health of their offspring. To bolster the strength of this consider-
ation we will first shortly describe the importance of adequate pregnancy preparation 
for the long-life health of newborns. 
Developmental origins of Health and Disease and epigenetics
The period surrounding pregnancy is taking center stage in the endeavor to unveil 
the ‘origins of health and disease’. (32-35) The findings of David Barker in particular 
propelled research that focuses on the ways in which the impaired development of the 
fetus is linked to chronic diseases later in life.(33, 36-38) This focus on the ‘Developmen-
tal Origins of Health and Diseases’ (DOHaD), ushered in a paradigm shift in which the 
paramount importance of a healthy pregnancy is recognized. The burdens of stunted 
fetal development are not only carried by newborns who become more prone to be 
born unhealthy. A stunted fetal development entails a life-long increased vulnerability 
to develop chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, certain types of cancer and 
type 2 diabetes.(39) In other words, an impaired development in utero hits twice. 
Research shows that so called ‘epigenetic mechanisms’ (partly) underpin the devel-
opment of the fetus (39). Epigenetics is described as the mechanism that regulates 
the gene expression and thus health outcomes, without changing the DNA sequence.
(40). An increasing number of clinical and epidemiological studies describe how 
preconceptional, prenatal and early life conditions of parents affect the epigenomic 
regulation of the fetal gene expression and thus consequently fetal health outcomes.
(41-44) What is of particular interest is that the study of developmental processes and 
epigenetic mechanisms are increasingly elucidating the pathways through which 
social disadvantages become biologically impinged. Poor living environments, starting 
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from the environment in utero, translate into poor health. Although pathways such as 
aging, stochastic events and genotype are beyond human control, environmental and 
behavioral factors are to a large extent controllable. These factors include exposure to 
pathogens and pollutants, housing, work, nutrition and lifestyle.(45, 46) These factors 
are associated with parental socioeconomic status and their detrimental effects are 
strongest during the period surrounding pregnancy.(39, 47-52)
The fields of public health policy and ethics are taking interest in DOHaD and epi-
genetics. Following the new scientific insights, researchers are calling for a shift 
towards preventive policy focusing on the mother-child pair especially during the 
preconception and prenatal period and the first few years of post-natal life.(53-55) 
The implications for the demands of justice have also been addressed, notably the 
implications from a  Rawlsian and luck-egalitarian perspective.(52, 56-58) The ethical 
literature available on ‘epigenetics and justice’ converges towards the idea that to the 
extent that epigenetic disadvantages, especially in the period surrounding pregnancy, 
are avoidable or amendable, justice requires the development of policy that aims at 
avoiding or amending these disadvantages. Preconception care has been put forward 
as a promising strategy to adequately prepare for pregnancy and thereby reduce poor 
pregnancy outcomes associated with epigenetic disadvantages.(59-61) Researchers also 
advise caution and conscientiousness when it comes to the ethical and policy implica-
tions of epigenetics. (52, 62) Following this caveat, we understand the insights from 
DOHaD and epigenetics as scientific insights that elucidate the way social misfortunes 
become biologically impinged and lead to lifelong disease or increased vulnerability 
to disease. These insights are relevant to determine the demands of justice regarding 
PHI, whatever theory of justice one adheres to. With these new scientific insights in 
mind, we move now to the question of what the demands of justice are regarding PHI 
in prosperous societies. 
Some remarks on justice and equality
At the heart of every theory of justice lies a claim to equality. Sen writes: “[T]he major 
theories of social arrangement [theories of justice] all share an endorsement of equal-
ity in terms of some focal variable, even though the variables that are selected are 
frequently very different between one theory and another”.(15) For example, utilitar-
ians want to give equal weight to the equal interests of all individuals,(63) Rawlsians 
strive for equal liberty and an equal (and fair) distribution of primary goods(64) and 
Nozickians demand equality of libertarian rights(65). All claim equality of something. 
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Consider also that Rawls’s egalitarianism was a response to utilitarianism and Nozick’s 
libertarianism a response to Rawls’s egalitarianism (his difference principle in par-
ticular). That is, theories of justice do not only differ in the variable of equality they 
endorse. They also differ in the variable of inequality they find unacceptable. Rawls found 
inequalities in liberties and primary social good unacceptable, which are prima facie 
tolerable for utilitarians. Nozick found inequalities in libertarian rights unacceptable 
which are prima facie tolerable for Rawlsians. And isn’t that an opportune starting 
point for any deliberation about justice? The observation that some forms of inequality 
are unacceptable. 
This is also our starting point. The observation that PHI in prosperous societies are 
unacceptable. Why? Because the vulnerabilities and disadvantages newborns born in 
underprivileged neighborhoods face –to the contrary of healthy newborns born one zip 
code away– deprive them of good health or burden them with a greater and life-long 
risk to become ill. This, to us, is unfair; an example of an unacceptable inequality. 
To effectively tackle PHI, we have to identify the appropriate focal variable. That is, we 
need to identify the variable which can be connected to PHI and which is appropriate 
to be corrected by the demands of justice. This also known as the identification of 
the correct ‘currency of justice’ or the correct equalisandum; the ‘good’ justice seeks 
to equalize. Typical candidates are: primary social goods, utility, well-being, liberties, 
rights, resources, opportunities and capabilities. Given we aim to counteract PHI in 
prosperous societies, the best course of action would be to first focus on the sources of 
these inequalities. These can subsequently inform us about the correct equalisandum.
Corrosive conditions 
There are conditions in which parents live that expose them to disadvantages that are 
likely to compound further disadvantages. Wolff and De-Shatlit call these disadvan-
tages ‘corrosive disadvantages’.(14) We call conditions in which these disadvantages are 
more likely to be present ‘corrosive conditions’. 
Consider this hypothetical but realistic portrayal. Parents living in underprivileged 
neighborhoods are more likely to have a lower educational attainment (a corrosive dis-
advantage). This increases the chance of having a low income job. A low income limits 
112 Chapter 7
the resources parents preparing for pregnancy have to buy healthy food11. Moreover, 
the lower educational attainment also makes parents less likely to be aware of the 
effects of poor nutrition on their own and their offspring’s’ health. This in turn makes 
parents less likely to want to improve their (possibly) unhealthy diet; an improvement 
for which they have limited resources.
In addition, low income jobs are often also risky jobs that typically put employees and 
consequently their offspring at an increased health risk. In combination with an un-
healthy diet, which these parent are more likely to have, these job-related health risks 
are more likely to develop into diseases. Parents that have low income jobs are also 
more likely to develop stress(66), which can have significant impact on their health and 
which in turn can affect their offspring, and so on and so forth…(67, 68) 
Slowly a web of compounding disadvantages starts to manifest when we consider the 
conditions that parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods face. The many ways 
in which parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods are disadvantaged have been 
observed and recorded manifold.(69-72) 
Together, corrosive disadvantages expose and re-expose parents to greater health risks 
for themselves and their offspring and they curb the parents’ abilities, preferences 
and ambitions necessary to counteract these increased risks for their own and their 
offspring’s health. In other words, together, corrosive disadvantages are ‘risk multipli-
ers’ and ‘agency reducers’. Yet PHI in prosperous societies are hard to address because 
viewed separately, corrosive disadvantages are not necessarily unjust. Having a low 
income can be a corrosive disadvantage but as long as it is above the minimum wage 
threshold, it isn’t necessarily unjust12. A low educational attainment can be a corrosive 
disadvantage but as long as one has finished compulsory education, it isn’t necessarily 
unjust. Having a risky job can be a corrosive disadvantage but it isn’t necessarily unjust. 
However, as our portrayal shows, it is the compounding effect of these “just” corrosive 
disadvantages that result in an unjust corrosive condition; a condition in which PHI are 
perpetuated and possibly exacerbated. 
So given these corrosive condition, what should the response from a justice perspective 
be to counteract PHI? Especially in prosperous societies it is clear that it can’t be only 
a matter of (re-)allocating goods. It can’t be only a matter of increasing the availability of 
11 Healthy food is not everywhere more expensive than unhealthy food but it is typically less 
convenient to prepare as opposed to ready-to-eat meals.
12 This obviously depends on whether the minimum wage threshold allows people to satisfy 
their basic needs in a given society. 
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and access to care, decent housing, decent wages, decent education and other goods nec-
essary for making poor pregnancy outcomes less neighborhood-dependent. Of course, 
policy should be in place to correct for the possible lack of these essential goods; that 
much is clear. But what to do with the adaptive preferences that parents develop living 
in underprivileged neighborhoods?
This is the trait that enables them to bear their underprivileged living condition but 
also the trait that curbs their capacity to form health-goals they have reason to value. 
Correcting for the deficit of goods does not necessarily correct the deficit of this capac-
ity. Due attention needs thus to be given to addressing the capacity people have to 
convert health-promoting goods into actual good pregnancy outcomes. To go back to 
our question about the appropriate equalisandum, we propose that this should be (a) 
the capacity to form health-goals they have reason to value, (b) the perceived control 
over achieving those health-goals and (c) the freedom(s) they have to achieve those 
health-goals, in sum, –an equality of sufficient health agency–.13 The importance of 
considering the capacity individuals have to convert goods into actual well-being is of 
course the cornerstone of the capabilities approach.(73) 
Capabilities and health agency
Within the justice discourse the ‘capabilities approach’ is a normative framework 
with which the demands of justice vis-à-vis social and political arrangements can 
be assessed. Whether a social or political arrangement is just then depends on the 
extent to which individuals have substantial freedoms “to do and be what they have 
reason to value”(74)These freedoms to achieve goals one has reason to value are called 
‘capabilities’. Amartya Sen, a distinguished capabilities scholar, argues that “one’s 
freedom to achieve those things that are constitutive of one’s own well-being”(15), 
is one’s capability set or well-being freedom. Sen also argues that one can have reasons 
to value other goals than the sole promotion of one’s own well-being.(75) Parents for 
example, typically pursue the promotion of the health and well-being of their children 
even if it comes at some cost of their own. Sen calls the freedom necessarily to pursue 
valuable goals other than one’s own promotion of well-being agency freedom and the 
corresponding goals agency goals.(75)  
13 We thus propose a baseline equality of health agency, or equality of sufficient health agency. 
This is a ‘suffcientarianist’ view which is compatible with our equality view.
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As we are dealing with PHI, the capacity parents have to avoid preventable poor preg-
nancy outcomes is thus better described as a matter of ‘agency freedom’ than as a mat-
ter of ‘well-being freedom’ or ‘capabilities’. And, as we are discussing the capacity to 
improve the health of newborns (which is an important element of the well-being of the 
newborn) the qualification health agency seems most appropriate. That is, although our 
normative analysis is capability-based, discussing the capacity parent have to promote 
the health of their offspring is better captured in terms of health agency than it is in 
terms of –say– health capability.
Taking stock, we have shown that PHI occur in prosperous societies such as the PHI in 
the city of Rotterdam and these can be partly explained by the adaptive preferences of 
parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods. We shortly described the ways birth 
and life in an underprivileged neighborhood translate into poor pregnancy outcomes 
and lifelong increased risk for chronic diseases. Then we argued that corrosive condi-
tions found in underprivileged neighborhoods not only increase health risks but also 
reduce health agency. Therefore, in addition to securing health-related goods we argued 
that justice also demands the equalization of sufficient health agency of parents. Lastly, 
we based our health agency concept on the capabilities approach and on Sen’s concept 
of agency. Because adaptive preferences can curb parents’ agency and we propose 
health agency as the appropriate equalisandum of justice we will now further develop 
our health agency concept. This more comprehensive description can aid caregivers 
and policymakers to counteract PHI in correspondence with the demands of justice.
Health agency and adaptive preferences
Capacity
We have argued that in underprivileged neighborhoods within prosperous societies, 
adaptive preferences can impair parents’ health agency. So what exactly is being 
impaired by adaptive preferences when we claim that health agency is impaired? To 
answer this question, we need to ‘unpack’ the concept of health agency. Now consider 
for example the preference to quit smoking before pregnancy to achieve the goal of benefit-
ing the health of one’s future baby.
X has this preference and makes an effort to stop smoking. 
Y has this preference but makes no effort to stop smoking. 
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To start, it isn’t unreasonable to assume that many women who smoke would do in 
fact want to stop smoking for the benefit of their future child. They can however, 
differ in the ‘type of preference’ they have regarding smoking cessation. Consider that 
X makes an effort to stop smoking. Therefor she has at least: a) identified ‘smoking 
cessation for the benefit of her future child as a goal worth pursuing. She has also 
acted in accordance with that goal. I.e. she made an effort to stop smoking. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that her preference to stop smoking was based on the goal 
of benefiting the health of her future baby. This is a goal she has reason to value. She 
wants to bear a healthy baby. 
But not all preferences are created equally. People prefer being rich over being poor. 
People prefer the freedom to enjoy the day as they see fit over long and arduous days 
at work. People prefer to be healthy over being unhealthy. And people prefer to have 
healthy children over having unhealthy children. However, as long as these preferences 
are not based on goals one has reason to value these preferences do not exceed the level of 
unattainable wishes. This is not to say that health is not a goal people have no reason 
to value. Quite the contrary. It is to say that goals one has reason to value have an 
important precondition. This precondition is that these goals have to be –in the mind 
of the agent– within reach, sooner or later. As a precondition, we tend to value those 
goals that are (eventually) attainable and adapt our preferences when goals are unat-
tainable. This is the lesson of adaptive preferences. People living in underprivileged 
conditions tend to curtail their aspirations for a better and healthier life so they match 
their unfavorable circumstances. What one needs is then not adequately mirrored in 
what one prefers.
The same goes for Individual Y. Of course she has the ‘preference’ to stop smoking. 
This preference however is closer to the preferences one has regarding unattainable 
dreams (e.g. being rich or a Maria Callas-like prima donna) than to preferences which 
are based on goals one perceives to be both valuable and achievable. Under unfavorable 
conditions Y’s preferences have adapted in such a way that her living conditions are no 
(longer) a source of frustration. This acquiescence however also stultifies her (health-
related) aspirations, making it less likely for her to consider the health of her offspring 
as an attainable goal worth pursuing. Which reasons does she in these circumstances 
have to give up smoking?  “In the end, what can we do but pray for the best?”(11)
Coming back to our concept of health agency we have formulated condition a) as: X 
has identified ‘smoking cessation for the benefit of her future child’ as a goal worth 
pursuing. To generalize this health agency condition we will formulate it as:  1. the 
capacity to form health-goals one has reason to value. The importance of this capac-
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ity condition for (health) agency is typically found in the capabilities approach based 
literature(75-77)
Control
Given that X has made an effort to stop smoking, it is furthermore reasonable to as-
sume that she has perceived that she had (some) control over achieving the goal she 
has reason to value. Control is typically considered to be an important condition for 
agency. When we act as agents we tend to feel ‘in charge’ of what we do and what 
happens to us. This experience of –being in charge–, or the lack of, has been described 
in the psychological literature as the ‘locus of control’.  Locus of controls entails that 
(health-related) behavior is predicated on whether individuals view the attainment of 
a goal as being either within their control (internal) or beyond their control (external). 
(78-80) Therefore it is of significant importance to the concept of (health) agency. An 
individual who attributes success (such as having good health) in her life to the choices 
she made will be more likely to make an effort to pursue other goals worth valuing 
(such as bearing a healthy baby). She has an internal locus of control. Adaptive prefer-
ences are in this sense characterized as a way to come to terms with one’s lack of 
internal locus of control. Those goals that are perceived to be beyond one’s control 
(external) are then less likely to be worth pursuing. There is evidence suggesting that 
women living in underprivileged neighborhoods do experience limited control over 
their pregnancy and the health of their offspring. (11, 13) Although this group of 
women is open to receiving help and care, they tend not to seek it because of their 
perceived limited control over their pregnancy and their pregnancy outcomes. This 
brings us to our second condition for health agency which is 2. the perceived control 
over achieving health-related goals one has reason to value. 
Freedom
The perception of control however is not enough. In line with Sen we argue that 
freedom is also an indispensable condition for agency and therefore also for health 
agency. Sen describes ‘agency freedom’ as “what the person is free to do and achieve 
in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important”(75) For Sen 
agency freedom consist of two elements namely ‘control’ and ‘power’. The former 
has been discussed in the previous paragraph and our account of control converges 
with his account. The latter element, power, is surprising enough a familiar concept 
within the healthcare debate. It typically appears as claims about the importance of 
empowerment of individuals to improve their health (and the health of their offspring).
(81-83) When it comes to health agency we also endorse the idea of freedom as a power 
or –if you will– empowerment. Especially when health-related goals require “complex 
self-management tasks”(84) such as comprehensive  life-style changes, the power to 
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actually carry out the changes one values and perceives as being under one’s control mat-
ter. This ‘freedom as power’ comes close to the concept of ‘executive autonomy’. This 
concept refers to “the capacity to perform complex self-management tasks, especially 
those related to treatment planning and implementation.”(84) The freedom condition 
of health agency thus refers to the freedom to actually do what is necessary to achieve 
the health goals one has reason to value. It is for example, the freedom to stop smok-
ing; today, tomorrow and preferably forever if one values smoking cessation. Thus our 
last condition for health agency is 3. the freedom one have to achieve health-goals one 
has reason to value. 
It is important to consider that although these three conditions (capacity, control and 
freedom) of health agency are distinct as concepts, in the agent’s mind they are interde-
pendent. If one’s capacity to form health-goals one has reason to value is compromised 
it is also likely that her perception of control will be compromised and vice versa. 
We have proposed that the demands of justice regarding PHI in prosperous societies 
are best captured by the claim that the health agency of parents should be equalized, at 
least until they meet the threshold of sufficiency. Now we have given a more compre-
hensive account of health agency the question that remains is: when is health agency 
sufficiently equalized?
Bare-bones perfectionism
We propose that health agency is sufficiently equalized when the preferences of par-
ents living in underprivileged conditions match the preferences they would endorse 
in conditions conducive to their own and their offspring’s health and basic well-being. 
These preferences might differ on a practical level. There are for example, numerous 
ways to try to improve one’s lifestyle in the period surrounding pregnancy. On a basic 
level however, these preferences are to some extent predictable. They are based on a 
goal we can reasonably expect to be endorsed by parents, caregivers and society as a 
whole, that is, the goal of improving the health of newborns and reducing PHI. There-
fore, health agency is sufficiently equalized when the preferences of parents regard-
ing pregnancy and offspring converge towards the goal of preventing avoidable poor 
pregnancy outcomes. Based on the relatively good pregnancy outcomes, we expect that 
parents living in conditions conducive to their own and their offspring’s health to have 
these preferences. 
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This goal does not have to be achieved by any means and at any cost. Moreover, condi-
tions necessary for preventing avoidable poor pregnancy outcomes, such as access to 
social services and adequate care, have to be in place. As we are considering PHI in 
prosperous societies we have, for the sake of argument, assumed that these are to a 
reasonable extent in place. This is not to say that there is still much to do to provide 
these material and social conditions for example in a city like Rotterdam. Rather, it 
is to say that even when these material and social conditions are met, health agency 
affected by adaptive preferences, can hinder the conversion of these conditions into 
actual good health for newborns. The mere fact that help is available does not neces-
sarily entail that people who would benefit from it will seek that help.
We proposed that the goal of improving the health of newborns by avoiding prevent-
able poor pregnancy outcomes, especially in underprivileged neighborhoods, is a goal 
worth valuing and pursuing by all members of the moral community. We base this 
goal on what is known in the ethical and philosophical literature as ‘perfectionism’. 
We will now shortly explain why this is the case and what type of perfectionism we 
have in mind.
When we make claims such as: ‘it is better for a baby to be born healthy than to be 
born ill’ and ‘we should aspire to equalize the health agency of parents, at least to a 
level of sufficiency’ we have an idea of the Good in mind. That is, good health for new-
borns and sufficient health agency for parents are goals we as a society have reason to 
value and therefore pursue, i.e. base policy on. The value of good health for newborns 
for example, is not predicated on whether parents, viewed separately, actually prefer 
or desire their baby to be healthy. It would be a strange state of affairs if hypothetical 
sadistic individuals who vehemently desire that their babies are born with poor health 
would affect the value we as a moral community attribute to good health for newborns. 
Rather, in this value we find expressed ‘an idea of the Good’; which is that as a moral 
community it matters to us how well the life of a newborn goes. And if that life is 
plagued by preventable poor health we have a responsibility to cure and prevent.
The idea that there are some goals we as a community have reason to value and there-
fore pursue because they generally make our life go better, irrespective of individual 
preferences is our bare-bones version of what is called (moral) ‘perfectionism’.(85) 
Educating children for example, is a goal we as a community have reason to value and 
therefore pursue because, generally speaking, education makes the lives of children go 
better. This goal is mirrored by the corresponding preference most (if not all) parents 
have, namely that their children are properly educated. Consequently, children have to 
go to school even if some parents or children would prefer otherwise. 
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In cases where adaptive preferences cause and/or perpetuate instances of injustice 
such as PHI, policy responses based on bare-bones perfectionism are very much worth 
considering. Policy that is aimed at improving the health agency of parents living in 
underprivileged neighborhoods is worth considering because it aims at achieving a 
goal we can reasonably expect parents to have reason to value and pursue. This goal 
is the prevention of avoidable poor pregnancy outcomes. We will now formulate two 
important caveats to our bare-bones perfectionism approach to counteract PHI in 
prosperous societies. 
Two caveats
First, our proposal to improve the level of health agency of parents to a level of suf-
ficiency is intentionally underspecified. What ultimately counts as sufficient should be 
determined through deliberation within the community that seeks to achieve this level 
of sufficient health agency for all parents. An overly specified top-down view of which 
goals we as a community have reason to value and how we ought to pursue them 
have been fiercely criticized and for good reasons. Such perfectionism-based policies 
disallow the plurality of views on which (health-related) goals are worth valuing and 
pursuing (86) and justify coercion of people who are not acting in accordance with the 
goals worth valuing and pursuing.(85) Coercing people to commit to one view of the 
“good life” and act accordingly is itself a source of much harm and many evils in the 
world. This is not what we have in mind. 
The importance of public deliberation to establish which goals (and which capabilities) 
are worth valuing and pursuing within a society has been stressed on multiple occa-
sions by capability scholars such as Sen and Nussbaum(18, 87). To our mind, delibera-
tion is especially important to establish justified policies to improve health agency as 
we cannot imagine that deliberation would result in the refutation of goals such as the 
improvement of the health of newborns and the health agency of parents. The ways to 
achieve this improvement however is clearly up for debate. The suitability and exact 
content of interventions such as: lowering the prices of healthy products, taxing un-
healthy products, encouraging a pro-active disposition of caregivers, rewarding healthy 
pregnancy preparation and embedding topics such as perinatal health and the effects 
on long-life health within local and national Governmental policies and education, 
should be determined by public deliberation. 
From this follows our second caveat. Adaptive preferences never justify the condescend-
ing view that parents living in underprivileged neighborhoods are unable to formulate 
120 Chapter 7
and pursue their own ends.(20) This entails that parents living in underprivileged 
neighborhoods should never be excluded from public deliberation on the suitability 
and content of agency-promoting interventions. Adaptive preferences are not irratio-
nal or unreasonable. If anything it is perfectly understandable that one adapts her 
aspirations so they align with her material, social and medical conditions. Adaptive 
preferences can justify the raising of questions about an unjust state of affairs such 
as PHI. By themselves however, they never justify detailed policy to counteract this 
unjust state of affairs. A serious engagement with parents is necessary to unfold the 
underpinnings of their adapted preferences as well as the ‘barriers’ and ‘facilitators’ to 
improve their health agency.(13, 88, 89) These insights are necessary to counteract PHI 
in prosperous societies because ultimately it are the parents that have to “own”(20) the 
alternative preferences which are based on an improved health agency. 
Conclusion
We have argued that PHI in prosperous societies are partly caused by adaptive prefer-
ences. These PHI are an example of unacceptable injustice. To counteract these adaptive 
preferences, we proposed that the health agency of parents living in underprivileged 
conditions should be improved at least to the level of equal sufficiency. The level of 
sufficiency is achieved when parents adopt the prevention of avoidable pregnancy 
outcomes as a goal worth valuing and pursuing; although not at all costs and by any 
means. 
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Abstract
Insights from the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease paradigm and epi-
genetics are elucidating the biological pathways through which social and environmen-
tal signals affect human health. These insights prompt a serious debate about how the 
structure of society affects health and what the responsibility of society is to counteract 
health inequalities. Unfortunately, oversimplified interpretations of insights from 
Developmental Origins of Health and Disease and epigenetics may be (mis)used to 
focus on the importance of individual responsibility for health rather than the social 
responsibility for health. In order to advance the debate on responsibility for health, 
we present an ethical framework to determine the social responsibility to counteract 
health inequalities. This is particularly important in a time where individual responsi-
bility often justifies a passive response from policymakers. 
Keywords: responsibility, DOHaD, epigenetics, ethics, justice
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Introduction
Insights from the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease (DOHaD) paradigm and 
epigenetics are elucidating the biological pathways through which social and environ-
mental cues affect human health. These insights do not only advance biological and 
medical knowledge. They also lay bare the biological effects of social inequities on the 
health and well-being of individuals, therefore raising serious ethical concerns. 
In this article we present these ethical concerns. Insights from DOHaD and epigenetics 
describe how social deprivation and poverty become biologically impinged.1 Adverse 
fetal and childhood exposures such as poor environmental quality, stress, smoking, 
drinking and poor nutrition all of which are typically associated with life in an under-
privileged environment, leave developmental and epigenetic traces on the developing 
fetus. Together, these socio-biological traces not only maintain but also exacerbate the 
effects of social deprivation, thereby propagating the persistence of health dispari-
ties, from early life to adulthood.2 Moreover, “there is a strong rationale to consider 
developmental and epigenetic mechanisms as links between early life environmental 
factors like maternal stress during pregnancy and adult race-based health disparities 
in diseases like hypertension, diabetes, stroke, and coronary heart disease.”3 These ad-
verse factors have durable  and even transgenerational influences thereby propagating 
existing race-based health inequalities.3
Despite this knowledge about the possible social and racial underpinnings of health 
inequalities, health is increasingly being described and presented as a matter of indi-
vidual responsibility; thereby suggesting that one’s health mirrors one’s efforts to be 
healthy. This view on health encourages a passive response from policy makers. We 
warn against this oversimplified view on individual responsibility for health which may 
be reinforced by an oversimplified interpretation of new developmental insights. We 
will present a basic ethical framework to help determine the responsibility for health 
which takes serious the insights of DOHaD and epigenetics. We will argue that the 
concepts avoidability and fairness are of critical importance for the proper assessment of 
responsibility. Building on the work of political philosopher John Rawls we will present 
a philosophical distinction between individual responsibility and social responsibility 
which follows from the Rawlsian principles of justice. We will focus especially on the 
responsibility for the health and well-being of parents-to-be and newborns as the effects 
of inequality have a significant and long-lasting impact on the groups. We conclude by 
presenting two initiatives that empower mothers-to-be to take responsibility for their 
own and their (future) children’s health.  
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responsibility
A deep rooted moral intuition is that one has to accept (some) responsibility for one’s 
actions. Incentives encouraging healthy behavior, penalties for unhealthy behavior, 
taxing of unhealthy products, 
variable health insurance premiums and the prioritizing of organs based on account-
ability are examples of how this moral intuition about individual responsibility is 
manifested in healthcare and public health policy. Insights from DOHaD and epi-
genetics can be used to strengthen this view of responsibility. These insights describe 
the possible long-term detrimental effects of poor maternal lifestyle choices such as 
smoking, drinking alcohol, having a poor diet and having a sedentary lifestyle, on the 
development and health of the newborn. Therefore, mothers(-to-be) have a serious and 
robust responsibility towards their (future) children to promote their health through 
healthy choice-behavior, or so the argument goes. This view is seen in multiple head-
lines in the popular press stating: “‘Mother’s diet during pregnancy alters baby’s DNA’ 
(BBC), ‘Grandma’s Experiences Leave a Mark on Your Genes’ (Discover), and ‘Pregnant 
9/11 survivors transmitted trauma to their children’” (The Guardian)4
This emphasis on individual responsibility for health presents serious concerns. First, 
colloquial and careless interpretations of DOHaD and epigenetic insights are at risk 
of unfairly targeting mothers as being primarily responsible for the health of their 
children.4 For example, although it is true that a mother’s nutrition influences the 
development of her fetus, insights from DOHaD and epigenetics do not suggest a 
mono-causal pathway from a mother’s dinner to a newborn’s disease. Fetal develop-
ment and epigenetic programming are both complex processes, steered by a myriad 
of endogenous and exogenous factors such as nutrition, hormones and environmental 
toxins that together affect the risk of disease development. The translations of these 
new scientific insights for a lay audience will require some simplification. However, the 
complex and multifactorial nature of disease development is itself an important insight 
that should not be compromised for the sake of clarity. If anything, the complexity of 
disease aetiology shows that the exact causes of, for example, chronic diseases are 
hard to establish. To oversimplify this complexity for the sake of clarity is to alter the 
insights of DOHaD. The tendency to solely focus on mothers as irresponsible subjects, 
blameworthy for the poor health of their offspring, is thus unwarranted 
This focus on individual responsibility also draws attention away from an arguably 
more important question. As one’s social and environmental conditions have deep 
and pervasive effects on one’s health, what responsibility does society have vis-à-vis 
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individuals living in that society? In the next sections we will clarify this question and 
aim to answer it by presenting a basic ethical framework.
from insights to avoidability
DOHaD research describes how the environmental factors before conception up to the 
first two years after birth affects fetal development and consequently both child and 
adult health.5 Epigenetic research describes how social and environmental cues affect 
the way genes are expressed and thereby how susceptibility for disease is to a certain 
extent ‘programmed under one’s skin.’6 These biological insights corroborate decades of 
epidemiological research where a stable association has been observed between people’s 
social conditions and their health.7 This association, which is widely known as the social 
determinants of health, is observable both in perinatal and adult health inequalities. 
Understanding the developmental sources of poor health outcomes alone however, 
does not make them avoidable. Avoidability depends on the possibility to mitigate the 
effects of detrimental sources on health. In other words, fascinating as they are, insights 
from DOHaD and epigenetics are of little help to the promotion of child and adult 
health if they are not used as the scientific base for the development and evaluation of 
actual pregnancy related interventions. This gives rise to the academic responsibility 
to determine the degree of avoidability (figure 1). That is, given that (i) perinatal and 
adult health inequalities present a serious healthcare and public health challenge and 
(ii) the responsibility to avoid these poor health outcomes hinges on their degree of 
avoidability, there is an academic responsibility to determine the avoidability of these 
poor health outcomes. 
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There are good reasons to believe that addressing developmental risk factors during 
the period surrounding pregnancy increases the avoidability of poor pregnancy out-
comes and many chronic disea es that m nifest in adult life. Insigh s from DOHaD and 
132 Chapter 8
epigenetics indicate that the risk of these diseases is set during fetal development.6 
Therefore, a shift towards preventive measures which focus on the mother-child pair 
during the periconceptional period has been called for.8 “Measures which improve 
nutrition, and reduce exposures to environmental chemicals, from all environmental 
compartments (air, water, soil) and in food and consumer products, are likely to im-
prove child and maternal health significantly over the short term, as well as reduce 
disease incidence and the cost of health care overall…”8 Illustrative of the academic 
responsibility to determine the degree of avoidability of poor health outcomes is the 
‘Healthy Pregnancy 4 All’ study. The ‘Healthy Pregnancy 4 All’ study, combines insights 
from public health and epidemiological research to ameliorate the offering of adequate 
preconception and antenatal care, thereby determining the avoidability of the rela-
tively high prevalence of poor pregnancy outcomes in the Netherlands.9 
Avoidability and fairness
Determining the avoidability of a health inequality alone is not sufficient to determine 
the social responsibility to counteract this inequality. The degree to which avoidable 
inequalities are unfair also determines the moral urgency, that is the responsibility, to 
counteract this inequality. Michael Marmot , chair of the WHO commission on social 
determinants of health writes “Health inequalities that could be avoided by reasonable 
means are unfair”10.To claim that a health inequality is unfair is to say that the inequal-
ity is the result of morally arbitrary factors. That is, if we agree that morally arbitrary 
factors such as race and socioeconomic background should not increase the risk of 
disease but developmental insights provide evidence that they do, then the resulting 
health inequalities are unfair (figure 2). 
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this inequality is morally indefensible. This raises the question: ‘ to which extent are 
perinatal and adult health inequalities unfair?’ or, more precisely, ‘which factors that 
result in avoidable inequalities are morally arbitrary?’ Factors like race and socioeco-
nomic background are obviously morally arbitrary; they ought not to matter. However, 
cigarette smoking, drinking alcohol, the use of drugs, having an unhealthy lifestyle and 
not seeking free and high-quality care in the period surrounding pregnancy are prima 
facie not morally arbitrary. That is, people can be held, to some extent, responsible. 
For example, in Rotterdam inequality in perinatal mortality, “as tip of the iceberg of 
perinatal morbidity”12 in neighborhoods ranges between 2 and 34 per 1000 births.13 
Women with a low socioeconomic status and with a non-Western background face the 
highest risk for poor pregnancy outcomes. On the other hand however, the Netherlands 
offers free and high quality pregnancy related care. One might ask “to what extent 
are these perinatal health inequalities unfair and to what extent are they a matter 
of parental responsibility –given that pregnancy related care is in place. The resolu-
tion of this moral dilemma requires the assessment of both the scientific component 
(the degree of avoidability) and of the ethical component (the degree of unfairness) as 
shown in figure 3. 
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The pivotal question to determine responsibility is ‘when exactly are inequalities 
unfair?’ In answering this question, John Rawls’s philosophical ideas about ‘justice as 
fairness’ and insights from DOHaD and epigenetics come together
Justice as fairness
In his book ‘A theory of justice’ John Rawls aims to identify and describe ‘the principles 
of justice’ which are the principles upon which a just society should be based upon. In 
his search for these principles Rawls writes: “the principles of justice for institutions 
must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions 
in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects 
and must be discussed separately.”14(p.47) Rawls ponders about whether the principles 
of justice should be responsive to judgements of individual conduct. Consider for 
instance whether the offering of pregnancy related care should be responsive to the 
way parents-to-be typically prepare for pregnancy. From a Rawlsian point of view, 
the answer is no, as the reasons to introduce pregnancy related care which are: “the 
principles of justice for institutions should not be confused with the principles that 
apply to individuals and their actions…” namely, the way they prepare for pregnancy. 
In other words, it is a ‘category mistake’ to base a policy response to health inequalities 
on judgments about individual responsibility for health. Rawls gives three reasons for 
making the category distinction between the ‘principles of justice’ (e.g. health care and 
public health policy) and the principles that apply to individuals and their conduct (e.g. 
individual responsibility for health).14 
First, the principles applied to shape society, (e.g. health care and public health policy), 
have profound and far-reaching effects and inequalities resulting from people’s initial 
social position are likely to be deep and pervasive.8 Second, these principles affect the 
way people shape their character, desires, aims, and aspirations making them ‘more’ or 
‘less’ likely to escape their initial position of poor health and destitution. Third, given 
the scale and complexity involved in shaping society (e.g. healthcare) it is not feasible 
to expect that the principles of individual conduct are adequate to counteract unjust 
states of affairs resulting from an unfairly shaped society. In sum, Rawls argues that 
the principles of justice should “secure just background conditions against which the 
actions of individuals and associations take place. Unless this structure is appropriately 
regulated and adjusted, an initially just social process will eventually cease to be just, 
however free and fair particular transactions may look when viewed by themselves”15 
(p.266) That is, because the ability to take individual responsibility for health depends 
on contingent social factors, it is mistaken not to improve these social factors (such 
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as health care and public health), however irresponsible one may judge individual 
conduct to be. Simply stated: the duty to help the marginalized communities should 
not depend on their conduct.  
Claims about the influence of environment and social background on individuals’ well-
being and life prospects have since moved beyond philosophical assertions. They are 
now a scientific fact, corroborated by developmental insights as depicted in figure 4.
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Together, ethical reflection and developmental insights show that perinatal and adult 
health inequalities are to a significant extent the result of contingent social and 
environmental factors which are morally arbitrary (or even reprehensible such as 
racism). These health inequalities are avoidable, unfair and unsolvable solely through 
individual conduct and therefore demand an active response from the academic com-
munity (figures 1,2 and 3) as well as from policy makers (figure 4) as they can improve 
socially contingent factors such as the provision of public health and healthcare. 
Discussion
In the healthcare and public health debate, individual responsibility and social re-
sponsibility tend to be erroneously pitted against one another. Taking responsibility 
however calls for social and environmental conditions in which individuals can be 
reasonably expected to make responsible health-related choices. Insights from DOHaD 
and epigenetics are sufficiently robust to show that more needs to be done to improve 
these conditions. Rather than viewing mothers(-to-be) as targets of blame, culpable for 
the poor health of their offspring, special attention for the conditions of the parents-
to-be is required.
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Here are two initiatives that depict how taking social responsibility creates the right 
conditions in which mothers-to-be to are empowered to take individual responsibility. 
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), 
which provides disadvantaged families with regular supplies of food essential for 
physical and cognitive development, has improved the quality of maternal and child 
nutrition, and the physical and cognitive development of children.16 This demonstrates 
how a coordinated care program benefits the health of mothers and newborns. The 
‘Mothers for Rotterdam’ initiative, in which women living in deprived neighborhoods 
are assisted and guided in addressing their medical and non-medical conditions, is 
another example.17 Young mothers are aided through mediation in cases of evictions, 
supported in the acquisition of proper health insurance and assisted in finding educa-
tion and employment. In this way mothers are empowered, giving them and their 
children a fairer chance to prevent poor health and escape their destitute situation. 
Michael Marmot writes:” Why treat people and send them back to the conditions that made 
them sick?”18 This statement poignantly captures the social dimension of the health 
inequality problem we are facing. Some ideas ought to cut across social, cultural and 
political beliefs. Securing the conditions for good health and well-being of newborns, 
regardless of how culpable one judges parents to be, is a prominent one.
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The first aim was: to identify and describe the views parents and caregivers on the responsibil-
ity for the health of children-to-be in general and the responsibility to prepare for pregnancy in 
particular
Maternal responsibility
Our study, in which we interviewed socioeconomic underprivileged mothers-to-be, has 
shown that this group of women does feel responsible for the health of their new-
borns also before birth and even before conception.(1) Most women we interviewed 
mentioned the timely intake of folic acid supplementation, alcohol and smoking ces-
sation, dietary improvements and the increase of physical activity as changes they (if 
relevant) should make for the benefit of the health of their children-to-be. Although 
advice from caregivers such as the GP about adequate pregnancy preparation was 
typically welcomed, the behavioral changes as such were thought to be, ultimately, a 
matter of maternal responsibility. According to these women, caregivers can thus play 
an important supportive role in empowering women to fulfill their responsibility. This 
supportive role was thought to be more important as the required changes were of an 
increasing medical character. For example, the role of the caregiver was in the eyes of 
this group more important when women took medication which was possibly terato-
genic or when women had an obstetric history such as a miscarriage. In these cases, 
cases in which medical expertise contributes significantly to an adequate pregnancy 
preparation, it was though that mothers-to-be and caregivers shared the responsibility 
for the health of the children-to-be.
This view on the maternal responsibility is promising as women are in principle open 
to pregnancy preparation for the benefit of their children-to-be. Leaving aside women 
who are adequately prepared for pregnancy, there are however, barriers that need to 
be overcome in order to go from the ‘experience of responsibility’ to ‘actual pregnancy 
preparation.’ For one, mothers-to-be typically feel sufficiently prepared for pregnancy.
(1-3) This feeling can be caused by a combination factors such as previous experiences 
with pregnancy, the experiences of relatives and friends with pregnancy and the avail-
ability of online pregnancy-related information. When we consider these factors to-
gether with the general unfamiliarity with pregnancy preparation and preconception 
care in particular (4, 5) and the tendency of mothers-to-be to underestimate the risk 
factors they have for poor pregnancy outcomes(1-3, 6), the feeling of ‘being prepared’ 
is understandable. Thus, although the feeling of responsibility for the health of the 
newborn is present, the fulfillment of this responsibility does not necessarily require 
professional health care interventions, according to the women we interviewed. 
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It seems to me that this feeling of being prepared warrants response. First, there ought 
to be a response from the scientific community. We have argued(7) and I argue once 
more that apart from its academic aims, scientific research on pregnancy prepara-
tion has a significant societal function. This function is to raise awareness and to set 
the societal agenda in order to make the avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes a 
prominent topic in the public discourse. Topics are not important until they are made 
important. Hence, the scientific community (a) carries the burden of proof to show that 
this feeling of preparedness is in fact a barrier to adequate pregnancy preparation and 
better pregnancy outcomes(1, 4) (b) has a duty translate scientific insight into actual 
interventions that aid women in preparing for pregnancy and lead to better pregnancy 
outcomes (8) and (c) has a burden of proof to show that women who receive preconcep-
tion care are truly better prepared for pregnancy and have a better chance at avoiding 
adverse pregnancy outcomes.(9) This last consideration present a serious challenge. 
In our study, women who received a preconception care consultation mentioned that 
although they were positive about the consultation they were also already aware of 
most information and advice given.(1) Consider that even if this group of women was 
somewhat overestimating their knowledge prior to the consultation, a good topic for 
future research, the problem of the perception of a limited added-value of the preconcep-
tion care consultation remains. This suggests that for an increased uptake, the delivery 
of preconception care has to make bigger impact on the perception of preparedness 
of women. 
Second, pregnancy preparation as a topic should be better imbedded within the educa-
tional system in order for women (and men) to have a better notion of what it entails. 
It is peculiar that although many women felt relatively prepared for pregnancy our 
research, which is in with line other studies, suggests that most women are unfamil-
iar with preconception care.(1, 2, 4) This might be the result of women associating 
pregnancy preparation (not preconception care) for the most part with fertility(1, 
3) and hence conception represents a successful pregnancy preparation.  The ‘cross-
pollination’ of knowledge about the importance of pregnancy preparation for health 
and the knowledge about fertility is an idea worth exploring. This entails, first, that 
in addition to lessons on fertility and sexual health, lessons on pregnancy preparation 
for the health of the mother and should be included newborn in the educational cur-
riculum. With the appropriate knowledge in mind, women will be far better able to 
estimate their preparedness for pregnancy and decide on better grounds whether to 
seek preconception care or not. Second, fertility as a topic should be a marked feature 
within preconception care. This may encourage women to seek preconception care as 
the important topic in which they are interested –fertility– will also be discussed. 
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In addition to the feeling of preparedness, skepticism was also expressed about the con-
trollability of the course of pregnancy and the health of their child-to-be. Statements 
such as “[w]ell as far as I know you cannot do anything about it [actual pregnancy going 
well], but you can help it a bit.”(1) denote the utero as a ‘black box’ of sorts in which the 
‘difficult to influence’ development of the child-to-be unfolds. Well-known claims such 
as ‘my mother smoked during my pregnancy and I am just fine’ reinforce this idea; in 
the end there is little we can do to influence let alone improve the course of pregnancy. 
This skepticism meshes well with the idea of the ‘naturalness of pregnancy’. This idea 
of pregnancy as being natural, has for our discussion two relevant meanings. First, 
the ‘naturalness of pregnancy’ can refer the perceived limited controllability as just 
described. If pregnancy is perceived to be natural in this sense, then human interfer-
ence such as preconception care will have little impact on the outcome of pregnancy. 
Second, the ‘naturalness of pregnancy’ can in addition also describe an ideal. Natural 
pregnancy in this sense refers to ‘pregnancy with as little (medical) interference as pos-
sible’ as something worth achieving. This ideal is not uncommon within the pregnancy 
domain as the increasing popularity of home deliveries in the Netherlands seems to 
suggest. Research has been done on the topic of ‘medicalization’ (10) in which the 
soundness of the ‘naturalness of pregnancy as a reason not to seek care’ argument 
has been discussed (and refuted). Yet, to my mind, important questions about the 
phenomenology14 of pregnancy remain unanswered. Why is there a tendency to perceive 
pregnancy as something which should be shielded from medical intervention in the 
first place? What are the reasons for setting the ‘naturalness of pregnancy’ against 
‘medical interventions’? What is the phenomenological distinction between eating 
more broccoli and taking folic acid pills to prevent neural tube defects? Unless we 
understand the reasons and more importantly the sentiments behind the skepticism 
about ‘the controllability of pregnancy’ and the idea of the ‘naturalness of pregnancy’ 
–two sides of the same coin– studies on medicalization will most likely only resonate 
with academic peers. Public deliberation and research is needed to enrich the concept 
of naturalness in the domain of pregnancy so that the image of natural pregnancy is 
no longer mainly underpinned (and thus dominated) by unreflective sentiments and 
perceptions. To my mind, there is in essence nothing good or bad about naturalness 
as such. 
Lastly, it is important to also mention the responsibility of the father-to-be for the 
health of his child(ren)-to-be. Although this responsibility is typically indirectly benefi-
cial to the health of his child(ren)-to-be, it is nevertheless not unimportant. Lifestyle 
14 Phenomenology is the study of structures of experience or consciousness as experienced from 
the first-person point of view. For example, what is it like to prepare for pregnancy? 
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changes associated with pregnancy preparation such as alcohol and smoking cessation 
and eating healthier are made and sustained easier when the prospective mother and 
father join forces in achieving these aims. What is good for the goose is good for the 
gander. The father-to-be can also play a supportive role when it comes to preconception 
care. Taking interest in pregnancy preparation, encouraging his partner to seek care 
and joining her during consultations are all admirable manners to fulfill his responsi-
bility as a father-to-be. 
The caregiver’s responsibility
The awareness of, or better yet, the knowledge about the benefits of pregnancy prepa-
ration and preconception care in particular is an important precondition to assume 
responsibility for the health of children-to-be.  Caregivers do typically have knowledge 
about the benefits of pregnancy preparation such as the importance of folic acid supple-
mentation, yet significant knowledge gaps do exist.(5, 11) Our research confirmed and 
gave a more detailed account of this ‘knowledge gap barrier’ to the uptake of precon-
ception care.(5) The lack of a government coordinated preconception care program in 
the Netherlands and the poor organization of preconception care are both detrimental 
to making preconception care more familiar and lead to situations in which necessary 
care is either delivered too late or not at all.(5) Statements such as: “ It is really important 
that patients are referred in time to the right caregivers which unfortunately doesn’t always hap-
pen… the communication between the different disciplines of PCC [preconception care]seems to 
be fragmented which makes the provided care suboptimal and less efficient.”(GP) and “Midwives, 
GP’s and obstetricians have insufficient expertise about inflammatory bowel disease to provide 
adequate care for patients who have a desire to become pregnant. However, these patients who 
should be seen by me or one of my colleagues are too often not referred to us.” (Gastroenterologist) 
attest to the missed opportunities to deliver much needed preconception care. That is, 
they attest to opportunities missed by caregivers to assume and fulfill their responsibil-
ity to secure and promote the health of children-to-be.
This barrier and its possible solution was also discussed during our expert meeting. 
According to the expert panel, the appointment of an easily identifiable preconception 
care provider who acts as a case manager of sorts and thus assumes responsibility for 
the pregnancy preparation from the caregivers’ perspective would be a good strategy 
worth exploring.(12)  The GP or public health nurse were put forwards as possible 
candidates. What is more, given that preconception care encompasses both the medi-
cal and non-medical domain(13) an additional recommendation of the panel was to 
define and distribute the different roles and responsibilities of caregivers. A shared 
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care model, a model of care that includes the skills and knowledge of a range of profes-
sionals such as pregnancy related healthcare professionals, policy makers, social peer 
group networks and community social workers, was proposed to secure the involve-
ment of all relevant stakeholders and improve the fair distribution of the responsibility 
to improve pregnancy outcomes.(12, 14) 
Yet, arguably the most important barrier for caregivers to fulfill their professional 
responsibility towards women contemplating pregnancy and children-to-be is that 
mothers-to-be who would benefit the most from preconception care are the hardest 
to reach.(4, 5, 12)  The unreachability of those who need care the most remains the 
bane of the preconception care professional. Especially women who have accumulated 
medical, obstetric, social and economic misfortunes can greatly benefit from the whole 
array of possible preconception care interventions; but unfortunately too few are 
reached to deliver this care. One way to better reach these vulnerable women who 
contemplate pregnancy, I assume, is by emphasizing the non-medical interventions 
which are available (and should to a greater extent be made available) through precon-
ception care. A, in my view remarkable initiative that does exactly this, is the Mothers 
of Rotterdam project where vulnerable mothers living in deprived neighborhoods are 
‘taken by the hand’ to address their medical problems (e.g. by making appointments 
for these women with the appropriate healthcare professionals and go with to the 
appointment if necessary) as well as their non-medical problems (e.g. by guiding these 
women towards debt management plans, housing services, educational plans and 
employment agencies)(15) To my mind, preconception care can play a more distinctive 
role when it goes beyond the identification of non-medical (and medical) risk factors 
and problems. To play this role, preconception care should be able to set in motion 
the appropriate social and economic interventions that are necessary to help women 
who, because of their accumulation of problems, are at risk of losing self-governance. 
Introducing so called ‘care pathways’ that facilitate necessary referrals to non-medical 
caregivers would be conducive to achieve this, in my view, ‘fleshed-out’ version of 
preconception care.(12) I would be more optimistic about the ability to reach vulner-
able women with well-functioning care paths in place. In other words, widening the 
scope so that social and economic problems are included would be, in my view, an 
improvement of preconception care. Yet, if preconception care ventures out in the 
world of non-medical risks and problems it has the responsibility to respond to the 
risks and problems it encounters, for example by guiding women towards the help 
and care they needed. Pointing out problems without providing some, for vulnerable 
women, attainable solution would indeed be quite unhelpful.  
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Lastly I would like to shortly discuss the disposition of caregivers who deliver or should 
deliver preconception care in relation to their professional responsibility. Our research 
as well as other research has reported on the relatively reticent (as opposed to proactive) 
disposition of caregivers when it comes to pregnancy preparation and preconception 
care. (5, 11, 16) This ties in with the earlier mentioned views on the lack of sufficient 
awareness of and sufficient knowledge about preconception care as well as the unclear 
definition and distribution of responsibilities as expressed by caregivers. Moreover, 
caregivers who could deliver preconception care reported that preconception care con-
sultations are time consuming –especially if one is unable to deliver them on a regular 
base– and the delivery of preconception care has to compete with the delivery of other 
forms of (preventive) care.(5, 11) Statements such as “The preconception consultation is 
very time consuming…”(Midwife)(5) and “I often have to use all the time available to address the 
patient’s medical questions, so the time to ask about the desire to have children or to discuss PCC 
[preconception care] is lacking… Because of time and resource constraints, PCC has to compete 
with other preventive care. That may also be a barrier.” (GP) (5) demonstrate these barriers 
as perceived by caregivers. The lack of a proactive disposition by caregivers regarding 
the offering of preconception care is thus understandable. I recommend the provision 
of education to equip professionals with the necessary awareness and knowledge for 
a proper deliver of preconception care, the organization of preconception care (prefer-
ably coordinated by the government) for it to have a less ‘impromptu’ character and 
thus to be of better quality and less time consuming and a clear distribution of the 
caregivers’ roles and responsibilities for the offering and delivering of preconception 
care as ways to address these barriers.
I would moreover like to draw attention to phenomenology once more. I do think that 
the fact that we are dealing here with those who are not-born (yet), makes an impor-
tant difference in the experience –in the phenomenology– of responsibility, harm and 
delivery of care. It is in our human nature to feel more committed towards the concrete 
and tangible rather than to the hypothetical and things of abstract nature.15 As was also 
mentioned during the expert meeting, the benefits of adequate pregnancy preparation, 
preconception care and prevention in general are intangible, abstract and only notice-
able as a statistic. The abstract nature of the benefits of prevention and preconception 
care in particular may be reflected in the experience of urgency caregivers (but also 
parents-to-be) have regarding pregnancy preparation. That is, the fact that the aim is to 
prevent hypothetical harm, benefiting a hypothetical child, may influence the experi-
ence of urgency and hence the commitment to offer and deliver preconception care. 
15 The speculative nature of our economic system, which seems to serve abstract market-related 
goals rather than actual people however, seems to suggest otherwise.
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Of course, this is a hypothesis from my side, but one which calls for further research. 
Moreover, this observation on the hypothetical nature of prevention and its effects on 
the experience of urgency is not meant as a reason to discard the barriers to the of-
fering and delivery of preconception care perceived by caregivers. These are quite real 
and need to be addressed. It is meant to show that if we want to address the barriers 
caregivers experience, as we should, we should take into consideration how caregivers 
balance the hypothetical harms to hypothetical children against other medical and 
preventive interventions in which the harms and benefits are more obvious. It seems 
to me that the crucial difference between ‘those who are more’ and ‘those who are less’ 
committed to preconception care boils down the perception one has on the harms that 
can be prevented and the benefits that can be gained by preparing for pregnancy, that 
is, a difference in phenomenology. 
The second aim was to: To provide an ethical analysis of the justifiability of unreflective behav-
ioral interventions (nudges) aimed at benefiting the health of children-to-be
Drawing lessons from nudging 
Research into the way we make choices has drawn much attention from scientists 
and ethicists, not least since the publication of Daniel Kahneman’s ‘Thinking Fast and 
Slow’(17) and Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s ‘Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness’(18) The central theme in behavioral research in general 
and these two books in particular is the question of how people make everyday choices. 
People typically face choices everywhere and all the time. And for life not to become 
overwhelmingly burdensome many choices in daily life are made quickly and without 
(significant) deliberation. Decisions about everyday choices such as what to eat and 
what to drink, how to work-out, what time to set the alarm, which road to take to the 
office and many more seem to effortlessly ‘pop up’ into our mind. Cognitive ‘rules of 
thumb’ or ‘heuristics’ as they are called underpin these unreflective decisions we tend 
to make. The tendency to stick with the default (default bias) or the overestimation of 
available information (availability bias) are examples of these heuristics that influence 
or sometimes even determine our choice behavior. 
The way these heuristics play out depends on the way a choice is designed and pre-
sented. If for example, the ‘choice architecture’(18) is designed in such a way that a 
magazine subscription is automatically renewed, the chances  that one remains a pay-
ing subscriber for years are significantly increased. Thus the basic equation is, combine 
a heuristic with a certain choice architecture and the result is a predictable outcome. 
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Given that heuristics are close to impossible to change16 and choice architectures are 
ubiquitous17, the best way to  arrive at this predictable outcome is by the deliberate 
design of the choice architecture. Choice architectures that have been designed delib-
erately so to steer people to a predictable outcome are what are known as ‘nudges’. 
Or as Thaler and Sunstein define it: “A nudge, is any aspect of the choice architecture 
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.” The potential of these nudges gener-
ated great interest also from policy makers tasked with encouraging individuals to lead 
healthier lives.(19) 
Before I move to the discussion of the possibilities of nudging for health and preg-
nancy preparation I want to emphasize an underappreciated insight. As mentioned 
already, behavioral insights shed light on people’s propensity to make heuristic-based 
choices in everyday life. Life would be quite unbearable if we would have to reflect on 
every choice we make, so heuristics are in this sense ‘necessary cognitive illusions’ The 
entrenched-ness of our mental rules of thumb provides the ‘cognitive room’ for the 
deliberation about the choices that require careful thought. With the easy choices out 
of the way, we can focus on the important matters at hand.  
However, when our heuristics steer us towards unfavorable outcomes and we want 
to change the corresponding choice behavior, the entrenched-ness of these heuristics 
becomes painfully clear. It can be truly hard to change choice behavior that is un-
derpinned not by deliberation, but by mental rules of thumb. Consider for example 
the lifestyle changes recommended for a healthy pregnancy such as dietary changes. 
Research has shown that there is an association between having a diet containing 
vegetables, fruit, whole grains and fish and having a lower risk of preterm delivery.
(20) Now consider women who have a fast-food based diet. The ‘choice’ to eat fast-food 
several times a week is not very likely to be a well-thought out decision but rather 
a simple and convenient way to solve the problem that one has to eat.18 Fast food is 
readily available and in line with the ‘availability bias’ therefore likely to be chosen. It 
is an easy heuristic-based fix to the problem of having to eat every day. 
Now if we ask these women to adopt a healthier diet when they are contemplating 
pregnancy, we are asking them to replace an easy heuristic-based approach which 
requires a minimal cognitive effort with reflective approach that requires (a) a cogni-
tive investment, e.g. making an effort to decide what to cook and how to cook it, 
16 which is not to say that they cannot be resisted e.g. through deliberation about a choice
17 choices have to always be presented in one way or another
18 This is in no way meant as a moral judgment of women who regularly eat fast-food
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(b) an investment in terms of time, e.g. when to go to the supermarket to buy all 
these healthy products and (c) a commitment to this dietary change, i.e. resisting the 
appeal of fast-food and sustain her change in diet. Upholding this dietary change is 
not impossible. But it surely is not an easy aim to achieve. More generally speaking, 
changing heuristic-based behavioral patterns is quite a challenge. Everyday behavior 
becomes entrenched in our mind and changing these patterns of behavior is though 
not impossible particularly hard as fast, unconscious and convenient solutions have 
to be replaced by solutions that require reflection and are typically more difficult to 
achieve. This is exactly why help in the form of nudges and mHealth tools such as 
‘Smarter Pregnancy’, which aims to lower the threshold to preconception care and 
make it easier to have a healthier diet and lifestyle is being explored.(21)
We have to keep this in mind when judging mothers-to-be with regards to their preg-
nancy preparation. 
nudge me, help my baby
I turn now to the possibility of using nudges to make the choices conducive to a healthy 
pregnancy preparation easier. The possibility of using nudges to improve people’s 
health has been discussed in the scientific and ethical literature.(19) Nudges such as: 
serving alcoholic and sugar sweetened drinks in smaller glasses, keeping cigarettes, 
lighters and ashtrays out of sight and making salad rather than fries the default side 
dish in a meal are all meant to make healthier choices easier.(22) So why not use 
nudges to make choices pertaining to a healthy preparation for pregnancy  easier? 
My short answer would be: indeed, why not. There are to my mind no fundamental 
moral objections to not consider nudges for pregnancy preparation and preconception 
care in particular. This entails that I do not think that nudges are freedom limiting or 
autonomy thwarting to the extent that they are morally unjustifiable as some of the 
ethical literature on this topic seems to suggest.(23-25) Given the inescapable influence 
of any choice architecture and the fact that proper nudges never eliminate choice, 
that is, the ‘Libertarian Paternalist’ justification for nudging(26), choice, freedom 
and autonomy are, in my view, sufficiently safeguarded. Moreover, the goals pursued 
through nudging, in our case the improvement of health of children-to-be (and the 
mother-to-be), are innocuous and more than likely to be in line with the aims of the 
‘nudgee’. We may safely assume that nudging women towards healthier pregnancies is 
‘for their own good in their own eyes’.(27)
150 Chapter 9
However, an interesting challenge presents itself when we consider the use of nudges 
for the benefit of the health of children-to-be. The justification of nudging as offered 
by Libertarian Paternalism, only applies to cases in which the benefit of the nudge is 
to be gained by the individual being nudged. When I am nudged, my biases are utilized 
so to benefit me according to my standards of what counts as a benefit. In the case of 
a pregnancy preparation nudge however a woman is nudged for the benefit of her 
child-to-be. This is not an account of paternalism but an account of beneficence; doing 
good for the benefit of the other.  One possible response to this challenge is to point 
to the benefits of pregnancy preparation for the mother. Although it is true that many 
(though not all) ways to prepare for pregnancy are also good for the health of the 
mother, the justification as such is not compelling. In the end, a pregnancy preparation 
nudge is primarily aimed at benefitting the health of the child-to-be even if it does also 
benefit the mother-to-be and the primacy of this aim should be accounted for in the 
justification offered for that nudge.  
This is why we introduced the concept of the ‘other-regarding nudge’, a nudge that is 
meant to benefit the other (even if it also benefits the individual being nudged).(27) We 
have argued that although Libertarian Paternalism fails as the justificatory principle, 
the Harm Principle and the principle of beneficence provide sufficient justification for 
these other-regarding nudges.(27) More specifically, other-regarding nudges that are 
aimed to prevent harm  are justified using the Harm Principle and other-regarding 
nudges that are aimed to bestow some benefit or good are justified using the principle 
of beneficence. 
An interesting discussion that, in my view, follows from the distinction between 
preventing harm and bestowing a good is how to morally label certain actions or omis-
sions pertaining to pregnancy preparation. Does an informed mother-to-be who does 
not take preconceptional folic acid supplementation harm her child-to-be or is she only 
failing to bestow a good? And the same question goes for smoking, alcohol, visiting a 
preconception consultation and so on. This is a relevant question as harm is typically 
met with stronger moral disapproval than not bestowing a good. For example, there 
are stronger reasons to nudge women who contemplate pregnancy to quit smoking 
than to nudge them to visit a preconception consultation; although there are good 
reasons for the latter as well. It seems to me that smoking while trying to conceive is 
an example of a possible harm whereas not visiting a preconception care consultation 
is not; it is a matter of failing to bestow a good. 
To my mind this is more than a philosophical puzzle. It raises the more fundamental 
question of what we can reasonable expect from women contemplating pregnancy.
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(27) Consider the danger of construing every deviation from an optimal pregnancy 
preparation (whatever that may be) as a form of harm. We are then at risk of reducing 
mothers-to-be to ‘fetal containers’, instrumental vessels that are valued largely in terms 
of their pregnancy-related efforts and investments. (28) Consequently, the need for 
justification for a whole array of pregnancy-related interventions becomes minimal as 
the prevention of harm to others typically warrants intrusive interventions let alone 
nudging. Therefore, a fuller account of the responsibilities of women trying to conceive 
towards their children-to-be is required in which the expected benefits to the child 
are reasonably balanced against the burdens for the woman. To be clear, my claim 
here is that the justification for other-regarding nudges involves ‘moral labels’, i.e. the 
prevention of harm or the promotion of the good, that we have to apply with great 
care in order not to consider every deviation from a perfect pregnancy preparation as 
a form of harm. 
I will end this section with two caveats pertaining to the use of nudges for the benefit 
of children-to-be. First, we have to be aware that although choices can be mediated 
through heuristics, poor choice behavior should not be automatically attributed to 
(only) some flaw of the human mind. Not every poor choice is a matter of corrup-
tive heuristics. Adverse pregnancy outcomes are largely the result of the structure of 
society, living in deprived neighborhood, rather than the structure of the mind.  This 
brings me to the second caveat. I do believe that nudges can be conducive to pregnancy 
preparation. However, poor pregnancy outcomes are ultimately not the result of a ‘lack 
of rationality’ but rather a lack of knowledge, education as well as a lack of medical and 
social support. No nudge will overcome these deficiencies.  Thus in the end, nudging 
is, I argue, an interesting strategy to consider when it comes to supporting women to 
prepare for pregnancy.  Nudging however, should not replace the comprehensive care 
and policy necessary to counteract avoidable pregnancy outcomes.
The third aim was to: provide an ethical analysis of the justifiability of the use of force in preg-
nancy related care by considering the case of the justifiability of forced cesareans 
why consider force?
In general terms, pregnancy-related research shows that the health of children-to-be is 
becoming less a matter of chance and more a matter of choice. Adequate preconcep-
tion, prenatal and maternity care can all contribute to the reduction or prevention of 
avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes thereby promoting and securing the health of 
children-to-be. The corollary of this increased ‘controllability’ of the course of preg-
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nancy is that more can be done to achieve healthier pregnancies that result in the 
birth of healthier babies. ‘More can be done’, but does this without question imply that 
‘more ought to be done?’ To some extent I would say –yes–.  An increase in knowledge 
leads to an increase of responsibility. Now we know that many neural tube defects can 
be prevented by preconceptional folic acid supplementation, this knowledge gives rise 
to the responsibility to use supplementation before (and during the first weeks of ) 
pregnancy. Knowledge alone however, is not enough to determine responsibility. The 
burdens associated with pregnancy preparation and the expected benefits to the child-
to-be should also be accounted for when determining the responsibility of mothers-to-
be for her child-to-be. I have discussed the question of determining responsibility of 
the mother-to-be in the previous section. The question I want to address here is: ‘what 
response is justified when a mother-to-be does not fulfill her responsibility?” 
Surely we should not force women into taking folic acid supplementation. This would 
amount to a moral outrage. Yet mothers-to-be who knowingly or even because of ‘weak-
ness-of-will’ forgo the regular use of supplementation are doing wrong and perhaps 
even harm to their child-to-be. So what is the adequate response to this wrongdoing 
and doing harm? A provisional answer would be that the more harm to the child-to-be 
can be prevented, the more intrusive the intervention can be that prevents this harm. 
So for example, the soft steering character of a pregnancy preparation nudge is justified 
by the hypothetical harms it aim to prevent.(27)19 But is the use of force then justified 
if acute and life-threatening harm for the child-to-be can be prevented? For the case 
of pregnancy preparation, this question comes too early; no acute and life threatening 
harm can be prevented. The risks of harm can be reduced, that much is clear. But the 
risk of harm is different from actual harm and it is the latter I wish to discuss. Does the 
prevention of inevitable acute and life-threatening harm justify the use of force against 
women? To my mind the best way to answer this question is by looking to cases in 
which this question actually arises. One such case is the that of the forced cesarean. Is it 
morally justifiable to force a pregnant woman to submit to cesarean surgery, if she does 
not consent to a medically indicated cesarean, necessary to save her fetus in distress? 
The line of argumentation used to answer this question provides, so I believe, valuable 
insights in the moral permissibility of force in pregnancy-related care in general.
19 or hypothetical goods they aim to bestow
General Discussion 153
forced cesarean
In the discussion on the ‘cesarean dilemma’20 proponents and opponents typically do 
agree on the interests at stake, the respect for autonomy of pregnant women on the 
one hand and the duty to save the life of the unborn on the other, yet they disagree on 
the moral weight that should be attached to these interests. We have argued that given 
this disagreement on the ‘weight’ the weighing of benefits and burdens is unlikely to 
succeed as a strategy to overcome this dilemma.(29) As an alternative we proposed to 
test the considered judgments of the professionals in the medical domain against the 
norms and values these professionals –by virtue of being professionals– are committed 
for their coherence. This method is widely known as the (narrow) reflective equilibrium.
(30) Basing our analysis on the four cardinal principles of medical ethics21(31) as the 
moral depictions of the norms and values professionals working in the medical domain 
ought to be committed to, we concluded that the justification for forced cesareans 
leads to too much incoherency between the considered judgments that underpin it22 
and the principles of medical ethics that should justify it23.  Therefore, the use of force 
is, we argued, morally impermissible.(29) 
I believe that the analysis that lead to this conclusion (as well as the conclusion itself ) 
is (are) relevant for our discussion on the responsibility caregivers and mothers-to-be 
have towards children-to-be. For one, it demonstrates that narrowing the scope so to in-
clude only the health and the interests of the child-to-be or the freedom and autonomy 
of mothers-to-be is insufficient to do a sound ethical analysis on which pregnancy 
preparation interventions are justifiable and which ones are not.  I often do think 
that there is a pitfall to being in the ‘preconception care business’ as we tend to, for 
perfectly understandable reasons, narrow our focus to the health and interests of the 
child-to-be. The improvement of the health and wellbeing of children-to-be is such a 
praiseworthy goal that we run the risk of discounting what we ask mothers-to-be to 
do in order to achieve this goal. The use of the reflective equilibrium in our analysis 
of the justifiability of forced cesareans offers a way to widen this scope by ‘forcing’ us 
to reconcile the duties and demands we attribute to mothers-to-be with the duties and 
demands we attribute to others who are also in the position to prevent harm to and do 
significant good for the health of children-to-be. Just think of the significant harms to 
children-to-be that are caused by tobacco companies, fast-food companies, unnecessary 
poverty and poor parenting to name just a few. Demanding an adequate pregnancy 
20 Is the use of force against pregnant women justified when it can save the life of their unborns?
21 These are the principles of: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice
22 the justification of forced cesareans.
23 Idem
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preparation from mothers-to-be in a society filled with possible harms for children-to-be 
is like fixing the window to subsequently burn the house. To be sure, I am not claiming 
that until all social and economic sources of harm are abolished, mothers-to-be carry 
no responsibility for their children-to-be. I am claiming that we should be ‘test’ our 
intuitions and considered judgments regarding the pregnancy-related interventions 
(which may or may not allow force) for their fairness and reasonableness by assessing 
how coherent they are with other intuitions, considered judgments, norms and values 
we are committed to.
The fourth aim was: to identify and present the demands of justice pertaining to the improve-
ment and securing of the health of children-to-be 
why justice?
I turn now to the societal responsibilities for the health of children-to-be, that is, the 
demands of justice. Let me start by pointing to an important debate in the field of politi-
cal philosophy which revolves around the question of whether the moral rules applied 
for interpersonal conduct should be the same as the moral rules applied for realizing 
social values such as fairness, equality and justice. Let me explain. It is clear that by any 
reasonable standard of evaluation, people within a society, even a prosperous society 
like the Netherlands, live lives of (significantly) varying quality. Individuals belonging 
to different socioeconomic positions differ in their quality of health, nutrition and 
lifestyle, life expectancy, access to medical care and education and their vulnerability 
to stress, violence and abuse. This is nothing new. 
Those who have the good fortune to belong to the more privileged strata of society can 
surely be moved by the ill-faith of those less fortunate, yet, in general, they look not 
primarily to themselves to alleviate their burdens. For example, for a privileged24 indi-
vidual it is a matter of personal responsibility to rescue a drowning infant from death in 
a pool but not or at best significantly less a matter of personal responsibility to counteract 
inequalities in infant deaths observed in the city of Rotterdam. In other words, there 
seems25 to be a difference in the way we ought to treat one another and respond to each 
other’s needs on a small-scale and the way we ought to respond to large-scale societal 
problems such as perinatal inequality. In the literature this is referred to as the ‘divi-
sion of moral labor’.(32) This dissertation also contains a division of moral labor. On the 
24 in fact, any individual who can swim or call for help
25 caution is in order as some political and ethical theories such as libertarianism and utilitarian-
ism do not make this distinction
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one hand I discussed the responsibilities of mothers-to-be, parents-to-be and caregivers 
for the health of children-to-be. These responsibilities are comprehensive but they do 
not include the large-scale problems pertaining to the health of children-to-be which 
have to do with the number of avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes is general and 
perinatal health inequalities in particular. In the next section I will turn to the re-
sponsibility of society to address these large-scale problems, that is, the demands of 
justice.26 Before doing so I want to stress the importance of this moral division of labor. 
There is a tendency to pit small-scale responsibilities against large-scale responsibilities 
in societies that (over)emphasize the individual responsibility for health.(7) In light of 
the insights provided by the DOHaD paradigm and epigenetics there exists a serious 
risk that mothers-to-be become the target of blame and shame in the discussion on 
avoidable infant disease and death; from the mother’s dinner to a newborn’s disease.
(7) This is both unwarranted and it draws attention away from the demands of justice 
pertaining to health of children-to-be. If it’s the mother then it can’t be society, or so 
the fallacy goes. Having mentioned this fallacy, I turn now to the demands of justice to 
counteract avoidable pregnancy outcomes in general and perinatal health inequalities 
in particular. 
Adverse pregnancy outcomes and the demands of justice
Adverse pregnancy outcomes occur everywhere in the world. The ones I discussed 
however, are particularly disquieting because of one special feature; they are observed 
in prosperous societies. The Netherlands for example, has free and high-quality (preg-
nancy-related) care in place yet it has a persistent high number of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes compared to other European countries.(33) Moreover, staggering inequalities 
in pregnancy outcomes between neighborhoods have also been observed.(34) Insights 
from the DOHaD paradigm and epigenetics show that a suboptimal embryonic growth 
which leads to many adverse pregnancy outcomes also increases the risk of attracting 
non-communicable diseases later in life. An impaired development in utero hits twice.
(35) These insights emphasize the importance of a good embryonic and fetal develop-
ment and thereby the importance of adequate pregnancy preparation as well as the 
availability of accessible pregnancy-related care. 
26 Responsibilities of society to address large-scale problems can also be based on solidarity 
rather than on determining the demands of justice. This is however typically considered to 
be a less principled and therefore less compelling way. Still, the healthcare system in the 
Netherlands for example, is based on solidarity and not on the principles of justice.
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So what to do to counteract these high number of adverse pregnancy outcomes and 
perinatal health inequalities in a prosperous society such as the Netherlands? Or more 
precisely, what does justice demand in this situation? We have argued that although 
much more can be done to improve the availability and accessibility of care in deprived 
neighborhoods this will most probably not be enough as the problem of adverse preg-
nancy outcomes cannot only be traced back to a ‘deficit of goods’ (such as availability of 
care) but also a ‘deficit of capacity’; the capacity individuals living in deprived neighbor-
hoods have to set health-related goals worth pursuing.(35) It has been widely observed 
that people living in deprived circumstances tend to adapt their (health-related) prefer-
ences, goals and aspirations so they match their unfortunate living conditions so that 
these conditions cease to be a source of frustrations. This ‘mechanism of acquiescence’ 
is widely known as ‘adaptive preferences’.(36, 37) Research on adaptive preferences has 
typically focused on people living in countries that face severe poverty and destitution. 
Our own research(1) however, suggests that these adaptive presences can also occur in 
deprived neighborhoods in prosperous societies; even if the level of  poverty is incom-
parable between those worst-off living in the Netherlands and those worst-off living 
in –say– India. Our observation can be seen as an invitation to further research into the 
ways life in deprived circumstances within a prosperous society curb the health-related 
preferences, goals and aspirations of mothers-to-be. 
We have argued that to meet the demands of justice we should focus on counteracting 
these adaptive preferences that are caused by living in a deprived neighborhood by 
investing in interventions that improve what we called the ‘health-agency’ of mothers-
to-be.(35) We described health agency as “1. the capacity to form health-goals one has 
reason to value, 2. the perceived control over achieving those health-goals and 3. the 
freedom(s) one has to achieve those health-goals.(35)” One can think of interventions 
that aim to improve health-agency as ‘anti-nudges’27 as they are aimed at empowering 
women in order for them to set health-related goals they have reason to value. Unlike 
nudging these interventions require serious societal investments in education and 
tailor-made care so that mothers-to-be are encouraged to raise their health-related ex-
pectations for themselves and their children-to-be beyond their adaptations. To be sure, 
this will most likely be a slow and arduous process. Helping mother-to-be to set ‘giving 
birth to a healthy baby’ as a valuable and achievable goal rather than merely ‘praying for 
the best’(35) is ambitious and requires social dedication. But as we have argued, justice 
demands nothing less.   
27 This is not to say that the potential of nudging as a way to encourage women to better prepare 




The subtitle of this dissertation is: ‘a moral exploration of the responsibilities of parental 
and societal responsibilities for children-to be’ and an exploration it is. The aim was to 
explore topics that matter greatly in the discussion on adverse pregnancy outcomes, 
pregnancy preparation and preconception care; topics such as the responsibility of the 
mother-to-be and society for the health of children-to-be; topics have always there in 
the background but should also take center stage. I am optimistic that the identifica-
tion, exploration and argumentation offered here on novel topics such as ‘nudging 
and pregnancy preparation’ and ‘the demands of justice pertaining to the health of 
children-to-be’ are conducive to finding comprehensive answers to the problem of 
avoidable infant illness and death. It seems to me that ethical and philosophical refec-
tion is indispensable in order to improve pregnancy outcomes in a manner that is 
respectful towards mothers-to-be and based on moral arguments we all have reason to 
be convinced by. It is my hope that this dissertation has made a contribution to this 
reflection.
As is with most explorations however, it leads not to fine-grained discoveries. As op-
posed to the recommendations for caregivers and policymakers, this dissertation was, 
not tailor-made. Although we have identified ‘health-agency’ as an important trait that 
enables mothers-to-be to set the good health of their children-to-be as a goal worth 
pursuing we have not specified which interventions are most likely to achieve the 
empowerment of health agency. We have justified the use of nudges for the benefit of 
the health of children-to-be but not yet given a specified account of the content of a 
pregnancy preparation nudge. The interview studies we did yielded interesting insights 
on the self-reported responsibility of caregivers and mothers-to-be for the health of 
children-to-be. More studies on the views of mothers-to-be and caregivers are however 
required to reaffirm and expand on our findings. 
recommendations
Recommendations for research
·	 The views, ideas and sentiments of mothers-to-be underpinning the feeling of 
preparedness for pregnancy should be researched
·	 The views, ideas and sentiments of mothers-to-be underpinning the purported 
‘naturalness of pregnancy’ should be researched
·	 The views and ideas of caregivers on the added-value and effectivity of preconcep-
tion care should be researched.
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·	 Research is needed to arrive at a fair and reasonable idea on what counts as harm 
and what counts as failing to provide a benefit in the case of pregnancy preparation. 
It is important to include within this deliberation the responsibilities we attribute 
to others (e.g. fathers, caregivers, fast-food companies) for the health of children so 
to ‘calibrate’ the responsibility to avoid harm and to provide benefits to children-to-
be by the mother-to-be. I recommend our distinct use of the reflective equilibrium 
as the appropriate method for this research.
·	 Research is needed on the way life in depraved neighborhoods curbs the prefer-
ences, aims and aspirations of mothers-to-be regarding the health of their children-
to-be.
Recommendations for caregivers, researchers and policymakers
·	 Invest in the translation of scientific insight into actual pregnancy preparation 
interventions
·	 Embed pregnancy preparation and preconception care within the educational 
system
·	 Include fertility care in preconception care
·	 Appoint a ‘case manager’, who can function as the primary responsible caregiver 
for preconception care. The GP or public health nurse are good candidates
·	 define and distribute the different roles and responsibilities of caregiver
·	 Include pathways to non-medical care in preconception care and make these path-
ways better known to mothers-to-be.
·	 Offer more education to caregivers on the topic of pregnancy preparation and 
preconception care
·	 Make preconception care a governmental coordinated form of preventive care
·	 Explore the possibilities of nudges for pregnancy preparation, in particular in the 
domains of E-Health and mHealth
·	 Invest in interventions that empower women to (re)gain their health agency
Recommendation for fathers-to-be
·	 Help your partner to prepare for pregnancy
Recommendation for mothers-to-be
·	 Prepare for pregnancy
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Children have certain needs that enter the world before they do. The overall aim of this 
thesis is to provide a moral exploration of the responsibilities mothers-to-be, fathers-to-
be, caregivers, policymakers and society as a whole have to meet the most elementary 
of these needs; the health-related needs of children-to-be. Such a moral exploration is 
warranted given the high number of avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes in pros-
perous societies such as the Netherlands and the recorded inequalities of these adverse 
pregnancy outcomes. An increasing body of scientific evidence shows that an adequate 
pregnancy preparation can significantly decrease the chances of adverse pregnancy 
outcomes. The delivery of preconception care in particular can play a key role in im-
proving the chances of mothers-to-be to have a healthy pregnancy. As welcome as they 
are, these opportunities to improve pregnancy outcomes do however raise moral ques-
tions. What are the views of parents-to-be and caregivers on the responsibilities for 
the health of children-to-be in general and the responsibility to prepare for pregnancy 
in particular? Is it justifiable to use nudges to help women prepare for pregnancy? Is 
the use of coercion or force against women justified if this would greatly benefit the 
health children-to-be or fetuses? What are the demands of justice pertaining to the im-
provement and securing of the health of children-to-be? These questions, which were 
introduced in chapter 1, need to be answered in order to improve pregnancy outcomes 
in a morally acceptable manner. 
In chapter 2 we examined the views of health care professionals regarding their respon-
sibility to deliver preconception care. We interviewed twenty health care professionals 
who provide preconception care on a regular basis. These interviews yielded four 
barriers to the uptake and delivery of preconception care those being: (i) a lack of a 
comprehensive preconception care program; (ii) most future parents are unaware of 
the benefits of preconception care. GP’s are hesitant about the necessity and effective-
ness of preconception care; (iii) poor coordination and organization of preconception 
care; (iv) conflicting views of health care professionals on pregnancy, reproductive au-
tonomy of patients and professional responsibility. These barriers need to be addressed 
in order to increase the uptake and improve the delivery of preconception care.
In chapter 3 we argued that in order to improve pregnancy outcomes, appropriate at-
tention has to be given to the perceptions of those who are most vulnerable, such as 
women with a relatively low socioeconomic status. To determine these perceptions, we 
conducted interviews with women with a low to intermediate educational attainment 
and with a desire to conceive, of which a subgroup had experience with preconcep-
tion care. We identified four themes of pregnancy preparation perceptions: (i) ”How to 
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prepare for pregnancy?”, which included health promotion and seeking healthcare; (ii) 
“Why prepare for pregnancy?”, which mostly related to fertility and health concerns; 
(iii) “Barriers and facilitators regarding pregnancy preparation”, such as having limited 
control over becoming pregnant as well as the health of the unborn; (iv) “The added 
value of preconception care”, reported by women who had visited a consultation, 
which consisted mainly of reassurance and receiving information. 
Our key findings were that the participants were unfamiliar with important pregnancy 
preparation topics such as over-the-counter drugs, immunizations, sexual risk behav-
iors, family history, chronic illness, and mental health. Therefore, more effort, e.g. in 
the form of information and education, is required to bring these topics to the atten-
tion of women with a desire to become pregnant. In addition, more research needs to 
be done about how women can be motivated to prepare for pregnancy as knowledge 
about pregnancy preparation alone does not necessarily lead to actual pregnancy 
preparation. Special attention needs to be given to whether and if so, how low-health 
literacy influences pregnancy preparation. As participants were open to receiving 
information about pregnancy preparation provided that this information is presented 
in relevant situations, we also recommend that healthcare professionals proactively 
integrate preconception care in their consultations, in particular when pregnancy af-
fecting issues are being discussed.
In chapter 4 we turned to the topic of nudging. Given the increasing attention from policy 
makers to make healthier choice-behavior easier, that is, to nudge people towards bet-
ter health, we analyzed the moral justifiability of using nudges to help mothers-to-be 
to better prepare for pregnancy. We started by arguing that Libertarian Paternalism, 
the standard justificatory principle for nudging, does not justify the nudges we have in 
mind. The nudges we have in minds are distinctive in the sense that, contrary to con-
ventional nudges, the person who benefits from the nudge is not the same person that 
is being nudged. We called these nudges other-regarding nudges. We used the harm 
principle and the principle of beneficence to justify these other-regarding nudges. We 
concluded by stressing the importance of a fair assessment of expectations towards the 
nudgee, when determining whether a nudge is aimed at preventing harm or promot-
ing a good. For our purpose this entails that a fair assessment of the responsibility 
of mothers-to-be for their children-to-be is warranted in order not to construe every 
deviation from optimal pregnancy preparation as a form of harm. 
After considering nudging, a relatively soft and nonintrusive intervention we focused 
on the other side of the demandingness spectrum. In chapter 5 we explored the justifi-
ability of the use of force in pregnancy related care. To do this, we considered whether 
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it is justified to use force to submit a pregnant woman to cesarean surgery when this 
would save the life of her fetus. We argued that even though proponents and oppo-
nents largely agree on the interests at stake, such as the health and life of the fetus and 
the respect for bodily integrity and autonomy of pregnant women, they disagree on 
which moral weight to attach to these interests. This is why disagreements about the 
justifiability of forced cesareans tend to be pervasive and intractable. To sidestep this 
deadlock, we focused on conditions that give rise to the ‘cesarean dilemma’ in the first 
place, namely the conflict between inherent norms and values medical professionals 
are committed to by virtue of being a medical professional. Using the reflective equi-
librium, we tested the opponents’ and proponents’ considered judgments about forced 
cesareans against the norms and values they –as medical professionals– are committed 
to. Subsequently we identified the proponents’ incoherencies between the considered 
judgments and norms and values they are committed to and concludes that as long as 
these incoherencies are in place, forced cesareans are morally impermissible. 
In chapter 6 we reported on an expert meeting on the ethical issues surrounding precon-
ception care which was held in October 2016. The aim of this meeting was to (i) discuss 
the key barriers in the provision, uptake and implementation of PCC, (ii) to explore the 
gaps in current research and (iii) to explore the potential of new scientific insights to 
improve pregnancy outcomes. The expert panel of 11 members consisted of clinicians, 
clinical researchers, medical ethicists, and a representative of a patient- federation (an 
alliance of 70 patient organizations). The discussion was structured around the follow-
ing topics: (1) ‘The concept of PCC and the role of caregivers’ (2) ‘reaching those who 
need care the most’ (3) ‘societal valorization of new knowledge’ and (4) ‘translating 
behavioral insights into preconception care interventions’. Each topic was introduced 
by a member of the expert panel. The main recommendations of the expert panel were: 
the provision of tailor-made care; the definition and distribution of roles and respon-
sibilities of caregivers; the inclusion of fertility counseling in preconception care, and 
the development of pathways that cut across the medical and non-medical domains. 
Moreover, the discussion on how to promote maternal and child health should include 
the detrimental effects of social inequities and the potential use of incentives such as 
E- and mHealth tools.
In chapter 7 we claimed that inequalities in child morbidity and mortality occur in 
poor societies but also in prosperous societies that have free and high quality care in 
place. Much needs to be done to ameliorate the conditions of parents-to-be who live in 
underprivileged neighborhoods within prosperous societies. The improvement of the 
material and social conditions of these parents-to-be however, is but part of the solution 
to perinatal health inequalities. We argued that the effects of life in underprivileged 
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neighborhoods on the health agency of parents-to-be have to be considered as well in 
order to successfully counteract perinatal health inequalities. That is, parents-to-be who 
live in underprivileged neighborhoods tend to adapt their preferences regarding their 
own and their offspring’s health so these match the unfortunate conditions in which 
they live. This adaptation curtails their ‘capacity’, ‘feeling of control’ and ‘experienced 
freedom’ to seek and make use of care available to them. We therefore proposed a 
‘bare-bones-perfectionism’ approach to counteract these adaptive preferences.
We concluded that perinatal health inequalities are an example of unacceptable injus-
tice. To counteract these adaptive preferences, we proposed that the health agency of 
parents living in underprivileged conditions should be improved at least to the level of 
equal sufficiency. The level of sufficiency is achieved when parents adopt the preven-
tion of avoidable pregnancy outcomes as a goal worth valuing and pursuing; although 
not at all costs and by any means. 
In chapter 8 we discussed the insights from the Developmental Origins of Health 
and Disease paradigm and epigenetics. These insights are elucidating the biological 
pathways through which social and environmental signals affect human health. These 
insights, we argued, prompt a serious debate about how the structure of society af-
fects health and what the responsibility of society is to counteract health inequalities. 
Unfortunately, oversimplified interpretations of insights from Developmental Origins 
of Health and Disease and epigenetics may be (mis)used to focus on the importance 
of individual responsibility for health rather than the social responsibility for health. 
In order to advance the debate on responsibility for health, we presented an ethical 
framework to determine the social responsibility to counteract health inequalities, 
perinatal health inequalities in particular. This is, in our view, certainly important in a 
time where individual responsibility often justifies a passive response from policymak-
ers. 
We concluded that in the healthcare and public health debate, individual responsibil-
ity and social responsibility tend to be erroneously pitted against one another. Taking 
responsibility however calls for social and environmental conditions in which individu-
als can be reasonably expected to make responsible health-related choices. Insights 
from Developmental Origins of Health and Disease and epigenetics are sufficiently 
robust to show that more needs to be done to improve these conditions. Rather than 
viewing mothers(-to-be) as targets of blame, culpable for the poor health of their off-
spring, special attention for the conditions of the mothers-to-be is required.
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We called attention to wo initiatives that depict how taking social responsibility cre-
ates the right conditions in which mothers-to-be to are empowered to take individual 
responsibility. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and 
Children (WIC), which provides disadvantaged families with regular supplies of food 
essential for physical and cognitive development, has improved the quality of mater-
nal and child nutrition, and the physical and cognitive development of children. This 
demonstrates how a coordinated care program benefits the health of mothers and 
newborns. The ‘Mothers for Rotterdam’ initiative, in which women living in deprived 
neighborhoods are assisted and guided in addressing their medical and non-medical 
conditions, is the other example.
In chapter 9 I summarized and discussed the main findings of this dissertation. I 
argued that efforts to prevent avoidable infant disease and death are necessary and 
praiseworthy. This becomes even more clear when we consider the significant detri-
mental impact social circumstances have on the prospective health and wellbeing of 
children-to-be, even in a prosperous society such as the Netherlands. We have tools 
at our disposal to mitigate the effects of deprivation on the health of children-to-be 
namely ‘pregnancy preparation’ and ‘preconception care’; now we have a job to do. 
Yet to prevent overzealous attempts to counteract adverse pregnancy outcomes and to 
distribute the responsibilities for the promotion and securing of the health of children-
to-be in a reasonable and fair manner, caution and ethical reflection are of paramount 
importance.
Central to the health of the child-to-be, is the health of the mother-to-be. The healthier 
she is, the healthier her child will likely be. This simple but important ‘equation’ cre-
ates both opportunities and risks. There are opportunities for mothers-to-be to seek 
preconception care in order to prepare for pregnancy. And these opportunities create 
duties, the duty to prepare for pregnancy. That much is true. Yet, when we see every 
deviation from an optimal pregnancy preparation as an instance of harm; as a serious 
moral shortcoming of women in the fulfillment of their maternal duties, we risk stig-
matizing mothers-to-be, unfairly targeting them as subjects of blame. Moreover, the 
fact that the health of children-to-be is, biologically speaking, mostly influenced by the 
health of the mother-to-be may, without diligent deliberation, lead to an overemphasis 
on the responsibility of mothers-to-be and an underappreciation of the responsibility of 
fathers, caregivers, policymakers and society as a whole. Apart from its health benefits, 
the organization and implementation of a coordinated preconception care program, 
which I recommend, also invites the discussion on who carries which responsibilities 
for children-to-be. 
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Insights from the behavioral sciences can be valuable in the pursuit of better preg-
nancy outcomes. Nudges are good candidates to consider as interventions that make 
adequate pregnancy preparation easier. However, the same insights also explain why 
changing choice-behavior, a necessary constituent of pregnancy preparation, is so diffi-
cult to achieve. Patterns of choice-behavior pertaining to lifestyle become ‘entrenched’ 
in the less-reflective parts of our mind. And it is the improvement of exactly these 
daily patterns of behavior, –smoking, drinking, eating, working out and so on– that 
benefit the health of the child-to-be the most. Advising mothers-to-be to improve these 
rooted patterns of behavior, something most mothers-to-be are willing to do even if 
they do not always succeed, is in my view justified but also demanding. And it is the 
demandingness of the request to prepare for pregnancy combined with the fruits of 
adequate pregnancy preparation for the child-to-be that make encouraging, rewarding, 
and nudging mothers-to-be ideas worth exploring. 
Still, the downside of incentive-based interventions is that they do not encourage indi-
viduals to do the ‘right thing for the right reasons’. This is why nudges are not meant 
to replace comprehensive policy but to supplement it. It is of course great if it turns out 
that nudges can in fact help women to adopt a healthier lifestyle during the period sur-
rounding pregnancy. But ultimately, the improvement of the mother-to-be’s lifestyle 
should result from (i) the value she attaches to the goal of ‘improving the health of her 
child-to-be’ as well as (ii) her experience of control and (iii) her experience of freedom 
she has over achieving that goal she has reason to value. That is, it should be the result 
of women’s ‘health agency’. The possibility for mothers-to-be to do those things they 
have reason to value depends on two conditions; external and internal. The external 
conditions have to do with the availability and accessibility of care and education to 
adequately prepare for pregnancy. It is disquieting that in a prosperous society such 
as the Netherlands, poverty still prevalent and is even increasing. This is also reflected 
in the suboptimal availability and accessibility of pregnancy-related care.  Investing in 
the improvement of these external adverse socioeconomic conditions is of paramount 
importance. Poverty however, gets under one’s skin. It can curb preferences, aims and 
aspirations for a healthier and better life. The constrained external conditions asso-
ciated with poverty become, much like the workings of the epigenetic mechanism, 
internalized so that one’s aspirations match one’s socioeconomic limitations. In other 
words, facing the difficulties of poverty, underprivileged mothers-to-be are more likely 
to accept the increased risk of adverse pregnancy outcomes as a given: “in the end what 
can we do but pray for the best?”(40) 
A proper response to the problem of avoidable adverse pregnancy outcomes has to, 
in my view, address this phenomenon of acquiescence. This response cannot only be 
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a matter of improving the availability and accessibility of care. It is also a matter of 
supporting mothers-to-be so they may think beyond their deprived circumstances. This 
is why in pursuit of better pregnancy outcomes, fostering health agency, primarily 
through the long and arduous process of education, is, in my view indispensable.
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Samenvatting
Kinderen hebben bepaalde behoeften die de wereld in komen nog voor dat zij zelf 
geboren zijn. In dit proefschrift wordt de morele verkenning gepresenteerd van de 
verantwoordelijkheden die toekomstige moeders, toekomstige vaders, zorgverleners, 
beleidsmakers en de samenleving in haar geheel hebben om aan de meest elemen-
taire behoeften van toekomstige kinderen te voldoen; de gezondheidsgerelateerde 
behoeften. Zo een morele verkenning is belangrijk gezien het grote aantal vermijdbare 
slechte zwangerschapsuitkomsten in Nederland –een welvarende samenleving- en de 
ongelijkheid van deze slechte zwangerschapsuitkomsten. Steeds meer wetenschap-
pelijk onderzoek laat zien dat een adequate zwangerschapsvoorbereiding de kansen 
op slechte zwangerschapsuitkomsten aanzienlijk kan verminderen. Het verlenen van 
preconceptiezorg in het bijzonder kan een belangrijke rol spelen bij het verbeteren 
van de kansen op een gezonde zwangerschap. Alhoewel deze kansen op het verbeteren 
van zwangerschapsuitkomsten welkom zijn roepen ze tegelijkertijd ook morele vragen 
op. Welke opvattingen hebben toekomstige ouders en zorgverleners over de ‘verant-
woordelijkheid voor de gezondheid van toekomstige kinderen’ en ‘de verantwoorde-
lijkheid om je op zwangerschap voor te bereiden?’ Is het toegestaan om ‘nudges’ te 
gebruiken om vrouwen te helpen bij de zwangerschapsvoorbereiding? Is het inzetten 
van dwang tegen vrouwen gerechtvaardigd in gevallen waarin dit bijzonder gunstig 
zou zijn voor de gezondheid van toekomstige kinderen of de foetussen? Wat zijn de 
rechtvaardigheidseisen die betrekking hebben op het bevorderen en veiligstellen van 
de gezondheid van toekomstige kinderen?  Deze vragen, die wij in hoofdstuk 1 hebben 
geïntroduceerd, behoeven antwoord om zwangerschapsuitkomsten op een moreel ac-
ceptabele manier te bevorderen.
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we de opvattingen van zorgprofessionals over hun verantwoor-
delijkheid om preconceptiezorg te verlenen onderzocht. We hebben twintig zorg-
professionals die op regelmatige basis preconceptiezorg verlenen geïnterviewd. Met 
behulp van deze interviews hebben we vier ‘barrières’ geïdentificeerd die de ‘uptake’ 
en het verlenen van preconceptiezorg belemmeren. Deze zijn: (i) het ontbreken van 
een uitgebreid preconceptiezorgprogramma, (ii) de meeste toekomstige ouders zijn 
zich niet bewust van de voordelen van preconceptiezorg. Huisartsen twijfelen over de 
noodzaak en effectiviteit van preconceptiezorg, (iii) slechte coördinatie en organisatie 
van preconceptiezorg, (iv) conflicterende opvattingen van zorgverleners over zwanger-
schap, de reproductieve autonomie van de patiënten en de verantwoordelijkheid van 
de zorgprofessionals. Deze barrières moeten worden aangepakt om de uptake en het 
verlenen van preconceptiezorg te verbeteren.
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In hoofdstuk 3 hebben we beargumenteerd dat voor het verbeteren van zwangerschap-
suitkomsten, passende aandacht gegeven moet worden aan de perceptie van die 
vrouwen die het meest kwetsbaar zijn, bijvoorbeeld vrouwen met een lage sociaal-
economische status. Om deze percepties vast te stellen hebben we vrouwen met een 
laag sociaaleconomische status met een kinderwens geïnterviewd. We hebben vier 
thema’s die betrekking hebben op zwangerschapsvoorbereiding geïdentificeerd: (i) 
‘Hoe voor te bereiden op zwangerschap’, waaronder het verbeteren van de gezondheid 
en medische zorg zoeken vielen. (ii) ‘Waarom voorbereiden op zwangerschap’, dit had 
het meest betrekking op vruchtbaarheid en zorgen over de gezondheid. (iii) ‘‘Barrières’ 
en ‘facilitators’ die betrekking hebben op zwangerschapsvoorbereiding’, hier werden 
het hebben van een beperkte controle over de zwangerschap en de gezondheid van 
het kind genoemd. (iv) ‘De meerwaarde van het preconceptieconsult” waarbij vooral 
geruststelling en het krijgen van informatie genoemd werden.
Onze belangrijkste bevindingen waren dat de deelnemers onbekend waren met belang-
rijke onderwerpen die over zwangerschapsvoorbereiding gaan zoals, vrij verkrijgbare 
geneesmiddelen, risicovol seksueel gedrag, de familiegeschiedenis, chronische ziekten 
en de geestelijke gezondheid. Daarom moet er meer gedaan worden, bijvoorbeeld met 
behulp van informatieverstrekking en onderwijs, om deze onderwerpen onder de 
aandacht te brengen bij vrouwen die een kinderwens hebben. Bovendien is er meer 
onderzoek nodig naar hoe we vrouwen kunnen motiveren om zich voor te bereiden 
op zwangerschap aangezien de kennis over zwangerschapsvoorbereiding alleen niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs tot leidt tot zwangerschapsvoorbereiding. Aandacht is in het 
bijzonder nodig voor de invloed van ‘health literacy’ op het voorbereiden van zwan-
gerschap. Omdat de participanten open stonden voor het ontvangen van informatie 
over zwangerschapsvoorbereiding, mits deze informatie verschaft werd tijdens een 
relevante situatie, raden wij ook aan dat zorgprofessionals preconceptiezorg ter sprake 
brengen tijdens hun consultaties, juist wanneer er zwangerschapsgerelateerde zaken 
besproken worden.
In hoofdstuk 4 richtten we ons op het onderwerp ‘nudging’. Gezien de groeiende aan-
dacht van beleidsmakers voor ‘makkelijker maken van gezond gedrag’, of te wel, het 
‘nudgen’ van mensen richting gezond gedrag, hebben we de morele rechtvaardiging 
van het gebruik van nudges om toekomstige moeder te helpen zich beter voor te 
bereiden op zwangerschap, geanalyseerd. Allereerst beargumenteerden we dat ‘Liber-
tarian Paternalism’, het principe dat de standaard nudge rechtvaardigt, ongeschikt is 
voor de nudges die wij in gedachten hebben. De nudges die wij in gedachten hebben, 
onderscheiden zich van de standaard nudges doordat de persoon die voordeel heeft 
van de nudge, anders dan bij de standaard nudge, niet dezelfde persoon is als degene 
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die daadwerkelijk ‘genudged’ wordt. Wij noemen deze nudges ‘other-regarding nud-
ges’. We hebben het ‘Harm Principle’ en het principe van weldoen gebruikt om deze 
other-regarding nudges te rechtvaardigen. We eindigden met het benadrukken van het 
belang van een eerlijke beoordeling van de verwachtingen die wij hebben ten aanzien 
van degene die genudged wordt om zo op een juiste manier te kunnen vaststellen of 
de nudge bedoeld is om schade te voorkomen of om wel te doen. In ons geval betekent 
dit dat een eerlijke beoordeling van de verantwoordelijkheden van de toekomstige 
moeder voor de gezondheid van haar toekomstige kind nodig is om niet elke afwijking 
van een optimale zwangerschapsvoorbereiding te begrijpen als het schaden van het 
toekomstige kind. 
Na het bespreken van nudges, een relatieve zachte en niet-intrusieve interventie, richt-
ten wij ons op de meer dwingende interventies. In hoofdstuk 5 verkenden wij de recht-
vaardiging van het gebruik van dwang binnen de zwangerschapsgerelateerde zorg. Om 
dit te doen onderzochten we de morele toelaatbaarheid van het dwingen van vrouwen 
tot een keizersnede als dit het leven van de foetus zou redden. We beargumenteerden 
dat alhoewel voorstanders en tegenstanders het eens zijn over de belangen die op het 
spel staan, namelijk het leven en de gezondheid van de ongeborene en het recht op 
lichamelijke integriteit en autonomie van de zwangere vrouw, ze het niet eens zijn 
over welk gewicht ze deze belangen moeten toekennen. Daarom is de verdeeldheid 
over de rechtvaardiging van de gedwongen keizersnede tussen voor- en tegenstanders 
vaak diep en onoverbrugbaar. Om voorbij deze impasse te komen richtten wij ons 
op de voorwaarden die ten grondslag liggen aan het keizersnede dilemma, namelijk 
het conflict tussen normen en waarden waar zorgverleners –omdat ze zorgverleners 
zijn–  aan gecommitteerd zijn. Vervolgens hebben we incoherenties geïdentificeerd in 
de intuïties, normen en waarden van de voorstanders van de gedwongen keizersnede 
en concludeerden wij dat zolang deze incoherenties aanwezig zijn, gedwongen keizer-
sneden niet te rechtvaardigen zijn. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 brachten we verslag uit over een expert bijeenkomst over de ethische 
kwesties rondom preconceptiezorg die gehouden werd in oktober 2016. Het doel van 
deze bijeenkomst was: (i) het bespreken van de belangrijkste barrières bij het aan-
bieden en verlenen van preconceptiezorg. (ii) het identificeren en bespreken van de 
hiaten in het onderzoek naar preconceptiezorg, (iii) het verkennen van nieuwe we-
tenschappelijke inzichten die gebruikt kunnen worden om zwangerschapsuitkomsten 
te verbeteren. In het expert panel dat uit 11 leden bestond waren aanwezig: clinici, 
wetenschappelijk onderzoekers, medisch ethici en een vertegenwoordiger van de pa-
tiëntenfederatie. Het gesprek werd gestructureerd rondom de volgende onderwerpen: 
(1) ‘Preconceptiezorg als concept en de rol van zorgverleners’. (2) ‘Het bereiken van 
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die personen die de zorg het hardst nodig hebben’. (3) ‘sociale valorisatie van nieuwe 
wetenschappelijke kennis en (4) het vertalen van gedragswetenschappelijke inzich-
ten in preconceptiezorg interventies. Elk onderwerp werd geïntroduceerd door een 
panellid. De belangrijkste aanbevelingen die uit de bijeenkomst volgden waren: het 
aanbieden van op maat gemaakte zorg, het vaststellen en verdelen van de rollen en 
verantwoordelijkheden van zorgverleners, de inclusie van advies over vruchtbaarheid 
in preconceptiezorg en het ontwikkelen van zorgpaden met aandacht voor medische 
en niet-medische problematiek. Bovendien moeten in de discussie over het bevorderen 
van de gezondheid van moeder en kind de schadelijke effecten van sociale onrechtvaar-
digheden en de mogelijkheden om incentives in te zetten zoals E-health en mHealth 
tools ook besproken worden.
In hoofdstuk 7 claimden we dat ongelijkheden tussen kindermorbiditeit en –sterfte 
voorkomen in zowel arme samenlevingen als in welvarende samenlevingen die gesub-
sidieerde en kwalitatief goede zorg aanbieden. Er moet nog veel gedaan worden om 
de omstandigheden van toekomstige ouders die in kansarme wijken in welvarende 
samenlevingen wonen, te verbeteren. Toch is het verbeteren van de materiele en soci-
ale omstandigheden van deze toekomstige ouders maar een deel van de oplossing. We 
betoogden dat de effecten van het leven in kansarme wijken op de ‘health agency’ van 
toekomstige ouders ook bekeken moet worden om perinatale gezondheidsverschillen 
tegen te gaan. Toekomstige ouders die in kansarme wijken wonen zijn geneigd hun 
preferenties betreffende hun eigen gezondheid en de gezondheid van hun toekomstige 
kinderen ‘te adapteren’ zodat deze beter aansluiten bij de onfortuinlijke condities 
waarin zij leven. Deze adaptie beperkt het ‘vermogen’, het ‘gevoel van controle’ en 
‘de vrijheid die men ervaart’ om gebruik te maken van beschikbare hulp en zorg. Wij 
hebben daarom een zogenaamde ‘bare-bones perfectionism’ aanpak voorgesteld om 
deze adaptieve preferenties tegen te gaan. 
Om deze adaptieve preferenties tegen te gaan stelden we voor om de ‘health agency’ 
van toekomstige ouders die in kansarme wijken wonen te verbeteren tot aan het 
niveau van ‘toereikende gelijkheid’. Het niveau van toereikende gelijkheid wordt 
bereikt wanneer toekomstige ouders het voorkomen van vermijdbare slechte zwan-
gerschapsuitkomsten als nastrevenswaardig doel zien, al hoeft dit doel niet koste wat 
kost bereikt te worden.
In hoofdstuk 8 bespraken we de inzichten vanuit het Developmental Origins of Health 
and Disease paradigma en de epigenetica. Deze inzichten beschrijven de biologische 
paden waarlangs sociale en omgevingsfactoren de gezondheid beïnvloeden.  Deze 
inzichten roepen op tot een serieus debat over hoe de structuur van de samenleving de 
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gezondheid van mensen beïnvloedt en wat de verantwoordelijkheid van de samenle-
ving is om ongelijkheden in gezondheid tegen te gaan. Helaas kunnen over gesimplifi-
ceerde interpretaties van deze inzichten gebruikt worden om te focussen op het belang 
van de individuele verantwoordelijkheid voor de gezondheid in plaats van de sociale 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de gezondheid. Om het gesprek over verantwoordelijkheid 
voor de gezondheid verder te brengen presenteerden wij een ethisch raamwerk dat 
het mogelijk maakt de sociale verantwoordelijkheid om ongelijkheden in gezondheid 
en ongelijkheden in perinatale gezondheid in het bijzonder tegen te gaan, vast te 
stellen.  Dit is, zo vinden wij, belangrijk in een tijd waarin het beroep op individuele 
verantwoordelijkheid een passieve attitude van beleidsmakers lijkt te rechtvaardigen. 
Wij concludeerden dat in het gezondheidszorgdebat individuele en sociale verantwoor-
delijkheid tegen elkaar worden uitgespeeld.  Het nemen van verantwoordelijkheid 
behoeft sociale condities waarin redelijkerwijs van individuen te verwachten valt dat 
zij gezonde keuzes kunnen maken. De inzichten vanuit het Developmental Origins 
of Health and Disease paradigma en de epigenetica zijn voldoende robuust om aan 
te tonen dat er meer gedaan moet worden om juist deze condities te verbeteren. In 
plaats van toekomstige moeders als schuldigen aan te wijzen voor de slechte gezond-
heid van hun toekomstige kinderen moet er meer aandacht komen voor de sociale 
condities van toekomstige moeders. Wij hebben speciaal aandacht gevraagd voor twee 
initiatieven die laten zien hoe het nemen van de sociale verantwoordelijkheid de juiste 
voorwaarden schept waarin toekomstige moeders in staat worden gesteld om hun indi-
viduele verantwoordelijkheid te nemen. Het Special Supplemental Nutrition Program 
for Women, Infants and Children, dat kansarme gezinnen voorziet van regelmatige 
voeding die essentieel is voor de fysieke en cognitieve ontwikkeling, heeft de kwaliteit 
van voeding verbeterd voor deze groep mensen. Het Moeders van Rotterdam initiatief, 
waarin kwetsbare moeders geholpen worden bij het oplossen van hun medische en 
niet-medische problemen is het andere voorbeeld.
In hoofdstuk 9 heb ik de belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift samengevat en 
besproken waarbij ik betoogde dat inspanningen om vermijdbare kindermorbiditeit en 
mortaliteit te voorkomen prijzenswaardig zijn. Dit wordt nog duidelijker als we kijken 
naar de schadelijke invloed die een slechte sociale omgeving heeft op de gezondheid en 
welzijn van toekomstige kinderen, zelfs in een welvarende samenleving als Nederland. 
We beschikken over de instrumenten om de effecten van armoede op de gezondheid 
van kinderen te beperken; nu moeten we dit ook echt doen. Echter, om overijverige 
maar ondoordachte pogingen om ongunstige zwangerschapsuitkomsten te voorkomen 
en om de verantwoordelijkheden voor het verbeteren en veiligstellen van de gezond-
heid van toekomstige kinderen op een redelijke en eerlijke manier te verdelen, zijn 
voorzichtigheid en ethische reflectie onontbeerlijk. 
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De gezondheid van de toekomstige moeder is belangrijk voor de gezondheid van het 
toekomstige kind; hoe gezonder de moeder hoe gezonder haar kind waarschijnlijk 
zal zijn. Deze eenvoudige maar belangrijke ‘vergelijking’ creëert zowel mogelijkheden 
als risico’s. Er zijn mogelijkheden voor toekomstige moeders om zich met behulp van 
preconceptiezorg goed voor te bereiden op hun zwangerschap. Deze mogelijkheden 
creëren uiteraard ook plichten, de plicht om je ook daadwerkelijk voor te bereiden op 
de zwangerschap. Maas als we elke afwijking van een optimale zwangerschapsvoorberei-
ding zien als een tekortkoming van toekomstige moeders dan lopen we het risico om 
hen te stigmatiseren. Bovendien, het feit dat de gezondheid van toekomstige kinderen, 
biologisch gezien, het meest beïnvloed wordt door de gezondheid van hun toekomstige 
moeders kan, bij gebrek aan reflectie, leiden tot het teveel benadrukken van de ver-
antwoordelijkheid van de toekomstige moeder en het te weinig aandacht besteden aan 
de verantwoordelijkheid van toekomstige vaders, zorgverleners en de samenleving. 
De organisatie en implementatie van een gecoördineerd preconceptiezorgprogramma, 
wat ik aanbeveel, heeft naast de voordelen voor de gezondheid van toekomstige 
kinderen ook als voordeel dat het de discussie op gang kan brengen over wie welke 
verantwoordelijkheden draagt voor de gezondheid van toekomstige kinderen. 
In het nastreven van betere zwangerschapsuitkomsten kunnen inzichten uit de ge-
dragswetenschappen waardevol zijn. Nudges zijn bijvoorbeeld goede kandidaten om 
adequate zwangerschapsvoorbereiding makkelijker te maken. Diezelfde inzichten 
echter maken ook duidelijk waarom het veranderen van gedrag, een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde voor zwangerschapsvoorbereiding, zo lastig is. Patronen van gedrag die 
betrekking hebben op leefstijl raken ‘ingebed’ in de minst reflectieve delen van 
ons verstand. En het zijn precies deze patronen –roken, drinken, eten, bewegen en 
zo voorts– die verbeterd moeten worden om het belang van het toekomstige kind 
te dienen. Het adviseren van toekomstige moeders om deze patronen van gedrag te 
verbeteren, iets wat de meeste toekomstige moeders bereid zijn om te doen, is, wat 
mij betreft, gerechtvaardigd maar het is ook veeleisend. En juist deze veeleisendheid 
in combinatie met de voordelen van een goede zwangerschapsvoorbereiding voor het 
toekomstige kind maken dat het aanmoedigen, belonen en nudgen van toekomstige 
moeders ideeën zijn die verkend zouden moeten worden.
De keerzijde van deze interventies is echter dat zij individuen niet aanmoedigen om 
‘het juiste te doen omwille van de juiste redenen’. Dit is waarom nudges nooit bedoeld 
zij om beleid te vervangen, ze zijn bedoeld om het aan te vullen. Het is natuurlijk 
geweldig als blijkt dat nudges inderdaad vrouwen kunnen helpen bij het aanmeten 
van een gezondere leefstijl in de periode rondom de zwangerschap. Maar uiteindelijk 
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zou het verbeteren van de leefstijl van de toekomstige moeder het resultaat moeten 
zijn van (i) de waarde die zij hecht aan het ‘verbeteren van de gezondheid van haar 
toekomstig kind’ alsmede (ii) ‘haar ervaring van controle’ en (iii) ‘de vrijheid die zij 
heeft om dat doel -waar ze zelf redenen voor heeft om daar waarde aan te hechten- te 
bereiken.’ In andere woorden, het moet het resultaat zijn van de ‘health agency’ van de 
vrouw. De mogelijkheid die toekomstige moeders hebben om die doelen te bereiken 
waar ze redenen voor hebben om daar waarde aan te hechten zijn afhankelijk van 
twee voorwaarden, een externe en een interne voorwaarde. De externe voorwaarden 
hebben te maken met de beschikbaarheid en de toegang tot zorg en onderwijs die het 
mogelijk maken om je goed voor te bereiden op zwagerschap. Het is verontrustend dat 
in een welvarende samenleving zoals de Nederlandse samenleving, armoede nog steeds 
voorkomt en zelfs steeds vaker voorkomt. De suboptimale beschikbaarheid en toegang 
tot zwangerschapsgerelateerde zorg laat dit ook zien.  Het investeren in bestrijden van 
deze externe ongunstige sociaaleconomische omstandigheden is van zeer groot belang. 
Armoede echter ‘kruipt onder je huid.’ Armoede beteugelt de voorkeuren, doelen en 
aspiraties voor een gezonder en beter leven. De ongunstige externe condities die geas-
socieerd worden met armoede raken, vergelijkbaar met het epigenetisch mechanisme, 
geïnternaliseerd zodat een ieders aspiraties aansluiten bij diens sociaaleconomische 
limitaties. In andere woorden, al kampend met armoede, zijn toekomstige moeders 
meer geneigd hun grotere risico’s op het hebben van ongunstige zwangerschapsuit-
komsten te zien als een gegeven: “wat kunnen we uiteindelijk doen behalve hopen op 
het beste?” 
Een adequaat antwoord op de problematiek van de vermijdbare ongunstige zwanger-
schapsuitkomsten moet, volgens mij, dit ‘berustingsprobleem’ het hoofd bieden.  Dit 
antwoord kan niet alleen een kwestie zijn van het verbeteren van de beschikbaarheid 
en toegankelijkheid van zorg. Het is ook een kwestie van het ondersteunen van toe-
komstige moeders zodat zij voorbij hun achterstandspositie kunnen denken. Daarom 
is in het streven naar betere zwangerschapsuitkomsten het bevorderen van de ‘health 




Mijn dank betuigen enkel in gezelschap van een kille monitor is een exercitie die 
gedoemd is te falen, maar ik probeer het toch.  
Allereerst wil ik mijn promotoren en begeleiders bedanken voor hun geduld, de ruimte 
die ze mij gegund hebben om het onderzoek naar eigen (gebrek aan) inzicht uit te 
voeren en de hulp die zij mij door de jaren heen geboden hebben waarzonder ik –dat is 
zeker waar– dit proefschrift nooit had kunnen schrijven. In het bijzonder:
eric, heel veel dank voor uw scherpe en nuchtere kijk op mijn schrijfsels. Door uw 
expertise en uw ervaring in het begeleiden van promovendi zijn mij, een leek, veel bla-
mages gespaard gebleven. Ik vind uw onverstoorbare strijd om kinderen een gezonde 
en eerlijke start te geven bewonderenswaardig. Ik ben erg blij dat de samenwerking 
niet ophoudt bij dit proefschrift.
Medard, jij was mijn begeleider tijdens de eerste jaren van mijn promotie. Dat kan niet 
makkelijk voor jou zijn geweest. Mede door jouw kunde om mijn ‘proto-argumenten’ 
te identificeren en op basis daarvan mij aan te moedigen om verder te schrijven werd 
het doen van onderzoek aanzienlijk minder pijnlijk. Bovendien was het een voorrecht 
om begeleid te worden door een Homo Universalis (hij is onder andere: ethicus, filo-
soof, wiskundige en dominee) 
Inez, heel veel dank dat jij, menig maal na een hectische dag, het vooruitzicht op een 
rustige treinrit liet sneuvelen om samen met mij in de auto te kletsen over onderzoek 
en safarireisjes, over filosofie en lekkere hapjes, over alle mooie en minder mooie 
dingen in de wereld. Ik ben blij dat jij naast jouw rol als promotor ook de dagelijkse 
begeleiding op je nam in de laatste fase van de promotie. Jouw aandringen om minder 
“eclectisch” zoals jij het noemde (en je bedoelde natuurlijk op basis van van-de-hak-
op-de-tak-logica) te schrijven, heeft mij enorm geholpen om artikelen te produceren 
die eindelijk ergens over gingen. Maar belangrijker nog, ik heb me mede door jou altijd 
ontzettend welkom en thuis gevoeld op de afdeling. Ik voel me op mijn plek en ik ben 
jou dankbaar dat ik mag blijven.
Suzanne, jij bent echt super lief. Wie maakt dat nou mee dat hij, een simpele pro-
movendus, wekelijks bij de hoogleraar mag komen eten zodat hij met een vol maagje 
avondcollege kan gaan geven. Jouw gastvrijheid, openheid en welwillendheid om te 
helpen en adviseren vind ik hartverwarmend. Hannie, ontzettend veel dank dat jij mij 
van begin aan af hebt gestimuleerd om mij in het onderwijs te verdiepen. En alhoewel 
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jij mooie en uitgekristalliseerde ideeën hebt over de meerwaarde en doelen van het 
ethiekonderwijs heb jij mij (maar eigenlijk iedereen) altijd de ruimte gegeven om het 
onderwijs zelf in te vullen. Dank je wel voor dat vertrouwen. Jij, –onderwijs-orkaan– 
hebt ook mij niet onberoerd gelaten en ik ben ontzettend blij dat ik als onderwijscoör-
dinator mag blijven samenwerken met jou. Ineke, wie had dat nou kunnen bevroeden 
dat mijn scriptiebegeleider in Utrecht mijn collega in Rotterdam zou worden. En die 
collega een maatje zou worden waarmee ik gezellig in de kroeg over alles en niets 
kon praten. En dat vervolgens die collega die een maatje werd, wederom collega werd 
op de plek waar zij mijn scriptiebegeleider was. Dat bedenk je toch niet? Maar wat 
ben ik blij dat het zo gelopen is! yrrah, ik ben blij dat ik je heb leren kennen. Je bent 
indrukwekkend slim en ik zie uit naar jouw promotie volgende week. Jona, ik kijk met 
veel plezier terug op onze gesprekken. Ik ben blij dat wij konden discussiëren over 
kunst, politiek, literatuur, filosofie en de wereld. Jouw genuanceerde kijk op zaken is 
benijdenswaardig en ik heb altijd het gevoel dat er een wereld van betekenis schuilt 
achter elk woord dat jij gebruikt. Ik ben nog lang niet uitgediscussieerd; nog lang niet 
klaar met kletsen met jou. Ik hoop jij ook niet. eline, ik ben blij dat wij collega’s zijn en 
blijven en ik hoop dat wij op een gegeven moment intensiever kunnen samenwerken. 
Ik steek namelijk veel op van jouw serene doeltreffendheid. Karin, wat zouden de 
eerste jaren van mijn promotie saai zijn geweest zonder jou! Dank je wel voor alle fijne 
gesprekken. We deden drankjes, we doen drankjes, en drankjes zullen we blijven doen! 
Krista, in menig dankwoord staat dat “het schrijven van dit proefschrift zou nooit 
mogelijk zijn geweest zonder persoon X” Maar in dit geval is het letterlijk, figuurlijk, 
overdrachtelijk, feitelijk en metaforisch, kortom in de meest volledige zin van het 
woord, waar. Dank je wel Krista voor al je hulp en voor alle gezelligheid. Sabine en 
Meertien ik ben dankbaar dat jullie mij wegwijs hebben gemaakt in de wereld van 
de preconceptiezorg. Ik vond het leuk om jullie te irriteren met mijn rare filosofische 
ideeën en ben blij dat jullie ondanks mijn ‘ethische fratsen’ enorm hebben bijgedragen 
aan de empirische stukken van dit proefschrift.  
Dascha en Sem, jullie zijn intimiderend intelligent en ontzettend leuk en lief.  Dank 
jullie wel dat jullie me wegwijs hebben gemaakt in Utrecht. 
rogier en wendy, mijn paranimfen. Wendy, jij bent de beste kamergenoot! Dank je 
wel voor jouw openheid en eerlijkheid. Rogier, wij kennen elkaar al zo lang. Samen in 
het conservatorium op de trap gitaar spelen. Samen in Leiden een MOOC over ‘Music 
and Society’ ontwikkelen. Samen bij mij thuis discussiëren over Coltrane, computer 
games en onze snode plannen om de wereld over te nemen. Ik prijs mij gelukkig met 
een vriend als jij!    
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elco, dank je wel dat je me eraan herinnert –keer op keer– dat de wereld veel verder 
rijkt dan de muren van de academie, dat de wereld veel verder rijkt dan de muren van 
het verstand. 
Ik wil mijn lieve neefjes yasin en elias bedanken. Door hen voel ik me telkens weer 
een trotse oom. Ik hou heel veel van jullie! Layla, nabila en fadoua. Het is eindeloos 
veel moeilijker dan het schrijven van een proefschrift om uit te drukken hoe dankbaar 
ik jullie –mijn parels van zusjes– ben, voor alle steun en liefde. Allerliefste Jihane. 
Promoveren was zwaar voor mij, maar misschien nog wel heel veel zwaarder voor jou. 
Ik was er weinig en als ik er was, was ik er maar een beetje. Ik ben je dankbaar dat je 
genoegen nam met een halve Hafez en ik ben je dankbaar voor jouw geduld en jouw 
steun. Ik ben dankbaar dat ik mijn leven met jou mag delen. Ik hou van jou met heel 
mijn hart.  
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